"The threats we face have changed dramatically, with suspicious Russian activity around critical undersea infrastructure, yet some of the laws protecting these vital connections date back more than a century," said telecoms minister Ian Murray.
What's changing: penalties, duties and ministerial powers
Whitehall has published plans to overhaul laws dating back to the Submarine Telegraph Act 1885 and to impose far tougher penalties for damaging subsea cables and pipelines. Under the proposals, intentionally damaging critical subsea energy or telecoms infrastructure could attract up to 14 years in prison. Reckless or negligent damage would face tougher penalties, including unlimited fines, replacing the Act’s original maximum fine of £100 for culpable negligence.
The White Paper also proposes new legal duties for subsea telecoms operators to identify and manage security risks. Ministers would gain powers to direct companies and cable-repair providers to take action where necessary and proportionate to protect national security, and the government wants to regulate fiber‑optic sensing technology that uses subsea cables to detect activity at sea.
Why ministers cite Russia and an April operation
Whitehall’s framing of the changes explicitly references "suspicious Russian activity" around undersea infrastructure. In April, British forces exposed what the government described as a covert Russian submarine operation near critical undersea infrastructure: an attack submarine reportedly acted as a decoy while two specialist vessels surveyed Britain's cable routes. That episode is invoked in the White Paper as evidence the threat environment has changed since the telegraph era.
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End the scrambleThe limits of existing law and enforcement challenges
The government’s review notes the mismatch between modern dependence on subsea networks and the Victorian-era legal framework that still governs much of their protection. Subsea cables carry around 99 percent of the UK’s international data traffic, and underwater pipelines account for 74 percent of its gas supply, according to Whitehall.
But the White Paper also acknowledges practical constraints: fishing boats and ships dragging anchors are estimated to cause up to 97 percent of faults, and proving state-backed sabotage is difficult when the crime scene is the seabed. Britain already has laws that allow life sentences for serious acts of state-backed sabotage, yet those provisions are of limited use if investigators cannot attribute an attack, and extraditing suspects from hostile states presents another hurdle.
Fiber‑optic sensing: a security trade-off
Among the regulatory measures the government proposes is control of fiber‑optic sensing technology. These systems repurpose subsea fiber to detect activity at sea — a capability that can enhance maritime awareness but, the White Paper warns, could also pose risks "if sensitive data falls into hostile hands." The proposal is to regulate that technology to manage the security implications of both its defensive uses and its potential for exploitation.
What this means for subsea telecoms operators, the military, and the public
- Subsea telecoms operators: They would face new statutory duties to identify and manage security risks, and could be directed by ministers to take specific actions to protect national security. They will need to prepare for regulatory obligations and possible government instructions on repair prioritisation and operational practices.
- The military and defence planners: The government’s account links changes to recent naval intelligence and operations, including the April incident. Defence actors are implicitly central to the rationale for granting ministers powers to direct civilian operators in certain circumstances.
- The public and energy consumers: The proposals reflect the strategic importance of subsea assets for communications and gas supply — the White Paper cites 99 percent of international data and 74 percent of gas delivery via undersea routes — and aims to reduce national vulnerability to both accidental and deliberate outages.
12‑week consultation and the road to any new law
None of the measures are yet law. The government has opened a 12‑week consultation on the plans; ministers will decide how to proceed after that period. The White Paper follows a May announcement that signalled the government’s intent to toughen penalties and introduce security obligations for cable operators, and it echoes concerns raised last year by Parliament's Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, which warned Britain was insufficiently prepared for a coordinated attack on subsea infrastructure.
Whether stiffer criminal penalties will deter the actors highlighted in the White Paper — or help in attribution and prosecution when incidents occur hundreds of metres below the surface — remains an open question embedded in the consultation itself.
