"There is no threat that looms larger than the People’s Republic of China," Lt. Gen. Stephen Sklenka told attendees at the 2026 Modern Day Marine Expo in Washington, D.C.
Who said this and why it matters
Lt. Gen. Stephen Sklenka, the U.S. Marine Corps Deputy Commandant for Installations and Logistics and a former Deputy Commander of U.S. INDOPACOM, framed his remarks as a strategic wake-up call. Speaking as the service’s lead strategist at the expo, Sklenka rejected the notion that China is merely a "near peer" and instead called it a full peer that "rivals us in nearly every single measure of national influence." He linked that assessment directly to Chinese political intent, asserting that General Secretary Xi wants to "upend the international structure [and] supplant us as the global leaders."
China's build-up as described by Sklenka
Sklenka catalogued specific trends he said underpin China’s growing capability: an industrial base that "has been out-producing us" across ships, steel, minerals, satellites and munitions; a reported shipbuilding capacity "230 times the capacity that the United States has"; accelerated construction of nuclear-powered submarines; a rapid expansion of ballistic and cruise missile inventories; and "the fastest growing" nuclear stockpile in the world. He added that China's military modernization includes the use of artificial intelligence, drone swarms and what he called "intelligentized warfare tactics" intended to dominate the Pacific and, in his view, extend beyond it.
Lessons from Epic Fury and attacks originating from Iran
Sklenka used the U.S. campaign against Iran, which he identified as Epic Fury and said was roughly two months into combat operations, to illustrate vulnerabilities. He noted U.S. forces have suffered wounded and killed, and that Iran launched "hundreds of drones and ballistic missiles at our bases and our allies throughout the region – Israel, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, Jordan." He also cited economic effects such as the "ongoing closure of the Strait of Hormuz."
The article includes references to satellite imagery and a social media post showing damage at bases including Al-Kharj in Saudi Arabia, Harir Air Base in Iraq, and Ali al-Salem in Kuwait, and mentions physical damage to aircraft such as a KC-135 Stratotanker that was shown with shrapnel after an Iranian attack on Prince Sultan Air Base.
Installations as warfighting platforms, not sanctuaries
Sklenka warned that U.S. bases are no longer "administrative garrison sanctuaries" and must be reframed as warfighting formations on par with divisions, wings and Marine Expeditionary Units. He emphasized the need to harden and defend installations against both kinetic and non-kinetic effects, saying non-kinetic attacks — cyber against power grids, disinformation campaigns targeting military families, and drone swarms — could be "just as debilitating and just as strategically consequential" as missile strikes. He called for resilient power, hardened infrastructure, a "hard network," and counter-UAS capabilities, urging industry help to deliver those solutions.
How technologists, installation leaders, and policymakers are implicated
- Technologists and security teams: Sklenka’s remarks place a premium on counter-UAS systems, resilient communications that can survive when networks are cut, and hardened power systems. He argued for moving from discussion to delivery on those capabilities.
- Installation commanders and industry partners: The call to treat bases as "warfighting platforms" demands integrated base defense and physical hardening, and Sklenka explicitly urged industry collaboration to develop and field those solutions.
- Policymakers and procurement leaders: Sklenka’s framing — that China is a peer contesting every domain and that nations with robust industrial bases enjoy strategic advantages — foregrounds choices about investment in magazine depth, munitions production, hardened infrastructure and acquisition priorities tied to sustaining forces in conflict.
Sklenka framed his arguments as lessons drawn from current and recent conflicts — Epic Fury with Iran, Ukraine’s Operation Spider Web against Russian air bases, and an Israeli operation that struck Iranian air defenses — and argued those episodes show how mid-tier powers and irregular methods can hold superior forces at risk. He concluded that the society best able to project and sustain power ultimately prevails, and that the United States must transform its approach accordingly.
Sklenka’s warnings leave a clear policy pivot on the table: if bases must be defended as front-line terrain and China already contests multiple domains, then delivery of counter-UAS systems, resilient power and hard networks — and the industrial capacity to sustain munitions and platforms — will be the measures by which preparedness is judged.
