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Quad Seeks Institutional Foundation to Endure Beyond Summit Diplomacy

Formal conference room with large wooden table, chairs, and blurred screens in a bright, neutral space.

The Quad had a bright start in 2025, receiving top billing on US Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s list of meetings following President Donald Trump’s inauguration.

Quad leaders’ summits and the ASEAN Summit

After that early visibility, the Quad’s public rhythm has been uneven. The source records an “extended period of radio silence” between the July 2025 Quad Foreign Ministers’ Meeting and the next ministers’ meeting in May 2026. Public momentum resumed with two more foreign ministers’ meetings in July and October 2026, and — as the source notes — “now the first leaders’ summit since September 2024 is occurring on the sidelines of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Summit this week, on 16 to 18 November.”

That choice to meet alongside the annual ASEAN Summit is highlighted in the source as both practical and symbolic: it uses ASEAN’s “neutrality and convening power,” reconnects to the Quad’s early incarnations — the first meetings took place at the ASEAN Summit in 2007 and 2017 — and signals a commitment to ASEAN centrality and shared interests in Southeast Asia.

Summit dependence during 2025–2026

The Quad’s rapid evolution from officials-level talks in 2017 to foreign ministers’ meetings in 2019 and leaders’ summits by 2021 has, according to the source, produced a structural weakness: “the Quad has become too dependent on summit diplomacy for its energy and direction.” High-level meetings are supported by officials-level working groups, but the source argues effectiveness has been left vulnerable to leader schedules and to “the perils of personality-driven politics.” The 2025–2026 pattern — a burst of activity followed by gaps and then a public re-energising — is offered as a recent example of that dynamic.

Fix 1: A fixed schedule of meetings

One straightforward institutional remedy the source recommends is confirmation of a fixed meeting schedule. Regularised consultations, the piece argues, would make the Quad “less dependent on the delivery of standalone leaders’ summits” and reduce the risk that political calendars or administrations’ inconsistencies interrupt cooperation. Embedding the leaders’ summit on the ASEAN sidelines is presented as the most meaningful way to implement that regularity while reinforcing ties to Southeast Asia.

Fix 2: Anchoring the Quad in a central vision or framework

The source also urges the Quad to “settle on a central vision, framework or agreement.” The precise vocabulary matters less than clarity about what the institution is and aspires to be. Anchoring the Quad to a set of principles, guidelines or interests would, the analysis holds, give “necessary ballast” as the Indo-Pacific security environment evolves — and curb an agenda that risks becoming “a mile wide and an inch deep.”

Such a framework would not make the Quad an alliance; the source explicitly says “The Quad is not an alliance.” Rather, a clear statement of purpose would shape priorities across the Quad’s practical activities — military exercises such as Malabar and Sea Dragon, economic-security work, maritime domain awareness, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief — and how the grouping presents itself regionally and globally.

Five Power Defence Arrangements: a strategic minilateral model

To illustrate what a non-treaty framework can look like, the source points to the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) between Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore and Britain. Established in 1971 without a treaty and instead based on a joint communique, the FPDA “built ministerial and chiefs of defence councils, a program of annual military exercises, coordinating committees and working groups.” Its agenda has evolved over 55 years while the communique has continued to guide core purpose and scope — a template the source suggests the Quad could adapt.

Drawing that parallel, the piece argues the Quad can preserve flexibility while creating institutional anchors: fixed meetings, a shared statement of principles, and a set of ongoing coordinating mechanisms to prevent episodic bursts of activity from defining its life.

Despite the “not insignificant challenges of managing an erratic and inconsistent Trump administration,” the source concludes the Quad “has delivered – and continues to deliver – on its commitments to provide practical support for Indo-Pacific countries” and can complement sub-regional groupings such as ASEAN and the Pacific Islands Forum. With a firmer institutional foundation — regularised meetings and a clarifying framework — the Quad could become “an enduring and impactful component of the regional strategic architecture.”

Read the original analysis