London pledged to spend the equivalent of 2.5 percent of the UK’s gross domestic product on defense by 2027 and 3.5 percent by 2035 — a commitment whose pathway has become the central battleground of the next British government.
Andy Burnham’s mandate after the Makerfield by-election
Andy Burnham arrived in Parliament as the winner of a special by-election in Makerfield, northwest England, where he outperformed pre-election polling and won by over 20 points versus predictions that put him 3–12 points ahead of his nearest rival. Makerfield is described in the reporting as a political bellwether for Labour’s challenge from the new right-wing Reform Party. With that strong result and reported popularity within the Labour Party, Burnham is positioned as the likely successor to a departing prime minister and therefore the likely next prime minister, with the next general election required by August 2029.
Defense spending, fiscal rules, and John Healey’s resignation
The defence spending pledges lie at the heart of the current political rupture. The government’s publicly stated targets — 2.5 percent of GDP by 2027 and 3.5 percent by 2035 — were not matched by an agreed pathway to get there, a gap that contributed to the resignation earlier this month of Defence Secretary John Healey. Starmer’s Chancellor, Rachel Reeves, had imposed strict fiscal rules to control spending and reduce debt, and the clash over how to reconcile those rules with the defence commitments has become a defining fiscal and political tension.
Reporting indicates Burnham will likely feel pressured to borrow beyond those fiscal rules to facilitate greater defense spending, “in a manner not dissimilar to what Germany has done.” How closely Burnham’s choice of chancellor and defence secretary align on that approach will be a major determinant of whether the UK meets its defense spending ambitions.
Strategic Defence Review, the delayed Defence Investment Plan, and procurement timing
Keir Starmer’s government commissioned an externally-led Strategic Defense Review that was published in June 2025. The government accepted all 62 recommendations, including the purchase of thousands of new missiles, investment in additional submarines, and enlargement of the army. One of the review’s authors, Lord George Robertson, later criticized the government for failing to follow through on those commitments.
That lack of follow-through is at the centre of the dispute over the Defence Investment Plan (DIP). The current government has insisted it plans to publish the DIP before the NATO Summit — a date that falls two weeks before the earliest Burnham could enter Downing Street — while Burnham is understood to want to delay publication into the Autumn so his incoming team can set course on the consequential early policy decision. Separately, Burnham favors a 10-year time horizon for procurement and investment, a tempo that appeals to defence suppliers seeking long-term commitments to expand production lines.
Industrial strategy, multinational operations, and the Ukraine commitment
Burnham frames increased defense spending as part of a broader industrial strategy: leveraging defence investment to strengthen growth, rebuild local economies, and expand worker skills over the long run. The reporting characterises this as an attempt at reindustrialization that connects “guns and butter” without necessarily reducing social expenditure — instead, Burnham has suggested moving more people into work and off welfare to free funds for defence.
On the use of force, Burnham is described as likely to continue the Labour tradition of favouring multinationality and international law as keys to legitimacy for overseas military operations. The reporting also expects strong UK support for Ukraine to continue in partnership with European allies.
Brexit, EU rejoining, and the strategic lever for European defence collaboration
Exactly 10 years ago this week, voters in the UK opted to leave the EU; the reporting says polling data indicates Britons are increasingly regretful of that decision and view it as an impediment to a stronger economy and a safer Britain. The article argues rejoining the EU would likely have significant, positive effects on British GDP and, by extension, on the defence budget, and would open more avenues for defence industrial collaboration, greater access to EU procurement financing, and influence over European defense‑industrial policy.
As a by-election candidate Burnham avoided making Brexit a central issue and distanced himself from fellow Labour figure Wes Streeting’s call to rejoin the EU. Nonetheless, the reporting states it is clear Burnham favors rejoining and that, if domestic political space permits, he could seek to normalise discussion of the UK once again joining the EU — a move that would dramatically reshape the country’s European security relationship.
What this means for defence contractors, the chancellor, and European allies
- Defence contractors: Burnham’s stated 10-year procurement horizon and emphasis on using defence spending as an industrial lever suggest the prospect of longer-term contracts and investment commitments that would expand production lines and workforce development.
- The chancellor (and prospective cabinet): The choice between maintaining strict fiscal rules and borrowing to meet defence targets is framed as one of the central political decisions ahead. Alignment between the chancellor and the defence secretary on that choice will shape whether pledged spending becomes funded programmes.
- European allies and Ukraine: Expect continuity on multinational operations and strong UK support for Ukraine; if rejoining the EU becomes politically feasible, the reporting suggests it would deepen defence-industrial collaboration and access to EU procurement financing.
Burnham’s immediate leverage rests on three concrete choices: whether to loosen fiscal constraints to fund the Strategic Defence Review’s promises; whether to delay and then reshape the Defence Investment Plan; and whether to nudge the Brexit question back onto the agenda. Together those decisions will determine if the broad commitments accepted in 2025 translate into funded programs, reindustrialisation opportunities, and a re‑configured European defence posture.
