The United States has conducted 66 strikes in a naval campaign that, by Pentagon counts in the reporting, has reportedly killed an estimated 221 people — and yet, the flows of cocaine to the U.S. appear unchanged.
Operation Southern Spear: how it began and what it is
Last November, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth declared the start of Operation Southern Spear, a U.S. military campaign aimed at defeating “narco‑terrorists” in the Western Hemisphere. The declaration followed a brief period in which the Pentagon began bombing small boats alleged to be carrying drugs through the Caribbean Sea and Eastern Pacific Ocean; the operation began less than two months after those initial strikes. The White House has framed the effort as a new, hard‑edged posture in the region — even invoking a so‑called “Donroe Doctrine” and pointing to the boat strikes as a visible example of wielding U.S. power aggressively in the hemisphere.
What U.S. enforcement metrics show: seizures, prices, and administration claims
The Trump administration has touted results. In June, President Donald Trump boasted about a supposed 97 percent decline in sea‑bound drug trafficking. Yet United States government data tell a different story. According to U.S. Customs and Border Protection, more cocaine was seized by U.S. authorities in the eight months since the boat strikes started compared with the eight months preceding them. At the same time, cocaine prices have remained stable across that period — a sign, economists would say, of no meaningful supply shock. Taken together, those metrics indicate that the strikes have not reduced the quantity of drugs reaching the U.S.‑Mexico border.
Costs on the books and the broader resource trade-off
The campaign has also carried a measurable price tag. The Pentagon’s Special Inspector General reported approximately $527 million allocated for Operation Southern Spear between January and March 2026, the most recent figures available in the public reporting. Brown University has estimated cumulative costs closer to $5 billion if the buildup in U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) beginning in August 2025 is included. The piece notes this expenditure comes while other large military commitments are underway — the reporting cites an estimate that the war in Iran could reach $100 billion — and at a moment when the 2027 National Defense Authorization Act is stalled and some lawmakers are skeptical of large defense supplementals without offsets.
Diplomatic and legal repercussions: partners, intelligence cooperation, and lawsuits
Unilateral military strikes at sea have prompted pushback and friction with partners. The United Kingdom, Colombia and the Netherlands have eliminated certain lines of information sharing with the United States on counter‑narcotics to avoid potential liability for wrongful deaths, according to the reporting. There are also legal challenges at home: families of two people killed by American strikes are suing the U.S. government, alleging violations of U.S. law and international human rights law. Operationally, the strikes remove individuals who might otherwise provide intelligence on criminal networks — who they work for, who orders them, and where production is taking place — potentially degrading law enforcement investigations and future cooperation.
What this means for U.S. law enforcement, Latin American partners, and the Pentagon
- U.S. law enforcement and intelligence: Eliminating suspects at sea reduces opportunities to debrief, recruit informants, and map trafficking networks — actions the reporting warns could make investigations harder and remove sources of actionable human intelligence.
- Latin American partners and European intelligence partners: Nations that have curtailed sharing lines with Washington may be wary of cooperation that could expose them to legal risk or public criticism; the campaign’s tactics risk alienating partners who do not share Washington’s military‑first approach.
- The Pentagon and U.S. policymakers: The campaign is consuming manpower, munitions, and hundreds of millions if not billions of dollars at a time of stretched commitments. The reporting concludes that using the U.S. military in this manner departs from previous counternarcotics paradigms and raises questions about effectiveness versus cost and collateral consequence.
Conclusion
The record, as laid out in the reporting, is stark: 66 strikes, hundreds of deaths, and no detectable reduction in cocaine reaching U.S. borders by the government’s own seizure and price indicators. Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s rhetorical prescription — “What will stop them...is when you blow them up, when you get rid of them” — has been tested in the field, and the results described here show the approach failing to meet its principal objective. Daniel R. DePetris, the author and a fellow at Defense Priorities, argues that Operation Southern Spear should be cut short; the facts presented raise a clear question for policymakers and the public about whether the military model is an effective or sustainable means to address a trafficking problem driven by persistent demand and resilient market dynamics.
