Australia risks losing ground not on the battlefield but in how crises are seen and understood by its own people: adversaries are “shaping what people notice and take to be real,” and that shift could erode public trust, slow decision-making and turn domestic audiences into a vulnerability during regional crises.
Perception and cognition as a distinct strategic domain
Traditional defence thinking, the source argues, has long been built on persuasion — diplomacy and alliances — and coercion — the use of force. Now there is a third major element: shaping perception. Through information environments, algorithmic curation and emotional amplification, actors aim to set the conditions under which political and strategic decisions are made. The objective is not merely to persuade but to influence what is noticed and accepted as real.
Russia-linked networks, Chinese campaigns and extremist ecosystems
The change is visible in recent practice. Russia-linked influence networks, Chinese state information campaigns and extremist online ecosystems tied to conspiracy movements are named as current conduits for that work. Their methods include viral imagery, emotionally charged content and coordinated amplification to shape public interpretation of events. The report warns that advances in artificial intelligence are accelerating this trend by enabling the rapid generation and spread of content at unprecedented scale and speed.
Three specific strategic risks for Australia
The source lays out three concentrated risks. First, a strategic asymmetry: actors that prioritise information operations and online influence can distort public interpretation of crises without crossing traditional thresholds of conflict, undermining trust in institutions and generating confusion at critical moments. Second, an institutional tempo mismatch: cognitive operations unfold in real time, exploiting speed and ambiguity, while Australia’s policy emphasis remains on long-term, decades-ahead decisions about conventional capabilities and major-equipment acquisition. Third, a domestic vulnerability: modern conflict blurs external and internal security, and foreign information operations could exploit social divisions, intensify confusion or panic, and erode confidence in institutions and official channels during a regional crisis.
2026 National Defence Strategy, Defence posture, and identified gaps
The 2026 National Defence Strategy and related planning documents are acknowledged for referencing the information domain, influence operations and national resilience. The Australian Defence Force already operates across cyber, information and strategic communication domains. Nonetheless, the source cautions that these functions are still often treated as supporting or adjunct capabilities rather than as core organising principles of strategy. The director general of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, Mike Burgess, is cited as warning that foreign interference and online influence increasingly seek to exploit social division and weaken Australia’s resilience during periods of heightened tension or crisis.
What this means for Defence, Educators, and Media organisations
- Defence: Move beyond treating information capabilities as ancillary — the source recommends integrating information warfare and mass-disinformation scenarios into military exercises, monitoring coordinated influence campaigns during regional crises, and strengthening rapid public communication capabilities.
- Educators: Invest in national media literacy. The source points to a civilian-led approach supported by government, educators, media organisations and technology platforms, similar to Finland’s nationally coordinated model for resilience against disinformation.
- Media organisations and technology platforms: Prepare for pre-planned communication and information-sharing arrangements. The source urges clearer public guidance around manipulated media and coordinated disinformation during geopolitical crises, together with cooperation across government, platforms and newsrooms.
The practical prescriptions the source lists are concrete: treat the information environment as core infrastructure alongside energy and communications; develop coordinated public communication and media literacy initiatives for geopolitical crises; incorporate information-warfare scenarios into exercises; monitor and track coordinated influence campaigns; strengthen rapid public communications; and establish pre-planned information-sharing arrangements between Defence, intelligence agencies, technology platforms and media organisations during regional crises.
In sum, the argument is clear and unambiguous: Australia’s 2026 National Defence Strategy marks progress, but adaptation must go beyond capability spreadsheets and platforms. Modern conflict increasingly involves shaping how crises are interpreted and responded to. If Canberra allows informational disruption, confusion and mistrust to outpace planning and public preparedness, Australia’s most consequential vulnerability in a future crisis may be perceptual rather than purely material.
Source: Australia is not prepared for the war over perception — The Strategist
