“any effective balance of military power” in the Indo‑Pacific requires the United States, the 2026 National Defence Strategy declares — and it adds that such a balance also requires “load‑bearing partnerships” to build Australia’s self‑reliance.
How the 2026 National Defence Strategy frames the Australia‑Japan relationship
The National Defence Strategy (NDS) issued in 2026 positions the United States as indispensable to balancing military power in the Indo‑Pacific while explicitly advocating for stronger bilateral and multilateral partnerships so Australia can become more self‑reliant. The NDS describes Japan as “an indispensable partner” in pursuing that aim, signalling Canberra’s intent to combine alliance dependence with closer regional cooperation rather than go it alone.
Mogami‑class frigates: a concrete deterrent and a regional export
At the centre of recent defence news is Australia’s acquisition of Japan’s upgraded Mogami‑class frigates. The article argues that this procurement — and the broader defence lift revealed during Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s visit — strengthens deterrence against China by making clear that regional actors are coordinating capability enhancements. The piece also notes the expansion of Japan’s security assistance to countries such as Papua New Guinea, and reports that several countries, including New Zealand and Indonesia, are considering following Australia in acquiring the Mogami frigate.
Economic security: joint declarations on food, energy and dual‑use technologies
Takaichi’s visit produced a joint declaration on economic security that emphasised mutual trust and shared values underpinning prosperity. The declaration targeted vulnerabilities in sectors including food, where the recent closure of the Strait of Hormuz has highlighted supply‑chain risks. A complementary joint statement detailed cooperation on energy security. The two governments also pledged deeper collaboration in dual civilian–military sectors such as AI and space, and flagged Japanese investment to help Australia break Beijing’s grip on processed critical minerals and other inputs vital to emerging technologies.
Supply‑chain strategy and addressing below‑market pricing
Tokyo is promoting a comprehensive supply‑chain model that seeks to offer alternatives to reliance on Beijing. The model includes measures to counter Beijing’s practice, described in the article, of setting below‑market prices for finished products — for example, electric vehicles — thereby manipulating demand and discouraging foreign investment. The stated aim is to give recipient countries in the region realistic economic options that are not accompanied by “strings‑attached largesse.”
Finance and infrastructure: JBIC reforms and co‑investment across the Pacific
The article highlights parliamentary debates in Tokyo that could allow the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) to underwrite strategic projects even if it risks losing money. That approach is characterised as echoing reforms already made to Export Finance Australia and as promising broader opportunities for co‑investment in infrastructure across the Pacific and Southeast Asia. The piece frames these finance tools as a way to improve regional resilience by offering alternatives to Chinese financing norms.
What this means for Australia, Japan and Pacific partners
- For Australia: the NDS and the procurement of Mogami frigates reflect a strategy of combining US reliance with greater self‑help and regional partnerships to deter coercive behaviour. The article notes Canberra is resisting disinformation and wedge tactics from Beijing, with Foreign Minister Penny Wong saying the relationship “contributes to regional peace and stability.”
- For Japan: the visit by Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi is presented as part of a policy to calibrate a deep economic relationship with China against national security risks, including the weaponisation of trade, while remaining anchored to the US role in the region.
- For Pacific and Southeast Asian partners (Papua New Guinea, New Zealand, Indonesia and others): increased Japanese and Australian security assistance, new finance mechanisms and supply‑chain alternatives could provide more procurement and infrastructure options — exemplified by interest in the Mogami‑class frigate and proposed co‑investment across the region.
The article contests the view offered by historian and commentator James Curran that closer defence ties with Japan risk dragging Australia into conflict. Instead, it argues the opposite: closer Australia–Japan ties — underpinned by the 2026 NDS, new procurement and economic‑security measures, and evolving finance tools — are intended to raise the cost to Beijing of aggressive moves and so deter efforts to impose a Sino‑centric order. The piece closes on a historical note: Graeme Dobell has chronicled earlier Australian efforts, including by former prime minister John Howard and some officials such as then‑intelligence analyst Andrew Shearer, to see Japan as a bilateral strategic partner. The article concludes that Takaichi’s visit and the 50th anniversary of the 1976 Nara Treaty should be milestones, not endpoints, and that talk of a future formal alliance would itself be a signal the authors take as evidence deterrence is working.
