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Phishing Kits Target Microsoft 365 Sessions With Advanced Token Theft Tactics

Laptop screen on a desk in an office setting with a blurred, empty login interface.

In early 2026, Huntress discovered EvilTokens as part of a device code phishing campaign that abused the Railway Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS) platform as a token-harvesting and replay engine.

How attackers convert a phishing lure into a live Microsoft 365 session

Huntress researchers lay out a clear tradecraft shift: phishing is moving from stealing passwords to stealing session tokens. Three principal techniques make that possible.

  • Device code phishing: the victim authenticates directly with the identity provider while the attacker quietly captures the resulting authorization and uses it — the victim never types credentials into an unfamiliar page, so the flow looks normal to them.
  • Adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM): the attacker relays authentication flows in real time, either via a fake login page or by intercepting an exchange inside the legitimate app; the victim completes MFA while the attacker captures session information.
  • Token theft and replay: after an attacker obtains a sign-in token, phishing kits such as Kali365 can replay it into an active session, giving access to cloud resources and email without needing the original password.

“These techniques don’t live in isolation,” Huntress researchers warn — attackers combine flows so successful MFA completion does not, by itself, make a session trustworthy.

EvilTokens, Knight Office, and Kali365 — the kits Huntress analyzed

Huntress analyzed three modern phishing kits that specifically target Microsoft 365 sessions.

  • EvilTokens: discovered in early 2026, used device code phishing and leveraged Railway PaaS as a token-harvesting and replay engine. A later joint effort between Microsoft’s Digital Crimes Unit and the FBI led to the arrest of one of its alleged operators.
  • Knight Office: described by Huntress as an AiTM kit that steals valid Microsoft 365 session tokens, feeds them into an operator console, and enables session replay and persistence across tenant accounts.
  • Kali365: packaged as a full Phishing as a Service (PhaaS) control panel that captures tokens through device code flows and reverse-proxy lures, replays them into live Microsoft 365 sessions, maintains access, and scales activity with built-in AI features.

Huntress emphasizes that these kits do more than harvest credentials — they are designed to give attackers persistent access, not just usernames and passwords.

Where defenders should look: signs of a stolen session

Huntress recommends that detection begins by following the entire sequence from lure to mailbox activity. Key signals to hunt for include:

  • Successful sign-ins originating from unfamiliar cloud infrastructure.
  • Evidence of device code authentication and automated token refresh activity.
  • New devices, new authentication methods, and unusual mailbox behavior such as forwarding rules or unexpected outbound messages.

Because token replay substitutes for credentials, Huntress notes, investigators should look past the original phishing page to how the token was subsequently used.

Containment and remediation priorities Huntress prescribes

When responding, the Huntress guidance is procedural and identity-focused:

  • Containment must address identity artifacts, not only the phishing lure domain.
  • Revoke refresh tokens immediately, and remove unauthorized devices and Windows Hello credentials.
  • Restrict or block device code authentication where possible, and investigate mailbox access, forwarding rules, and outbound phishing activity.
  • After containment, continue monitoring for replay or re-entry and continue hunting even after the original phishing domain disappears.

What security teams, law enforcement, and end users should watch now

  • Security teams and defenders: prioritize hunting for token-based indicators (device code flows, refresh behavior, unfamiliar cloud-origin sign-ins) and ensure containment procedures explicitly revoke identity artifacts as Huntress prescribes.
  • Law enforcement and platform security teams: the EvilTokens case shows the operational value of joint action — Huntress cites a joint effort between Microsoft’s Digital Crimes Unit and the FBI that resulted in an arrest tied to the campaign.
  • End users and IT administrators: recognize that completing MFA is not a guaranteed safeguard if a session token is captured or relayed; investigate new devices and mailbox rules following any suspected phishing lure.

Phishing kits have graduated from simple fake login pages to full-service toolsets with dashboards, real-time relays, and token-replay capabilities. Huntress’s analysis of EvilTokens, Knight Office, and Kali365 underscores a simple operational fact: once an attacker holds a valid session token, they can walk into an active Microsoft 365 session where login and MFA are already complete. Defenders must therefore treat token theft as a distinct threat — detect the replay, revoke the artifacts, and hunt for persistence long after the lure disappears.

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