"There would be a ‘very serious restructuring’ of the Philippines’ relations with China and the need to ‘redraw’ Manila’s international relationships," President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. said in a Bloomberg interview in late March. That blunt formulation captures a central tension of Manila’s 2026 foreign policy: a publicly firm stance on sovereignty in the West Philippine Sea, paired with selective engagement that preserves economic and diplomatic space with Beijing while sustaining a deep security relationship with Washington.
Public opinion and influence: surveys that matter
Recent public-opinion and influence surveys reinforce the idea that the Philippines remains more closely aligned with the United States than its Southeast Asian peers. The ISEAS‑Yusof Ishak Institute’s State of Southeast Asia survey found Philippine respondents chose the U.S. over China by 77 percent to 23 percent when forced to pick between the two powers. Complementing that finding, the Lowy Institute’s Southeast Asia Influence Index 2025 ranked the U.S. higher than China for the Philippines — alongside Singapore and Timor‑Leste — across economic relationships, defense networks, cultural influence, diplomatic relationships, and regional engagement. Yet those metrics coexist with deliberate hedging in Manila’s policy choices.
Diplomacy with Beijing: Quanzhou meetings and a visa‑free pilot
After Marcos’ Bloomberg remarks, Manila and Beijing resumed high‑level consultations: the 24th Foreign Ministry Consultations and the 11th Meeting of the Bilateral Consultation Mechanism on the South China Sea met from March 27–28 in Quanzhou, Fujian Province. The talks yielded practical confidence‑building measures — coast guard communications, ocean meteorology cooperation, and initial exchanges on potential oil and gas collaboration.
Domestically oriented steps accompanied those talks. In January, the Philippines announced a 14‑day visa‑free entry arrangement for Chinese nationals as a one‑year pilot, a directive meant to facilitate trade, investment, tourism, and people‑to‑people exchanges. The move signals Manila’s intent to separate security disputes from economic and diplomatic channels where possible, an approach the source describes as central to its hedging strategy.
Energy emergency: a practical driver of engagement
The context for Manila’s recalibration is not abstract. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz triggered a global oil supply disruption and, in late March, the Philippines became the first country in the world to officially declare a state of national energy emergency. In his Bloomberg interview, Marcos pointed to that disruption as a potential catalyst for exploring joint oil and gas development with China in the South China Sea. The energy shock provides a concrete, near‑term rationale for pragmatic cooperation that sits alongside Manila’s insistence on its maritime claims under UNCLOS and the 2016 arbitral ruling.
Security ties with Washington: Balikatan 2026 and Pax Silica
Manila’s hedging does not equate to abandoning the U.S. alliance. The Philippines‑U.S. alliance, the source notes, "remains at a high point since 2016." The countries concluded Balikatan 2026 — the largest iteration of the annual exercises to date — involving 17,000 troops and representatives from five other partner nations. Shortly before those exercises, the United States announced the launch of a 4,000‑Acre Economic Security Zone to be established in Luzon under the Pax Silica initiative. Those developments illustrate how Manila is simultaneously deepening defense cooperation even while pursuing other diplomatic channels.
How Manila, Washington, and Beijing are positioned
- Manila (the Philippines government): Balances a robust defense partnership with the U.S. and a public, legalistic defense of maritime sovereignty with tactical engagement on economic and technical issues with China — including a visa‑free pilot and renewed consultative mechanisms.
- Washington (the United States): Maintains expanding security cooperation with Manila, exemplified by Balikatan 2026 and the Pax Silica economic security zone; those initiatives reinforce alliance commitments that Manila continues to honor.
- Beijing (China): Engages through resumed high‑level consultations in Quanzhou and practical confidence‑building proposals, and is being courted on potential oil and gas cooperation as the Philippines grapples with an energy emergency.
Manila’s 2026 foreign policy reads as a calibrated mix: a firm — even assertive — public defense of maritime rights combined with tactical openings where national interest and regional responsibility demand engagement. As ASEAN chair this year, the Philippines has additional incentives to preserve working ties with Beijing while advancing a legally binding Code of Conduct for the South China Sea before year’s end, and to pursue energy security options exposed by the Strait of Hormuz disruption. The result is not a pivot but a purposeful hedging strategy: draw clear lines where sovereignty is non‑negotiable, and preserve flexible channels elsewhere to manage economic and regional obligations.
