"China appears to be playing the long game in pursuit of its interests in the Indo‑Pacific," write Joe Keary, Raji Rajagopalan and Linus Cohen, framing a portrait of gradual change that Australian strategists and partners should not mistake for the absence of intent.
ASPI war games in March and the 2036 horizon
The authors draw on a series of war games that the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) hosted in March that, in their words, "explored how China’s defence and security agencies might extend influence out to 2036." Those exercises form the backbone of the analysis: not a single incident, but a scenario-based look at how patterns of activity could accumulate over a decade and a half to reshape presence and influence across the Indo‑Pacific.
A campaign of normalisation: concrete measures Beijing may use
The Strategist pieces identify a set of explicit measures the authors say could be used to make Chinese military activity routine rather than exceptional. These measures, described in the source, include:
- a greater frequency of resupply and medical visits to regional ports;
- a more regular presence of "surveillance and intelligence ships, falsely called research vessels";
- the inclusion of naval and intelligence functions in dual‑use logistics facilities; and
- a larger role for the China Coast Guard.
The authors characterise these steps as part of a broader reliance on naval modernisation, "grey‑zone tactics" and a "layered, multi‑force coercion toolkit" aimed at shifting the regional status quo gradually rather than attempting to displace others overnight.
Salami‑slicing and the steady normalisation of presence
Keary, Rajagopalan and Cohen use the familiar metaphor of "salami slicing" to describe a strategy of incremental acquisition of advantage: "a port visit here, a survey mission there, a new security agreement with a Pacific Island state—each may seem manageable in isolation. But together they point to a long‑term effort to shift the balance of presence and influence across the Indo‑Pacific." The authors note that China's appearances in seas and ports far from its coast have been rising for about a decade and are "approaching a point where China’s military presence has become normal and expected, not aggressive."
Cumulative friction and the risk of escalation
Normalisation, the authors warn, carries its own dangers. As Chinese naval activity becomes more common, regional powers may increase their own surveillance and operational activity in response. That reciprocal tempo of operations "increases the risk of incidents, therefore raising the likelihood of escalation." The central hazard is cumulative friction: repeated, routine interactions that are individually manageable can, over time, be misinterpreted or spiral beyond original intent—particularly where trust is limited and communication channels are underdeveloped.
Policy options: deterrence, partnerships, and resilience
The authors argue deterrence could be sufficient to counter a slow, quiet expansion. But they warn that if Beijing were to accelerate its outward push, "an accelerated Chinese campaign would require Australia and other regional powers to also adopt a more active strategy." To shape outcomes, they recommend three durable lines of effort: partnership building, domestic resilience and sustained regional engagement. Practically, that means expanding persistent presence, intelligence sharing, joint exercises and operational interoperability to manage risk and maintain influence in a more contested environment.
What this means for Australia, regional partners, and maritime forces
- Australia: will need to work on persistent presence and interoperability with partners to operate effectively while "limiting the risks that come with" more frequent encounters.
- Regional partners: should prioritise intelligence sharing and coordinated surveillance so individual activities do not become isolated flashes that escalate.
- Maritime and coast‑guard forces: must prepare for an increased role—both in responding to dual‑use logistics and in managing encounters with surveillance vessels and coast‑guard units.
The picture the authors paint is neither sudden nor cinematic: it is a methodical campaign of routine activity that, taken together, could reconfigure influence across the region. The immediate policy question is therefore concrete rather than hypothetical—can Australia and its partners scale the persistent presence, intelligence sharing and interoperability the authors say will be necessary to manage cumulative friction and, if necessary, respond to an accelerated campaign?
https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/chinas-expanding-frontiers-views-in-the-strategist/
