"[The reforms are] not only Japan’s internal affair," said China’s foreign affairs spokesperson, responding to Tokyo's recent intelligence reforms. That line — voiced as Beijing criticised Japan's May moves to better coordinate intelligence — highlights the transnational tensions that Australian and Japanese analysts say can be met, in part, by joint work on countering state-aligned disinformation.
China's reaction and the context inside Japan
The foreign affairs spokesperson characterised Japan’s intelligence restructuring as a return to imperial-era militarism and a preparation for international aggression, and urged Tokyo to "learn lessons of history." The Japanese reforms include the May establishment of a ministerial-level National Intelligence Committee, served by the newly formed National Intelligence Agency (also translated as the National Intelligence Bureau). The source also notes that Sanae Takaichi became prime minister in October and won a resounding general election victory in February, a mandate the explainer says enables her government to push ahead with reforms intended to improve resilience to disinformation and other coercion.
Why Canberra and Tokyo can pool complementary strengths
The ASPI and Japan Nexus Intelligence explainer argues that Australia and Japan have distinct but complementary capabilities for countering hostile information activity. Australia has enacted legislation and institutions to counter foreign interference, including a transparency register that distinguishes lawful lobbying from malign activity, and mechanisms for attributing hybrid attacks to specific groups and countries; Canberra also possesses "unrivalled networks across much of the Pacific." Japan brings geographic reach, economic weight and "unique insights into China and Chinese influence in Southeast Asia," along with a "trailblazing approach to economic security" that can inform protection against information-based coercion.
A bilateral counter-disinformation cell — virtual and narrowly focused
The explainer recommends a joint Australia–Japan counter-disinformation mission, endorsed by national leaders and embedded in existing bilateral coordination mechanisms, but stopping short of "full intelligence integration." Instead, it proposes establishing a bilateral counter-disinformation cell that would initially operate virtually. Mission leads should be appointed in Australia’s Office of National Intelligence and Japan’s National Intelligence Agency to coordinate work across intelligence, foreign affairs, defence, home affairs, electoral integrity and strategic communications agencies.
Operational priorities: shared taxonomy, narrative tracking, attribution, and response
Planned priorities for the mission are concrete. The explainer lists establishing a shared taxonomy of hostile information activity; tracking recurring disinformation narratives across the Indo‑Pacific; agreeing thresholds for coordinated public attribution; and developing joint protocols for responding to disinformation that threatens key national activities such as elections, referenda and crisis preparedness. It also points to evident tactics used against Japan — overt Chinese state media combined with exploitation of online influencer networks, inauthentic accounts and bots — and notes Beijing has intensified that campaign since October.
Democratic safeguards, oversight and the proposed forum on information integrity
The explainer stresses that these operations would require legislative oversight and democratic safeguards. It proposes stronger engagement between Australia’s Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security and its counterparts in the Japanese Diet. Separately, the authors recommend a standing Australia–Japan forum on information integrity that brings together officials, technology companies, media, think tanks, civil society and election experts. Properly resourced, the forum could produce annual narrative‑risk assessments and conduct crisis simulations; the Australia–Japan leadership dialogue announced in May is named as a possible foundation but not a substitute for a dedicated inclusive forum.
What this means for intelligence agencies, technology companies, and electoral authorities
- Intelligence agencies: appoint mission leads in the Office of National Intelligence and the National Intelligence Agency to coordinate cross‑government responses and share attribution mechanisms.
- Technology companies and media: participate in the proposed forum on information integrity and work with Canberra and Tokyo on narrative‑risk assessments and simulated crises.
- Electoral authorities: be included in joint protocols and preparations for disinformation threats to elections and referenda, as a stated mission priority.
The path laid out by ASPI and Japan Nexus Intelligence is specific: senior mission leads, a virtual bilateral cell, a shared taxonomy and agreed attribution thresholds, legislative oversight and an inclusive forum that produces assessments and simulations. The next concrete moves to watch — all cited in the explainer — are whether leaders formally endorse the mission, whether the Office of National Intelligence and the National Intelligence Agency name mission leads, and whether Australia and Japan commit resources to the proposed forum on information integrity.
