A USD $686 million support and upgrade deal signed with the United States in December 2025 confirms a simple timetable: a portion of the Pakistan Air Force’s (PAF) F-16A/B fleet will reach the end of its practical service life by 2040, and a major procurement cycle will follow in the 2030s.
Why the F‑16A/B fleet is time‑limited
The PAF’s three F-16A/B Block‑15 Mid‑Life Update (MLU) and Block‑15 Air Defence Fighter (ADF) squadrons are scheduled for retirement by 2040, a point underscored by the December 2025 U.S. support and upgrade agreement. Previous Quwa reporting and analysis estimated these older F‑16 airframes will begin reaching 50 years of age in the 2030s. Unlike the F‑16C/Ds, the A/B variants lack a service life extension program (SLEP) that would push them beyond the 8,000 guaranteed flight hours. In effect, the PAF faces a hard limit on those airframes and is preparing now to identify successor aircraft.
The numerical and operational replacement challenge
On paper the arithmetic looks straightforward: roughly 50–55 F‑16A/Bs may need replacement, and a modern, suitable next‑generation fighter aircraft (NGFA) force might be fielded in the order of ~40 aircraft. But the choice is not solely a numbers game. The PAF’s requirement is less about the single “best” platform on specification sheets and more about which aircraft best succeeds the F‑16A/Bs in the concrete roles those jets have performed — availability, sustained sortie rates, weapons carriage, maintenance tempo, and mission flexibility.
Why the Shenyang J‑35AE leads — and why it is not a foregone conclusion
Reports that the PAF is seeking the Shenyang J‑35AE from the Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC) align with the numerical and generational requirements: the J‑35AE currently represents the only NGFA platform available to the PAF that would constitute a clear generational leap over the F‑16A/Bs and could set Pakistan’s procurement trajectory for decades after 2030. The author of the Quwa analysis describes the J‑35AE as the leading option.
That said, the author argues the J‑35AE is not an inevitable choice. The PAF will weigh a broader set of characteristics — not only raw generation leap but also the operational profile that made the F‑16A/Bs enduring: high availability, ease of maintenance, mature logistics, and interoperability with Western and regional partners.
F‑16 operational qualities — technical and “soft” factors the PAF will weigh
Cited qualities of the F‑16A/Bs include high availability rates, relative ease of maintenance, and maturity after decades of service. The analysis also highlights two “soft” but consequential factors: interoperability with NATO and regional partners (for example, Gulf Arab states and Türkiye), and the F‑16’s role as a technical bridge to Western equipment and logistics. While the PAF’s reliance on Chinese solutions has grown, those softer interoperability arguments could still matter in regional defence diplomacy.
The author further notes doctrinal and force-structure reasons to retain a non‑stealth, medium‑to‑heavy 4.5/4+ generation fighter alongside any future stealth NGFA. A previous Quwa analysis argued that stealth fighter‑led operations typically require follow‑on support from fighters that can sustain higher sortie rates, carry larger munitions loads, and “deliver” after stealth assets have created initial effects. The author points to the example of air forces that have inducted stealth fighters (the F‑35) yet continue to operate larger numbers of 4.5/4+ generation aircraft — including the United States, Israel, South Korea, Japan, the United Kingdom, Spain, Italy, and China — and notes that Türkiye is pursuing both a stealth NGFA and investments in new‑built F‑16s and Eurofighter Typhoons.
What this means for Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Türkiye
- Pakistan (the PAF): The service is preparing now for a procurement cycle that will begin in earnest in the 2030s and must prioritize replacement candidates that replicate the F‑16A/B’s operational mix — availability, sustainment, and interoperability — not just raw generation.
- Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman (regional partners): The author notes a potential diplomatic/operational argument Pakistan could make — that commonality of fighter type would facilitate immediate integration and mutual support with the Royal Saudi Air Force and other Gulf air forces, removing “technical friction” from regional defence cooperation.
- Türkiye: The analysis points out Türkiye’s parallel path — developing its own stealth NGFA while investing in new‑built F‑16s and Eurofighter Typhoons — as an example of combining stealth development with continued fielding of high‑sortie, heavy‑payload fighters.
The PAF’s next procurement cycle, set to begin across the 2030s, will be decisive. The J‑35AE is the current frontrunner because it offers a generational leap that could replace the A/B squadrons in capability terms. Yet the final choice will hinge on a cluster of technical and diplomatic considerations that go beyond raw performance metrics: sustainment, sortie generation, munitions carriage, and the value of interoperability and political signalling to regional partners. The record shows the PAF is planning for that reality now — and that the procurement will shape the service’s force structure and partnerships for decades after 2030.
