"Sovereignty is not achieved through declarations. It is built deliberately with long-term commitment," write Elin Hammarberg and Carina Zaring, framing a steady policy pivot inside EU circles from efficiency to resilience.
The new vocabulary: from globalization to resilience and sovereignty
Across EU policy discussions, the authors say the language that long privileged efficiency and interconnected supply chains is being replaced by terms such as resilience, sovereignty, and strategic autonomy. Budgets are being redirected and industrial strategies rewritten in response. The goal is not a retreat from open markets or global partnerships, the authors note, but a guarantee that "critical capabilities can be sustained when those systems come under strain."
Critical physical infrastructure Europe must build
Hammarberg and Zaring make a clear distinction: software-led approaches and "vibecoding" speed prototyping, but defense and mission-critical systems require heavy-duty physical assets that cannot be replicated with low-code tools. They list the concrete facilities Europe needs: secure cleanrooms, advanced laboratories, testbeds, cyber validation environments, redundant manufacturing capacity, and communications infrastructure. These, they argue, are the backbone of both innovation and defense readiness — the assets needed to design, test, manufacture, deploy, and maintain systems that must function under pressure.
The authors give one concrete example of existing infrastructure: the Electrum Laboratory, a KTH Royal Institute of Technology research infrastructure that provides a fully equipped CMOS and III‑V semiconductor laboratory and is part of the Chips JU funded WBG Pilot line. They argue such shared assets must be scaled and made broadly accessible rather than duplicated in fragmented national efforts.
Regional innovation clusters: Kista, Stuttgart, Toulouse
Hammarberg and Zaring point to regional ecosystems as the operational heart of a resilient industrial base. Kista is described as evolving from a telecom and ICT hub into a dual-use innovation ecosystem where commercial capabilities — sensors, data infrastructure, and mobile communications — are increasingly applied to defense contexts. Stuttgart exemplifies tightly integrated industrial capabilities that enable precision manufacturing at scale. Toulouse anchors aerospace and defense capabilities across satellite systems, avionics, and mission‑critical infrastructure.
The authors recommend scaling these clusters through Triple Helix collaboration — academia, industry, and government — and argue EU and NATO member states must take a more active role in long-term co-investment. They cite programs such as the European Defence Fund and ESA‑led collaborations as examples where pooled funding has incentivized cross‑border coordination and reduced fragmented defense spending.
Funding, coordination, and the semiconductor talent gap
Money alone, the authors caution, is not sufficient. They say flagship initiatives like the European Chips Act and IRIS² ultimately depend on Europe’s ability to build end‑to‑end industrial capacity, not just on passing policy or allocating budgets. Current EU support instruments such as the European Innovation Council and the EU Defence Innovation Scheme exist, but Hammarberg and Zaring argue that fragmented funding, overlapping remits, administrative bottlenecks, and funding delays limit innovators' access to shared infrastructure.
Workforce resilience is another hinge point: the authors state that "Europe’s semiconductor talent gap is set to significantly widen over the next five years." To meet that challenge they call for academia and industry to jointly develop new talent pipelines and prioritize reskilling and upskilling, while channeling funding through coordinated programs that prioritize shared infrastructure over isolated national projects.
What this means for EU and NATO member states, academia and industry, and innovators
- EU and NATO member states: must shift from short‑term, siloed investments toward long‑term co‑investment models that align defense and industrial funding and make R&D infrastructure accessible across borders, the authors argue.
- Academia and industry: are urged to deepen Triple Helix collaboration to create shared testing, validation, and specialized equipment capacity and to jointly build talent pipelines for semiconductor and critical-technology sectors.
- Innovators and regional hubs (Kista, Stuttgart, Toulouse): should focus on scaling dual‑use capabilities and connecting clusters into a networked ecosystem to support knowledge sharing, supply‑chain integration, and faster deployment.
Hammarberg and Zaring's central insistence is straightforward: resilience in Europe’s defense, space, and critical technology systems "cannot be vibecoded." It must be constructed — with steel, silicon, long-term funding models, shared facilities, and workforce planning — and coordinated across national borders. The authors leave one clear policy test: whether existing European programs can be scaled and integrated to deliver shared, accessible infrastructure, or whether continued fragmentation will undercut the very sovereignty those programs proclaim to pursue.
