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Geopolitics & DefenseNational Security

Former Pakistani Army Captain Commands BLA Insurgency

A lone figure walks through a sparse, desert-like landscape with rocky outcroppings under a vast, cloudy sky.

"the tactical doctrine and exceptionally heavy costs of Operation Herof 2" — that judgment, offered by the Pakistan Institute for Conflict Studies and Security (PICSS), helps explain why on November 14 Rahman Gul, also known by the nom de guerre Ustad Mureed, was named commander of the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA).

Rahman Gul’s background and what his appointment signals

Gul is an unusual figure in the leadership of an insurgent group: he served eight years in the Pakistan Army before leaving to join the Baloch insurgency, the Jamestown Foundation reported. He fought in Waziristan and on the Line of Control, and until his promotion he commanded the Majeed Brigade, the BLA’s suicide attack unit. His elevation follows a costly BLA operation earlier in 2026 and is widely interpreted inside Pakistani and analyst circles as a rebuke of the previous leader, Bashir Zeb.

Operational shift: from large offensives to small, mobile cells

Operation Herof 2 — a six-day offensive in January–February 2026 that produced heavy BLA losses — is the proximate cause cited by PICSS for the leadership change. Insiders quoted by PICSS say Gul favors abandoning large, inflexible formations in favor of small, mobile teams. He argues that large units attract conventional military concentration and increase BLA losses; his playbook prefers disciplined cadres, strategic patience, and the maintenance of a trained core able to execute targeted attacks over mass operations.

Security consequences for Pakistan and China

PICSS and other observers warn that Gul’s combination of Pakistan Army training, command discipline, and an institutional focus on suicide attacks could make the BLA more lethal in different ways than before. The BLA under Gul is described as unlikely to resume mass attacks of the Herof 2 type, but more capable of sustaining long-duration campaigns of small, hard-to-defeat cells. Violence in Balochistan rose sharply in 2026: the number of violence-related deaths between the second and third quarters of 2026 nearly tripled, with 829 deaths recorded in the third quarter.

China has been singled out in Gul’s public messaging and appears central to his strategic target set, according to PICSS. Between 2021 and 2024 at least 20 Chinese nationals — including employees of Beijing-funded projects — were killed in attacks in Pakistan. PICSS believes Gul masterminded multiple high-profile strikes, including a 2022 bomb that killed three Chinese lecturers at Karachi University and a 2023 attack that killed Chinese engineers on a highway project near Karachi. Those incidents have prompted Chinese pressure on Islamabad to secure Chinese personnel and projects; Pakistan established a new protection unit for Chinese nationals in early 2026.

Counterterror tools: designations, finance, and intelligence cooperation

Pakistan sought and secured external tools to constrain the BLA. In 2025 the United States designated both the BLA and the Majeed Brigade as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs); Pakistan then secured a joint naming of the BLA in the Pakistan–U.S. Counter Terrorism Dialogue. The source notes that the U.S. FTO designation permits interagency cooperation to trace and seize terrorist financing and suggests that a tighter information and enforcement net — including a possible Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) listing for Gul — could help Pakistan and partners counter BLA financing and media-driven recruitment.

How Pakistan, China, and the United States are responding

  • Pakistan: has sought external assistance, created a protection unit for Chinese nationals in early 2026, and welcomed U.S. counterterror cooperation including the FTO designation.
  • China: has pressured Pakistan to secure Chinese nationals and projects after multiple Chinese deaths in attacks and the 2022 Karachi airport incident prompted explicit demands for protection.
  • The United States: designated the BLA and the Majeed Brigade as FTOs in 2025 and joined Pakistan in publicly naming the BLA during counterterror talks—measures that open interagency tools to trace and seize financing and to coordinate intelligence and cyberspace efforts.

Funds, media, and closed intelligence channels are identified in the record as key pressure points: tracing and seizing terrorist financing, countering recruitment through joint media and cyberspace management, and tightened intelligence sharing with Islamabad are presented as immediate levers to constrain Gul and the BLA. The report also notes that shared investments in Balochistan — cited examples include the Reko Diq and Saindak mines — give China and the United States practical reasons to engage.

Yet the source concludes with a sober caveat: only an amicable political process that addresses Baloch rights and representation can pacify grievances and resolve the insurgency. Short of that, the war against terrorism in Balochistan is likely to continue for a long period.

Original story