Since Washington switched diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing in 1979, there has been only one publicly documented direct conversation between a US president or president-elect and Taiwan’s sitting leader: Donald Trump’s December 2016 phone call, as president-elect, with then president Tsai Ing-wen.
The historical anomaly and the unofficial relationship
The post‑1979 arrangement has produced an unusually circumscribed practice of top‑level contact. There are no publicly documented face‑to‑face meetings and no other known phone calls between US presidents and Taiwan’s leaders in that period, a fact that underscores the unofficial nature of the United States’ relationship with Taiwan. That history is the context for the current discussion about a possible call between US President Donald Trump and Taiwan’s President Lai Ching‑te; importantly, no such call has been scheduled.
Trump’s framing: talk, arms, and Xi
What makes talk of a Trump–Lai call politically combustible is how the president has framed it. The suggestion that he might speak with Lai comes after a summit with Chinese President Xi Jinping in which Mr. Trump said Taiwan and arms sales were major topics of discussion. Mr. Trump has tied the possible call directly to a pending arms package reportedly worth up to US$14 billion (A$19 billion). That sequencing places any high‑level contact squarely inside a live negotiation over Taiwan’s security, rather than as a standalone act of reassurance.
Signalling: deterrence or tradability?
The core issue here is signalling. A disciplined, carefully staged call could reassure Taipei: the source argues President Lai would almost certainly use such a call to stress Taiwan’s commitment to the cross‑strait status quo and to argue that China, not Taiwan, is destabilising the region through coercion. In that best‑case framing, a direct presidential conversation could reinforce that US arms sales are about deterrence, not provocation, and that China does not have a veto over top‑level US–Taiwan communications.
But that optimistic outcome depends on preparation and purpose. The source warns that if the call is presented as part of broader dealmaking with Beijing — or if it is followed by delays, reshaping or downgrading of the arms package because of discussions with Mr. Xi — the symbolism of direct contact could be hollowed out. Rather than demonstrating resolve, such a sequence would convey that Taiwan’s security is a negotiable commodity.
Legal and policy touchstones: One‑China policy, Six Assurances, Taiwan Relations Act
Legally, the source notes, there is no obvious statutory bar to a US president speaking directly with Taiwan’s president: the United States’ One‑China policy does not prohibit high‑level communication. Washington has also expanded practical contact with Taiwan in recent years through congressional visits, senior official interactions, transit arrangements and updated State Department guidelines.
Yet other elements of established US policy constrain the political reading of such contact. The Six Assurances — principles outlined by Ronald Reagan — include the long‑standing US position that Washington did not agree to consult Beijing on arms sales to Taiwan. Under the Taiwan Relations Act, defensive arms are described not as a favour to Taipei or a bargaining chip with Beijing, but as part of the legal and strategic basis of US policy. That legal language heightens the reputational cost if arms sales begin to look improvised or transactional.
What this means for Taiwan, Washington, and Beijing
- Taiwan: President Lai would likely use a call to stress commitment to the cross‑strait status quo and to depict Beijing as the destabiliser. But Taipei would also risk having symbolic reassurance undermined if arms approvals are then altered following US–China talks.
- Washington: A carefully prepared presidential call could be used to reclaim top‑level channels of communication and to underline deterrence. Conversely, linking a call openly to dealmaking with Beijing risks portraying US arms sales as negotiable leverage.
- Beijing: The source argues Beijing would likely exploit any ambiguity, advancing a narrative that Taiwan is not an autonomous partner but a card Washington can play and ultimately trade in negotiations.
The narrow legal answer is straightforward: the president can speak to Taiwan’s president. The strategic question — and the one that will determine consequences — is whether such a conversation would be rooted in clear deterrent goals and explicit support for defensive arms sales, or whether it would arrive wrapped in the language of bargain and exchange. Right now, the source concludes, the risk is that the latter framing will predominate, making Taiwan look tradable rather than bolstering its security.
