China Coast Guard, now the world’s largest, plays a central role in projecting presence while maintaining a law-enforcement narrative.
China’s layered toolkit: navy, coast guard, militia, and research ships
Beijing’s expansion beyond the first island chain rests on a deliberate mix of instruments. Over two decades, the Chinese navy has evolved into a force capable of sustained blue‑water operations, underpinning regular deployments into the Indian Ocean for counter‑piracy missions and long‑range task group operations. But naval power is only one element. The analysis argues that the China Coast Guard “plays a central role in projecting presence while maintaining a law‑enforcement narrative.” Maritime militia vessels, research ships and survey ships also operate in ways that blur the line between civilian and military activity, extending reach without obvious escalation.
Southwest Pacific: access through cooperation, infrastructure and regularised presence
ASPI’s wargame findings foresee intensified engagement in the Southwest Pacific over the next five years. Beijing will likely build access and influence through a steady mix of security cooperation, infrastructure development and a more regularised presence. Port visits, training programs and maritime enforcement cooperation will be framed as pragmatic responses to local needs — disaster relief, fisheries protection and capacity building. Collectively, these routine activities are designed to create conditions for more consistent access, including storing supplies and rotational deployments so that “one ship or another will always be present.”
Australia’s maritime approaches: mapping, signals and lawful pressure
In waters to Australia’s north and west, the emphasis is described as operational familiarity and signalling rather than establishing formal bases. Naval flotillas, intelligence collection vessels and survey ships are expected to operate with increasing frequency to map seabed infrastructure, monitor communications routes and test Australian and allied responses. ASPI notes that such operations can be conducted “within the bounds of international law,” allowing Beijing to apply pressure while avoiding actions that cross clear red lines.
Indian Ocean: protecting sea lines of communication and building logistics networks
Across the Indian Ocean, China’s stated priority is protecting sea lines of communication, especially oil and gas routes from the Middle East. The shift highlighted in the source is not a single dramatic move but a gradual increase in scale and permanence: a network of port access arrangements, logistics hubs and strategic partnerships “gradually emerging, from Djibouti to Pakistan and potentially beyond.” Facilities presented as commercial or dual‑use lay the groundwork for sustained naval operations and, over time, a more enduring military footprint.
What this means for Australia, Pacific Island states, and the United States and its allies
- Australia: will face more frequent Chinese naval and maritime activity in its northern and western approaches, where survey ships and task groups can both collect intelligence and signal intent while staying within international law.
- Pacific Island states: should expect increased offers of security cooperation and infrastructure development framed as aid, disaster relief or fisheries protection; these engagements can evolve into routines that enable logistics support and storage for rotating Chinese vessels.
- The United States and its allies: will confront a pattern of persistent, incremental activity designed to avoid triggering a unified or forceful response; ASPI’s assessment stresses Beijing’s incentive “to avoid actions that would trigger a unified or forceful response,” choosing ambiguity and legal framing to manage escalation risk.
The throughline is clear: Chinese activity beyond the first island chain is unlikely to produce dramatic, headline‑grabbing events. Instead, the strategic effort emphasises persistence, normalisation and cumulative advantage — a grey‑zone competition that reshapes regional environments by degrees. ASPI’s March war gaming modelled two pathways to 2036 — steady growth and accelerated expansion in response to opportunity or crisis — and judged that, by 2031, activity across the Southwest Pacific, the Indian Ocean and Australia’s approaches is likely to intensify along the lines described above. The next instalments promised by ASPI will unpack how those patterns might become normalised by 2036 and map likely actions and regional responses out to 2036 on the Pressure Points platform.
