The president's new National Security Presidential Memorandum pushes the United States to expand a model — used for Coast Guard Arctic Security Cutters built initially in Finland — to allow a limited number of Navy vessels to be constructed overseas. That memorandum and the administration’s parallel legislative push have exposed a thicket of technical, logistical and political problems that analysts say could determine whether foreign-built hulls ever become a practical part of the U.S. fleet.
Bradley Martin on technical unknowns
Martin spelled out the core engineering problem plainly: many foreign hulls are not designed from the keel up to accept U.S. weapons, survivability standards and redundancy requirements. If a foreign yard builds a hull without those design details integrated early, Martin warned, back-fits after delivery will be time-consuming and disruptive. “The best outcome would be: Buy a ship and build it from the keel up, with the ability to integrate these systems,” he said. Otherwise, he predicted “all kinds of delays.”
Bryan Clark on combat systems and communications
Bryan Clark, director of the Hudson Institute’s Center for Defense Concepts and Technology, highlighted how interoperability is a separate and thorny challenge. He noted that many allied ships lack U.S. networks such as Cooperative Engagement Capability, and although datalinks and “compatible” networks could be added, commonality in combat systems would be harder to achieve. Clark pointed to differences in Aegis implementations among Spanish, Korean and Japanese ships and to undersea warfare suites that are “completely different.” He also observed that integrating foreign hull mechanical and electrical parts into U.S. supply systems would complicate logistics.
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Protect the town officeHow the Navy, Congress, and U.S. shipyards are likely to respond
- The Navy: The service will have to decide which technical standards it will keep and which to revise, and how much post-delivery testing—such as shock-hardness trials—must be applied to foreign-built vessels. The Navy’s FY27 budget request includes $1.85 billion in reconciliation funding to study foreign yards and potentially procure an initial vessel from Japan or South Korea.
- Congress: Lawmakers have pushed back. The House-passed FY27 NDAA includes a provision barring construction of warships and combat logistics vessels in foreign yards. The Senate Armed Services Committee’s version also restricts warship construction abroad but permits procurement of up to two auxiliary ships if the foreign builders invest in the U.S. maritime industrial base; however, Senate Democrats have halted the legislation from advancing to the floor citing concerns about defense spending and the conflict with Iran.
- U.S. shipyards and trade groups: The Shipbuilders Council of America urged the administration to “reverse course and redirect this funding to qualified U.S. shipyards,” warning that “every hull built abroad is demand, jobs, and industrial capability diverted from American shipyards,” according to president Matthew Paxton.
Fincantieri, Constellation-class teething pains, and maintenance risks
The record of recent programs is cited as a cautionary tale. A Constellation-class frigate program based on an Italian design led to a contract for Wisconsin-based Fincantieri Marinette Marine in 2020; the Navy announced in December 2025 it would cut the program and accept only the two frigates already under construction after cost overruns, delays and design changes. Eric Labs of the Congressional Budget Office warned foreign-built classes could become expensive to sustain if only a few hulls are bought, creating “an orphan class” like the three Zumwalt-class destroyers. Labs added that if the Navy purchased 10–20 foreign ships, maintenance and training pipelines would resemble those of other new ship classes, but stressed the need to “invest heavily in an upfront supply of spare parts” and noted that some foreign designs may be easier to maintain if designed that way.
The memorandum’s details and the remaining path
The White House memo proposes expanding the “Finland model” for the Navy: allow foreign shipbuilders to construct up to two ships in each of three ship classes at parent docks overseas, provided those builders agree to on-shore future production. The classes named include surface combatants with anti‑submarine, surface‑warfare and convoy‑escort capabilities, Consolidated Cargo Replenishment at Sea (CONSOL) tankers, and Roll‑On/Roll‑Off vessels. The memorandum directs that ships after the initial two be built in the United States.
The administration had already sought congressional authorization to hire foreign yards to build four vessels through the FY27 NDAA and had requested reconciliation funds to study and possibly procure an initial vessel overseas. Prior practice suggests a waiver of U.S. Code 8679—used in previous icebreaker deals—could be the route to authorize foreign construction under national-security grounds, a path Eric Labs described prior to the memo’s release.
The bottom line: the memorandum clears presidential-level intent to try an extraordinary procurement experiment, but experts in the story agree the devil is in engineering, supply chains and politics. Capitol Hill language, industry pushback, and the technical work of designing foreign hulls around U.S. combat systems and sustainment cycles will determine whether the door opened by the memo becomes a corridor to more ships, or a costly one-off with limited operational value.
