Skip to main content
Geopolitics & DefenseNational Security

Australia Urges Institutional Resilience Amid Indo-Pacific Elections

Serene government building with subtle hints of international cooperation.

The Philippines presidential election in May 2028 will reveal the consequences of any lack of institutionalisation.

Elections, institutions and the immediate test in Manila

The source is explicit: under Ferdinand Marcos Jr, Manila has strengthened defence cooperation with Australia, Japan and the US amid escalating tensions in the South China Sea, while the previous Rodrigo Duterte administration accommodated Beijing. That contrast is the practical reason the May 2028 vote matters: a future administration could again recalibrate Manila’s foreign policy, and a subdued ASEAN would leave partners exposed. The piece argues Australia must continue working with its Quad partners to institutionalise cooperation with Manila so that defence and security ties withstand electoral turnover.

Why institutions matter across the Indo‑Pacific

The argument begins from a simple premise: "The US midterm elections offer Australia a timely reminder that political alignments can change quickly but national interests endure." The essay stresses Australia’s confidence in its alliance with the United States rests on institutions rather than personalities. It then widens the frame — noting uncertainty in Wellington because "New Zealand’s election on Saturday has not yet produced a winner" — and warns that upcoming votes across the region will test whether security depends on durable institutional foundations or on short‑term personality politics.

European engagement is flagged as another institutional variable. France, described as "itself a Pacific power," faces a presidential election next year and the rise of populist parties could produce a "radical shift in Paris" that changes foreign policy toward China and Russia. That is why institutionalised groupings such as the France Australia New Zealand Partnership on security and humanitarian assistance in the Pacific (FRANZ), the NATO IP4 and Group of Seven plus groups, and AUKUS are singled out as mechanisms that maintain European interest in the Indo‑Pacific.

Six priorities Canberra should pursue

  • Strengthen institutional and societal resilience. Deepen cooperation not just with national governments but with foreign universities, civil society organisations, local governments and professional institutions. Investments in information integrity, cybersecurity and emergency preparedness are highlighted as ways to sustain partnerships through leadership changes and bolster local capacity to resist coercion.
  • Pursue principled diplomacy and practical conflict prevention. ASEAN remains central; Canberra should complement that with bilateral and minilateral agreements because ASEAN’s consensus model can delay urgent responses. The recommendation builds on the 2025 Australia‑ASEAN commitments to conflict prevention and crisis management and calls for strengthened cooperation on critical infrastructure protection, civilian crisis response and regional confidence‑building, with respect for sovereignty and safeguards against political misuse.
  • Encourage continued US engagement with ASEAN. Southeast Asian governments want the US "on the wall that protects them from a regionally peerless China" and fear US absence more than great‑power tension. The source cautions not to mistake tactical or operational shifts for strategic change: "The US will not get closer to Iran notwithstanding any diplomatic pause to the conflict. Nor will it end its strategic competition with China."
  • Coordinate practical Quad initiatives. Australia, India, Japan and the US should focus on disaster preparedness, maritime safety and cyber incident response to complement ASEAN mechanisms and provide tangible benefits to Southeast Asian communities.
  • Regularise the 'Squad'. The informal grouping of Australia, the US, Japan and the Philippines—referred to as "Squad"—should be formalised, with Washington and Canberra joining Tokyo and Manila in adopting the name.
  • Upgrade Canberra‑Manila ties. Canberra and Manila should convert their relationship into a Comprehensive Strategic partnership to institutionalise cooperation against the backdrop of political turnover.

What this means for technologists, policymakers, and Canberra and Manila

  • Technologists and security teams: The call for investments in information integrity and cybersecurity translates to sustained funding and cooperation on incident response, resilience exercises and civil‑sector outreach so partnerships outlast electoral cycles.
  • Policymakers and regional diplomats: Expect a dual track of ASEAN‑centred diplomacy and pragmatic bilateral/minilateral arrangements focused on crisis management, infrastructure protection and civilian response capacities that can operate even when consensus is slow.
  • Canberra and Manila: Australia is urged to institutionalise ties — through a Comprehensive Strategic partnership and by supporting Quad and 'Squad' mechanisms — to guard against abrupt policy shifts following elections in Manila or elsewhere.

A strategic moment for durable ties

Across the Indo‑Pacific the pattern is plain: democratic turnover is inevitable, but enduring partnerships are not. The prescription offered is procedural rather than partisan — build universities-to-government linkages, formalise minilateral groupings, and invest in the civic and technical infrastructure that keeps relations stable when leaders change. The next elections in Wellington, Paris and Manila will test whether those prescriptions have stuck. If institutions are strengthened as recommended, Canberra gains a clearer path to preserve regional stability and the domestic benefits it underwrites; if not, partnerships risk reversion to episodic, personality‑driven arrangements.

Original story