"Asia is a place that is bound to experience military competition, that will be subject to the vicissitudes of nationalism and ambition … it must find a way to ensure those forces do not spiral out of control," writes Nick Bisley.
Nick Bisley on Asia at a hinge point
Bisley, a pro vice-chancellor at Australia’s La Trobe University, frames contemporary Asia as standing "at a hinge point" after several decades of rapid development. He traces that rise to an extraordinary historical arc: roughly 200 years ago the region was dominated by old empires such as the Qing and Mughal; a century later it had been substantially overrun by Western powers including Britain, the Netherlands, France and the United States. The end of World War II made empires anachronistic, producing decolonisation and a patchwork of independent states whose borders are "mainly colonial artifacts." New states such as Indonesia and Malaysia emerged, while issues including Taiwan and the two Koreas remained unresolved.
From Cold War turmoil to economic acceleration
Bisley challenges the label "Cold War" for Asia’s 1945–79 period, calling it a misnomer — a "hot period of conflict and turmoil" that simultaneously saw the beginning of Asia’s economic acceleration. That acceleration unfolded as Japan rose first, followed by Taiwan, South Korea and parts of Southeast Asia. The normalisation of Sino‑American relations in the 1970s and China’s economic reform program further boosted the regional economy, creating a dynamic driven by globalisation, market integration and global value chains increasingly centred on China.
Globalisation’s gains — and the seeds of its undoing
Bisley argues that the same forces that powered Asia’s rise also contained vulnerabilities. US regional security assurance complemented economic growth by allowing states to prioritise development. But financial crises rooted in the US and Europe raised questions about globalisation, and tangible examples of "weaponised" interdependence emerged: Bisley points to the September 2010 stoush between China and Japan over the Senkaku Islands and China’s subsequent rare‑earths export ban. He identifies the Covid‑19 pandemic as a key tipping point, citing a lack of transparency about the virus’s origins, weaponisation of supply chains for pharmaceuticals and personal protective equipment, and limited international cooperation.
China’s revisions to regional order and US counter‑efforts
According to Bisley, China views the existing regional order as US‑made and oriented toward American interests. As China has grown richer it has become "more nationalist and ambitious" on issues including the South China Sea, Taiwan and its border with India; it has also built alternative elements of regional order through initiatives such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and the Belt and Road Initiative. The United States, Bisley writes, has long aimed to oppose the rise of a hostile dominant power in Asia, but its efforts to contain China have been "relatively ineffectual" — examples he cites include the pivot to Asia under Barack Obama, trade wars under Donald Trump, and burden‑sharing efforts such as AUKUS. Bisley even notes that "Even today, it’s still not clear what the Trump administration’s posture is towards Asia."
What this means for regional policymakers, exporters, and global investors
- Regional policymakers — Must navigate competing pressures: sustaining growth while managing resurgent geopolitics, unresolved territorial questions, and the risk that national security frames will reshape trade and investment policy.
- Exporters and supply‑chain managers — Face heightened vulnerability as international trade is increasingly viewed through national‑security lenses; the Senkaku dispute and Covid‑era disruptions are explicit examples of how critical inputs and markets can be leveraged or restricted.
- Global investors — Confront a shifting risk calculus: Bisley describes a broken consensus on globalisation and a shattering of the binding forces of interdependency, signaling that investment decisions will have to account more explicitly for geopolitical contingencies.
Bisley offers three broad scenarios for Asia’s future — fractured, unified or rebalanced — and his tone is cautious. He warns that rising nationalism and ambition, combined with a return of geopolitics and the decline of stabilising interdependencies, make military competition more likely. The central question his framing leaves for policymakers and publics alike is concrete: which of the three paths will prevail, and which institutions or choices will prevent the spiralling of the very forces he identifies?
Original story: https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/bookshelf-asias-uncertain-future/
