Operation Epic Fury, which began on 28 February 2026, has reshaped the Gulf security landscape in ways that directly implicate the Saudi‑Pakistan Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement (SMDA) signed in September 2025.
The SMDA: signed in September 2025, tested by war
Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif signed the Saudi‑Pakistan Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement in September 2025, formalizing decades of de facto security cooperation between Islamabad and Riyadh. The agreement was intended to cover contingencies now playing out: Iranian Shahed‑series drones and missiles striking Saudi infrastructure, violations of Riyadh’s airspace, and threats to the Strait of Hormuz. Those are precisely the scenarios the SMDA was meant to address — and, six months after the signing, the pact has encountered its first real stress test.
Pakistan’s public posture: studiously ambiguous
According to the reporting, “Pakistan’s public posture has remained studiously ambiguous.” Islamabad has not committed to operational support for Saudi Arabia, nor has it articulated a clear framework for what the SMDA means under live conditions. The ambiguity has been visible to Riyadh: Quwa reports that Saudi policymakers are “sophisticated readers of Pakistani signalling” and are aware of Islamabad’s domestic and strategic constraints.
Domestic constraints Islamabad cannot ignore
The article names several concrete limits shaping Pakistan’s response: a Shia population estimated at 15–20 percent; an unwillingness, described in the source, to open “a third hostile front” after India and Afghanistan; and the geographic reality of a “long Iranian border.” These factors, the piece argues, explain why Pakistan has been cautious even as the SMDA’s obligations appear to be tested in real time.
A recurring pattern: 2015 and the Imran Khan era
The current hesitation is framed as part of a pattern. In 2015, when Saudi Arabia launched its campaign in Yemen against the Houthis, Pakistan declined to commit forces despite GCC expectations that it would, leaving a “sour taste” with Saudi policymakers. The Imran Khan government later aggravated bilateral friction: then‑Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi made public statements about Saudi Arabia that the source says “no senior diplomat should have voiced,” and Islamabad’s overtures toward Turkey and Malaysia — including talk of a new bloc that would rival the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and the Arab League — compounded the damage. The piece notes that bilateral relations only began to recover under the current civil‑military setup that took power afterward.
The underpriced security premium and a lost muscle memory
Quwa’s analysis makes a pointed economic and strategic claim: Pakistan’s security value is rare in the region and ought to translate into pricing power. The article highlights Pakistan’s record as “a high‑end gray zone actor,” its history of confronting India directly when challenged, and “maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent,” all attributes that, in Quwa’s view, should be leveraged more effectively. It recalls the 1970s and 1980s, when Pakistani forces were stationed in Saudi Arabia and Riyadh paid an estimated $3–4 billion annually — the piece equates that to roughly $10–15 billion in current terms — as an example of how Islamabad once structured such relationships to secure durable benefits. The argument: the current generation of Pakistani policymakers has “lost that muscle memory.”
How Saudi policymakers, Pakistani policymakers, and Gulf security planners are reacting
- Saudi policymakers: Watching Islamabad’s signals closely and registering discomfort when the SMDA’s operational meaning is not articulated, given the immediate threats to infrastructure and the Strait of Hormuz.
- Pakistani policymakers: Constrained by domestic demographics, regional border realities, and a desire to avoid a new frontline after existing security commitments, prompting a cautious, ambiguous public posture rather than a clear operational pledge.
- Gulf security planners and economic actors: Confronted with the practical risk that an agreement intended to reduce ambiguity may instead lock Pakistan into long‑term commitments without delivering locked‑in economic or diplomatic returns that make ambiguity costly to all parties.
The central risk, as the piece lays out, is not immediate collapse of the SMDA but a familiar strategic cost: Pakistan could “lock itself into a long‑term security commitment without locking in the long‑term benefits.” The deeper test is less military than diplomatic and economic — whether Islamabad will begin to price and articulate what it offers and thereby convert a security pledge into enduring leverage, or whether the old pattern of hedging will reassert itself and leave both capitals disappointed.
For further detail and the full audio discussion with Lahore‑based journalist Usman A. Khan and host Bilal Khan, Quwa’s Pulse Check podcast offers a subscriber episode and a free preview; Quwa Plus subscription details are available at quwa.org/plus.
