"neither covers all law-of-the-sea issues nor stands as the sole source of the law of the sea", the China Institute for Marine Affairs wrote in a new assessment marking its 30th anniversary of UNCLOS accession.
China Institute for Marine Affairs' reinterpretation of UNCLOS
The institute’s assessment frames the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) not as the sole founding architecture for maritime governance but as “one pillar” among several possible legal arrangements. That formulation departs from how many smaller and middle powers in the Indo‑Pacific have traditionally regarded the convention — as a “constitution for the oceans.” By presenting UNCLOS as one component rather than the definitive framework, the report opens intellectual space for alternate mechanisms and raises the prospect of a more fragmented maritime order.
Resumed island‑building and administrative measures
According to the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, China has resumed major artificial island‑building, including construction of “one of its largest new features in years.” Alongside physical construction, Beijing has layered administrative measures: increased research activity and the establishment of a new marine protected area around Scarborough Shoal. The source cautions that while marine conservation is a global public good, these measures risk being “weaponised through a form of strategic greenwashing,” using environmental protection and zoning to strengthen control over contested maritime space. The 2016 arbitral tribunal ruling is cited as having concluded that China violated its UNCLOS obligations to protect the marine environment through its South China Sea island‑building.
Operational pressure at Scarborough Shoal and the Second Thomas Shoal clash
The Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative also reports a dramatic operational build‑up around Scarborough Shoal: Chinese patrols and maritime assets have doubled over the past year and more than tripled over the past two years. The immediate consequences are tangible — Philippine fishers are being blocked from waters where they previously and legally operated. A recent clash between the China Coast Guard and the Philippine Navy near the Second Thomas Shoal was serious enough that each government summoned the other’s ambassador. The source describes the West Philippine Sea as “at the coalface of maritime grey‑zone coercion,” with the Philippines often receiving inconsistent backing from the wider international community. Unsafe and unprofessional encounters between Chinese forces and foreign military vessels and aircraft continue elsewhere in the region; Australia has experienced “several dangerous near‑misses in airspace over recent years,” according to the reporting.
New institutions and the push for parallel dispute mechanisms
Beijing’s approach extends beyond ships and reefs to the architecture of dispute resolution. The new International Organization for Mediation, headquartered in Hong Kong, has claimed success resolving a maritime charter dispute involving parties from China and Singapore. The source notes that at least one China scholar has proposed the organisation could play a role in managing or resolving South China Sea disputes. That proposal sits uneasily next to the fact that UNCLOS already contains arbitration and conciliation options for maritime disputes — prompting the straightforward question posed in the reporting: if those mechanisms exist, why is an alternative being promoted?
What this means for the Philippines, Australia, and the wider international community
- The Philippines: The country remains “at the coalface of maritime grey‑zone coercion,” with fishers excluded from traditional waters and the state responding to formal provocations such as the Second Thomas Shoal clash. The reporting underscores that Manila’s security concerns are immediate and operational.
- Australia: As “a major trading nation,” Australia’s prosperity is described as dependent on open sea lanes governed by predictable rules; its own 8‑million‑square‑kilometre exclusive economic zone “exists by virtue of the ongoing legitimacy of the international law of the sea.” Any erosion of that architecture would, the source warns, undermine Australia’s security and prosperity.
- The wider international community: Attention is waning. A decade ago the South China Sea dominated regional security discussions; today crises in Europe, the Middle East and the Western Hemisphere have diverted focus. The United States quickly condemned the latest “dangerous and aggressive” actions at Second Thomas Shoal, but the reporting expresses a clear concern that such encounters risk becoming routine if the international community’s response softens.
China’s combination of renewed construction, administrative zoning, operational massing, and the promotion of alternative dispute institutions — set against an international attention deficit — is the core picture that emerges. The facts recorded here leave a pointed and concrete question: will states committed to the centrality of UNCLOS reinforce that architecture now, or will parallel pathways and tactical pressure on the water rework the rules that underpin freedom of navigation and coastal states’ rights?
