"Trigram is a large-scale campaign that impersonates about 50 brands in the blockchain and AI sectors, to trick developers into executing an infostealer themselves," Stormshield said in a deep-dive technical report published Monday.
What Stormshield found: an industrialized, multi-vector operation
Stormshield traces Trigram to a coordinated toolset that combines three social engineering scenarios (recruitment, conference, and package tracking), a software supply-chain compromise, and trojanized code repositories — all converging on a single infrastructure and a common payload. The company says the operation targets developers across artificial intelligence, blockchain, and logistics sectors in Europe and the United States, and reuses abused, legitimate services such as GitHub, GitLab, Brevo, Resend, Mailgun, Smartlead, and FullStory to host code, configuration, emails, and visitor session recording.
Recruitment lures and the clipboard trap
The campaign's "recruitment" flow is unusually involved. Targets receive emails advertising job opportunities that lead to a faux recruitment platform. The site fingerprints visitors, uses IP-based geofencing (Stormshield notes it may block access from China), and requires a referral or invitation code. If the code is accepted, the site displays a terminal-style technical check that asks the user to copy-and-run a command.
Stormshield describes a two-stage verification trick: an initial innocuous interaction, followed by a modified "Copy" button or even clipboard injection that places a malicious command directly into the victim's clipboard. The command executed depends on the operating system: on Windows it launches PowerShell to download and run "v.cmd"; on Linux it runs bash to download and run a file named "u"; on macOS it runs bash to retrieve and run "verify_m". Those loader scripts then fetch a JavaScript payload named install_guard.js, which deploys an infostealer to harvest metadata, browser credentials, cryptocurrency wallets, and sensitive files.

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End the scrambleSupply-chain tactics and Overlord RAT delivery
Trigram also uses supply-chain and repository maneuvers. Jamf, SafeDep, Proofpoint, and Genians previously documented related activity; Stormshield aggregates those findings and adds new detail. An October 2026 forged commit in the antd-img-crop GitHub repository installed malware via a prebuild hook ("prebuild.js") that runs when a developer executes "npm run build"; the npm package itself was not modified. The JavaScript payload in that chain downloads a fake installer, attempts to install or configure Node.js, retrieves an encrypted in-memory next-stage, and locates command-and-control servers via a GitLab dead drop.
On macOS and Linux the operation can lead to deployment of Overlord, an open-source remote access trojan framework. Jamf documented a macOS campaign using a fake Zoom installer to deploy Overlord and observed shared LaunchAgent labels (com.zoom) and plist names (com.zoom.plist) with FlexibleFerret, a DPRK-attributed macOS family tied to the Contagious Interview cluster. SafeDep reported that the malware steals browser passwords, cookies, keychains, cryptocurrency wallets, SSH keys and .env files on macOS, Linux and Windows, and installs a remote-access agent disguised as Google software. On macOS and Linux it also shows a fake dialog prompting for the system password under the guise of "apply system updates and verify drivers and security settings."
Infrastructure, tracking, and attribution signals
Stormshield links the campaign to a back office and victim-tracking platform called "rms-platform," hosted on 170.205.30[.]27:8000. The platform records user actions, monitors bot visitors and removed lookalike domains, and rates real visitors as "important," "moderate," or "useless." API analysis shows capabilities to scrape GitHub profiles, send phishing emails, manage decoys and access codes, export stolen data, and monitor cryptocurrency wallets.
Several technical indicators recur across Trigram, UNK_DeadDrop, and Kimsuky-related clusters: the super-administrator email eros1030109@gmail[.]com; a Medium account 0xapp123 listing that email; the username silviattech1129_db_user appearing in a MongoDB and GitLab dead-drop history; a GitHub backup repo alexlopez-g/rms-platform and a commit signed with harper.danie95@gmail[.]com; the domain asteara[.]org; and a Telegram account pichi_finance_hr used to impersonate HR at a DeFi platform. Stormshield concludes with "high confidence" that Trigram represents a continuation of the UNK_DeadDrop cluster while showing an evolution in delivery tactics.
What this means for developers, open-source maintainers, and security teams
- Developers: be wary of copy-paste terminal checks and unexpected clipboard behavior; Stormshield documents cases where a verification page injects malicious commands into the clipboard and then the system runs OS-specific loaders (v.cmd, u, verify_m).
- Open-source maintainers: monitor repository commits and build hooks carefully — the antd-img-crop incident used a prebuild hook ("prebuild.js") to trigger malware even though the npm package itself was not altered.
- Security teams: watch for indicators tied to rms-platform and the back-office IP 170.205.30[.]27:8000, monitor for unusual Node.js installations (the campaign attempts to install Node.js 20.18.1 when a compatible version is absent), and track dead-drop activity on GitLab and other abused services named in the report.
Stormshield's synthesis weaves previously separate disclosures into a single portrait: Trigram automates targeting from GitHub discovery through large-scale phishing, manages campaigns via a dedicated back office, and retrieves final payloads remotely rather than embedding them in trojanized repositories. The result, Stormshield warns, is an adaptable system that both shortlists high-value developer targets and launders proceeds through monitored cryptocurrency wallets — a technical architecture that bridges supply-chain trickery, social engineering, and persistent remote access.
https://thehackernews.com/2026/11/trigram-campaign-impersonates-about-50.html




