"China’s view of NATO has not changed for years," the article observes, laying out a sustained Beijing narrative that the alliance remains a Cold War relic and a latent threat to Asia.
How Beijing frames NATO: expansion, intervention, and the Russia buffer
The source describes Beijing’s steady reading of NATO as "a remnant of the Cold War" that should have been dissolved alongside the Warsaw Pact. In this framing NATO is not defensive but "an offensive" actor that threatens global stability through "successive eastward enlargements" and "out-of-area interventions." The 1999 accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade is cited by Beijing as a concrete illustration of NATO’s hostile footprint.
According to the article, China shares Moscow’s view that NATO’s eastward moves ignore Russian security concerns and thus create pressure that, in Beijing’s telling, makes Russia’s preemptive military actions — "such as in Ukraine" — acts of self-defense. The source also stresses that China interprets NATO’s inclusion of China on the alliance’s agenda (first in 2019 and then in the 2022 Strategic Concept) as evidence the alliance is preparing to expand into Asia or to form an "Asian NATO." In that reading, Russia functions as a buffer zone; without it, China believes NATO would already be present in Asia and posing a serious security threat.
Why many European allies resist elevating China inside NATO
- The article lists three main European concerns that have historically limited NATO’s focus on China. First, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine demonstrated that "Russia, not China, is an imminent security threat to the alliance."
- Second, NATO's mandate is geographically bounded by the Washington Treaty; Article 6 refers to the "North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer" as NATO’s area of activities, which constrains out-of-theatre expansion as a formal matter.
- Third, the piece stresses a divergence in threat perception: Europe tends to view China primarily as an economic challenge — risks like deindustrialization and job losses — rather than as an immediate hard-security adversary. The article credits European allies with ensuring NATO still describes China as a "challenge" rather than a "threat" in the Strategic Concept wording.
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End the scrambleOperational misunderstandings that feed the narrative
The source argues that NATO’s public explanations — that freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs) in the Indo-Pacific are national, not NATO, actions — do not persuade Beijing. China, the article states, "does not accept NATO’s explanation" and is quick to lump national FONOPs by the United States, France, Britain, Germany or others into a single NATO basket for political effect.
Even NATO’s limited, non-operational engagements — the article notes exchanges with the "Indo-Pacific Four" (IP4) and other Asian partners on issues such as cyber security — are insufficient to disabuse Chinese analysts who read NATO’s Strategic Concept as proof of expansionist intent. The author warns that discussing China within NATO risks validating those fears.
Alternatives proposed: the EU, IP4, ASEAN, G7 and bilateral channels
The source suggests multiple forums as better venues for Europe to address China. It highlights the European Union as "the best option" for European countries, noting the EU already discusses China in economic and hard-security terms and has taken concrete steps such as adding Chinese companies to EU sanction packages against Russia — "albeit in small numbers."
Other recommended formats include transatlantic talks, bilateral discussions, ASEAN cooperation, the G7 and multilateral engagements with the IP4. The argument is practical: using these venues avoids reinforcing Beijing’s negative perception of NATO and preserves scope for potential cooperation with China on issues where their interests intersect.
What this means for NATO, the European Union, and China
- NATO: The author argues that continuing to place China on NATO’s agenda would be counterproductive — it could "reinforce or validate" Beijing’s fears of expansion into Asia and divert attention from the alliance’s immediate concern, Russia.
- European Union: The EU is positioned as the principal forum for addressing both economic and hard-security dimensions of China’s role in Europe, and the piece notes the EU has already exercised sanctions authority against certain Chinese firms tied to Russia.
- China: Whether or not Beijing genuinely believes NATO seeks an Asian footprint, the article says it will use NATO references as a political tool — to justify support for Russia and to amplify negative feelings toward the West.
The article closes with a pointed prescription: rather than treating China as a NATO agenda item, the alliance should pursue "regular dialogue with Beijing" and emphasize that NATO's existence can benefit China by deterring Russia from initiating a war with NATO allies — a line the author frames as the clearest argument for calming Beijing's fears while keeping the alliance focused on its declared geographic and strategic priorities.
