"This is not a future problem. It is already visible," the article in The Strategist warns, arguing that ships concentrated in large logistics formations have become "big, close targets."
The last mile — perhaps 1,700 km or more
The piece reframes the familiar logistics problem of the "last mile" – traditionally the short, exposed run from ship to shore – as a far larger and continuously contested zone. Where the last mile once meant a brief dash under fire, the article says persistent surveillance, low-cost guided weapons and precision strike have expanded the risk envelope, making the last mile "a good deal longer now – perhaps 1,700 km or more." That expansion, the author contends, moves the threat well beyond the near shore and into the approaches that large supply ships must traverse.
Why small, low‑profile vessels change the targeting problem
Concentrating supplies in a few large vessels, the article argues, hands adversaries "high-value and increasingly easy targets." By contrast, many small, low-signature vessels — commercial craft, workboats and decommissioned ships repurposed for logistics — present a far harder task for an opponent. Operating in numbers and with adaptable routes and behaviour, such a distributed fleet would complicate surveillance and targeting, reduce the strategic value of any single loss and make attrition tolerable where crewless craft are used.
Hybrid crewing and "software‑defined autonomy" — retrofit in days, not years
The author sets out a spectrum: hybrid crewing (humans working alongside AI and autonomy), remotely controlled operations to keep crews out of the most dangerous phases, and eventual full autonomy for persistent, low-signature work in denied environments. The Strategist article states bluntly that "Software-defined autonomy enables existing vessels to be retrofitted and integrated in days, not years," and suggests that this approach allows rapid scaling and concurrent doctrine development rather than waiting for new shipbuilding to catch up.
To underline feasibility, the article notes the author's company is developing these systems and cites international activity: Ocean Infinity in the United States and Britain and Kongsberg in Norway are named as working on related maritime autonomous capabilities. The United States' Defense Innovation Unit is also referenced; in early March it issued a challenge for Autonomous Low-Profile Vessels to resupply widely dispersed units in contested littoral environments.
Australia's fleet choices: shipbuilding limits, vessels of opportunity, and the Maritime Autonomous Systems Unit
The article stresses that Australia faces a shipbuilding capacity constraint but has access to vessels. It recommends using "vessels of opportunity" — commercial craft, workboats and decommissioned naval ships — as a latent logistics network that can be rapidly adapted with autonomy software. Canberra's Defence is encouraged to test concepts quickly. Supporting this shift, the Royal Australian Navy has "formally stood up the Maritime Autonomous Systems Unit," the piece notes, and landing-craft program acceleration is cited as reflecting renewed focus on littoral manoeuvre and distributed sustainment.
How technologists, policymakers, and the Royal Australian Navy are implicated
- Technologists and security teams: The article points to a practical, phased pathway — hybrid, remote and full autonomy — and suggests rapid integration is possible by retrofitting existing vessels with autonomy software. It frames mine warfare, surveillance and logistics as near-term use cases already seeing autonomous deployment.
- Policymakers and regulators: Doctrine, force design and regulatory frameworks must evolve alongside technology, the author argues. Training, assurance and command structures require adaptation to manage hybrid and autonomous operations, and partnerships across the Indo-Pacific are presented as essential to scale capability.
- The Royal Australian Navy and Defence: The piece presents an operational imperative — extend recent investment in landing craft into autonomy-enabled logistics to close the gap between ship and shore — and highlights institutional steps already taken, notably the creation of the Maritime Autonomous Systems Unit.
The central prescription is concrete: move logistics away from a few large, exposed platforms and toward a distributed, software-enabled fleet that can be scaled quickly by converting vessels of opportunity. The article closes by urging a phased approach across hybrid, remote and autonomous operations and by stressing that this is not about replacing existing vessels but augmenting them to provide options and reduce risk. The next step, the author argues, is to extend landing‑craft thinking into autonomy‑enabled logistics, particularly in the gap between ship and shore.
