"Food security is a foundation for national security," President Xi Jinping declared — a line that, according to the source, now underpins Beijing's push to build domestic biomanufacturing at scale.
China's industrial build-out: 43 pilot plants and a five-year plan
China is aggressively expanding its bioindustrial base. The country is planning to build at least 43 new pilot biomanufacturing plants focused on key inputs, and it made biomanufacturing a priority at its parliament meeting in March by unveiling a five-year plan that emphasises resilient new protein sources. Provinces are also rolling out initiatives to scale industrial biomanufacturing. Experts from the Good Food Institute Asia Pacific, who toured several facilities, described the new plants as impressive in scale and maturity: one Angel Yeast factory the size of 50 football pitches is producing a new protein through biomass fermentation at half the cost of whey protein, with applications across baked goods, protein shakes and plant-based meat.
United States policy moves: biotechnology centred in security planning
The United States has also elevated biotechnology as a component of national security. In April 2025 the National Security Commission on Emerging Biotechnology released a report placing biotechnology at the centre of national security and highlighting its role in agri-food supply chain resilience. And, the source reports, earlier this year the departments of agriculture and defence launched a partnership that embeds food production within national security infrastructure. These actions reflect a strategic effort to reduce exposure to geopolitical and environmental shocks.
Australia's exposure and latent strengths
By contrast, Australia has not yet adopted a comparable, coordinated approach. The source argues Canberra has not fully recognised vulnerabilities in agri-food supply chains despite being a globally competitive net food exporter — a position that may be generating complacency. Still, Australia is well placed to act: it has robust research capability, globally prominent companies such as Cauldron Ferm and Vow, and is one of the world’s leading sources of biomanufacturing feedstocks. That access to domestic feedstocks — and potential for inputs needed to produce them, such as fertiliser and fuel — gives Australia a comparative advantage for onshore biomanufacturing, even though biomanufacturing will still rely partly on conventional supply chains.
Supply shocks in practice: the Middle East conflict and Canberra's response
The source cites recent disruptions as a warning. Shipping disturbances linked to the current conflict in the Middle East created supply bottlenecks and spiked fuel and fertiliser costs, prompting Canberra to fast track its national food supply chain assessment in March. The government did make a targeted commitment in September 2025, allocating A$1.1 billion to biofuel production to address fuel supply vulnerabilities, but the source notes that investment remains fragmented and is not part of a national biomanufacturing strategy. Without coordinated, long-term planning, the source warns, the reactive cycle of short-term fixes will repeat when the next shock arrives.
What this means for Australian technologists, policymakers, and exporters
- Australian technologists and innovators: Companies redesigning hardware, software and wetware are already working to reduce cost and scale pressures across the biomanufacturing stack; coordinated support could accelerate commercialization and lower unit costs.
- Policymakers and regulators in Canberra: The source argues they face a choice between continuing with fragmented investments (such as the A$1.1 billion biofuel package) or adopting a national biomanufacturing strategy to convert scientific strength into sovereign industrial capacity.
- Australian exporters and feedstock producers: Domestic feedstock advantages mean they could help underpin onshore biomanufacturing inputs, but only if supply-chain vulnerabilities for fertiliser, fuel and other inputs are addressed in a joined-up policy framework.
The central takeaway from the source is straightforward: China and the United States have moved to enshrine biomanufacturing within national security frameworks and are committing public funding and policy coordination to match. Australia, the source contends, has the scientific base and feedstock endowments to do the same — but without a national biomanufacturing strategy, its response risks remaining piecemeal. The practical choice before Canberra, as laid out in the source, is whether to stitch existing investments and assessments into a long-term sovereign capability or to accept recurring exposure to supply shocks that could threaten food and fuel resilience.
