"Foreign policy is too important to be left to governments alone."
That line, from former West German chancellor Willy Brandt and quoted in the source piece, frames a central argument: Australia lacks an institutional layer that can publicly and robustly critique the Chinese party‑state without the constraints that bind official agencies and many universities. The article proposes building "critical China hubs" — independent, publicly engaged centres that would collect, analyse and disseminate information about the many dimensions of China’s activities that affect Australia and its region.
The US House Select Committee on China as a working model
The most prominent example cited is the US Congressional House Select Committee on China. On 1 October, US Congressman John Moolenaar, chairman of the Select Committee, wrote to Secretary of War Pete Hegseth asking that more than 100 Chinese institutes and programs be added to a list of entities of national security concern established under section 1286 of the National Defense Authorization Act. The source explains that inclusion on that list is a practical research‑security tool: it "can directly affect whether researchers funded by the Department of Defense may have a relationship with that entity."
Beyond a single regulatory list, the Select Committee’s remit — holding hearings and compiling reports across economic aggression, United Front activity, cyber and critical infrastructure threats, internal repression, international influence operations, transnational challenges and threats to Taiwan — is presented as one of the few national‑level efforts that publicly educates audiences on the systemic challenges posed by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The article urges Canberra to learn from and replicate not only the legal tools but the Select Committee’s public, wide‑ranging posture.
Existing global critical‑China hubs and their limits
The article surveys a set of civil‑society and research organisations already doing parts of this job in other countries: Sinopsis and the European Values Center in Prague; Spain‑based Safeguard Defenders; the Inter‑Parliamentary Alliance on China (headquartered in Britain); UK‑China Transparency, established in 2023; the China‑Mediterranean project out of the University of Turin; The Bureau, run by Canadian journalist Sam Cooper; Taiwan’s Doublethink Lab; and the California‑based SeaLight Foundation. Each is credited with researching Chinese influence and seeking to educate publics, often using Chinese‑language materials.
But the piece notes two constraints common to these groups: chronic under‑resourcing and the pressure of what it calls "China’s coercive power." It also says that much documentary material about China‑linked entities and United Front bodies appears almost entirely in Chinese, a factor that "often obstructs research efforts and western media reporting."
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The piece argues that a government service cannot perform this public, critical role alone and that most Australian universities are unlikely to host such a body. The reason given is financial ties: "so many of them are tightly tied financially to China." It adds that the few China studies programs in Australian universities lack "the will nor the capacity" to pursue an agenda of public critique.
It also puts Canberra’s current public engagement in context: security services such as the Australian Signals Directorate, the FBI, MI5 and the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service may occasionally reference aspects of China’s global activities, but "there is little open and critical engagement about the systemic challenges the CCP poses to all countries," the article says.
Practical steps proposed for Australia
The article lays out three practical approaches Australia could take. First: establish a parliamentary committee modelled on the US Select Committee, dedicated to identifying and addressing China challenges. Second: encourage think tanks to host critical China hubs; the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) is singled out as "one of the few entities with a dedicated team of China watchers," and the article calls for more such teams across more think tanks. Third: attract philanthropic funding either to expand existing think‑tank capabilities or to found a new academy focused on critical China studies.
The piece emphasizes that this is not an argument to "close our doors to China," but a call to "open our eyes" — to educate legislators, the public service, and society so Australia can "respond to and interact with China more securely."
What this means for parliamentarians, think tanks, and philanthropists
- Parliamentarians: The proposal asks legislators to create a standing parliamentary mechanism — modelled on the US Select Committee — that holds hearings and publishes findings on the full range of issues named in the source (economic statecraft, United Front activity, cyber and critical infrastructure threats, internal repression, international influence operations, transnational challenges, and threats to Taiwan).
- Think tanks and research groups: Organisations with China expertise are encouraged to host dedicated teams that can pursue Chinese‑language research and public education. ASPI is identified as one existing example; the article calls for more such teams in other think tanks.
- Philanthropists and foundations: Private funders are urged to seed capacity — by investing in think‑tank teams focused on China or by backing the creation of a new academy devoted to critical China studies — to overcome the chronic under‑resourcing that currently constrains global hubs.
Australia’s challenge, as set out in the article, is institutional rather than merely analytical: the country needs independent, public‑facing capacity to translate Chinese‑language materials and to explain the changing relationships between China‑linked entities and Australians. Establishing parliamentary oversight, expanding think‑tank teams and mobilising philanthropic capital are the specific steps proposed. The final admonition is concrete: not to shut engagement with China, but to pursue it with clearer eyes and stronger public institutions.
