On 25 April 2026 SUPARCO’s PRSC-EO3 rode a Chinese Long March rocket into orbit, completing Pakistan’s three-satellite electro-optical imaging constellation and bringing the country’s dedicated remote-sensing fleet to five satellites.
PNS/M Hangor and the return to long-endurance submarine operations
The Pakistan Navy commissioned PNS/M Hangor, the lead boat of the Hangor-class (S26) program, a derivative of China’s Yuan-class (Type 039B) fitted with a Stirling-cycle air-independent propulsion (AIP) system. The program traces to a contract signed around 2015 for eight submarines; four are being built at Wuchang Shipyard in China and are reportedly in final handover or sea-trial stages, while four are slated for construction at Karachi Shipyard and Engineering Works (KSEW) but have progressed more slowly due to funding constraints.
The Hangor-class represents a capability shift: unlike Pakistan’s smaller coastal submarines, it is intended for forward-deployed, long-endurance missions — covering sea lines of communication across the Arabian Sea, operating toward the Gulf, and extending coverage into the wider Indian Ocean. The Stirling-cycle AIP introduces more moving parts than the fuel-cell AIP that would have accompanied the cancelled Type 214 deal, creating a potential acoustic-exposure risk in warmer waters; the Hangor’s double-hull design is reported to mitigate that through improved acoustic control. When complete, the Hangor fleet will expand Pakistan’s AIP-equipped submarine force from three Agosta 90B boats to eleven platforms in total.
Surface combatants, VLS limits, and the SMASH trade-offs
Quwa’s Defence Uncut discussion highlighted structural supply constraints shaping the Babur-class corvettes (modified Ada-class MILGEM) and the forthcoming Jinnah-class frigates. Available vertical-launch systems were constrained: the Mark 41/EXLS family was not exportable to Pakistan, France’s SYLVER was unavailable, and Turkey’s MIDLAS was not ready during design. The China-supplied AJK-16 cold-launch cell became the viable option; it is a single-missile-per-cell system that limits total missile load unless substantial hull changes — and attendant cost increases — are accepted.
On anti-ship options, the SMASH — a navalized anti-ship ballistic missile derived from the Fatah-II core — is significantly heavier than conventional anti-ship cruise missiles. Arslan Khan observed that this weight differential can sharply reduce the number of missiles a corvette can carry, estimating the Babur-class could end up with as few as four SMASH rounds. Pakistan conducted a SMASH certification launch from a Babur-class corvette in April 2026 (with earlier launches from F-22P frigates), and also tested the Taimoor AS — a surface-launched, stripped-down derivative of the Ra’ad — as part of a broader move toward domestically produced or co-produced munitions families. Defence analysis on the podcast framed shipborne SMASH as potentially better suited to shore-based coastal batteries, while lighter cruise missiles such as the Rasoob 250 could offer a more scalable fit for frigate midlife upgrades.
Army Rocket Force Command and the Fatah-II’s operational framing
The Army Rocket Force Command (ARFC), formed in August 2025, publicly reported its first training launch of the Fatah-II in late April 2026. The launch’s designation as a training exercise — rather than a development test — was read as indicating that the Fatah-II has moved into operational deployment within the ARFC inventory. The Fatah-II is described as a 400 km-plus range supersonic guided missile with a 365 kg warhead and a stated circular error probable (CEP) of 50 metres or less in the GIDS export specification; Quwa noted the Pakistani military variant likely differs.
The Fatah-II’s common-core rocket underpins other variants including SMASH and the Abdali strategic weapon system, mirroring an industrial approach that iterates around a single motor and core design to scale families of weapons.
PRSC-EO3, onboard AI, and the imaging triad
PRSC-EO3 finalizes the three-satellite electro-optical layer (PRSC-EO1/EO2/EO3) sitting alongside a synthetic aperture radar satellite (PRSC-S1) and a hyperspectral satellite (PRSC-HS1). Quwa described the five-satellite set as a coordinated sensor triad: SAR to detect change, EO to provide visual confirmation, and hyperspectral to classify material composition.
EO3 carries three experimental systems: a multi-geometry imaging module for 3D terrain modelling (relevant to terrain-contour-matching guidance), advanced energy storage, and an onboard artificial intelligence processor for real-time data analysis and anomaly detection — the first PRSC satellite reported to include onboard AI. A forthcoming $406 million PIESAT InSAR constellation deal was reported to scale the SAR layer to up to 20 additional SAR satellites, potentially enabling near-hourly revisit rates.
Bilal Khan argued on the podcast that the operational return on the space investment depends on ground and edge software: data-ingestion, processing, and dissemination stacks that turn raw imaging into actionable targeting intelligence.
What this means for the Pakistan Navy, the Pakistan Army, and Pakistan’s defence industry and space agencies
- Pakistan Navy: Expect a continued emphasis on submarines for wartime operations while recycler-friendly, land-origin anti-ship options and lighter cruise missiles shape frigate and corvette armaments; decisions over VLS architecture and missile mix will be constrained by export controls and hull-design limits.
- Pakistan Army: The ARFC’s Fatah-II training launch signals a doctrine increasingly organized around integrated precision-fire and precision-strike, with guided artillery kits, tank rounds, and DFCS-equipped platforms awaiting deeper ISTAR-network integration.
- SUPARCO, NASTP, and the defence industrial base: Completing the EO constellation raises demands for sovereign software and processing stacks; partnerships with the private sector and international partners were flagged as possible routes to operationalize the space and targeting investments.
The pattern across these developments is consistent: hardware progress — submarines, missiles, satellites — is advancing rapidly, but converting those platforms into a cohesive, sensor-to-shooter kill chain hinges on software, data fusion, and production-scale munition logistics. As Bilal Khan put it on Defence Uncut, whether integration is achieved through state entities alone or via broader private and international partnerships will likely determine how much of the investment translates into real operational advantage in the next five to ten years.
