"I will first of all start with answering the question of why," an Unmanned Systems Department Officer for the First Corps Azov of the National Guard of Ukraine said in an exclusive interview, explaining the operational logic behind a recently publicized campaign of modified, AI‑enhanced kamikaze drones striking Russian logistics deep behind the front lines.
How the First Corps Azov frames the mid‑range strike campaign
The officer described the campaign’s purpose as "to hunt enemy logistics capabilities," concentrating on places where cargo is dense and protection is thin. He mapped a simple gradient: nearest the contact line, resupply is by individuals with backpacks; farther back, cars then trucks; deeper still, long‑haulers and rail. The campaign focuses where concentration and vulnerability intersect—roughly 50 kilometers from the line of contact is often the most densely protected belt, while deeper areas present protection gaps the unit seeks to exploit.
Drones, modifications, and range
First Corps Azov uses fixed‑wing, one‑way ("kamikaze") drones including Hornet and Darts systems, plus other unnamed platforms. The officer said the units have been receiving U.S.‑made Hornet drones "for almost a year," and that the corps itself conducted early winter tests of modifications before combat deployment in January or February. Modifications include engine and propulsion changes and enhanced communications hardware; the officer said the team installed Starlink terminals on some drones. He reported current reach "up to 250 kilometers" and said the same base assets used for tactical 50‑kilometer missions can, with these modifications, operate at much deeper ranges without materially increasing unit cost per asset.
AI for target identification and terminal guidance
The officer described AI functions as twofold: terminal or "last‑mile" guidance and automated target recognition when drones operate in autonomous mode. He said the AI can "recognize the type of the target and it can automatically engage the target," but also emphasized that the unit’s policy keeps a human in the loop: "usually it is the person who takes the final decision and actually makes this decision to strike the target." He added that while the system can operate without human input, they prefer operator final authorization to avoid over‑reliance on AI.
Operational effects reported by Azov and media
The campaign is described as continuous rather than episodic. Since early May, one open‑source tally cited in the reporting notes "more than 270 trucks have been hit, together with multiple fuel depots and trains." The campaign has been extended to maritime routes: Ukrainian forces reportedly struck at least five vessels in the Sea of Azov, including two hit at occupied ports of Berdyansk and Mariupol. The officer and media reports link these strikes to fuel shortages in Russian‑controlled Crimea and other territories; he characterized fuel as "the blood of war," pointing to both the volume lost when tankers are struck and the logistic multiplier effect that has on frontline operations.
Russian countermeasures and Ukrainian adaptability
According to the officer, Russian responses are still nascent: painted trucks intended to confuse AI, anti‑drone nets, shotgun posts along roads, and interceptor drones or air observation posts. He judged electronic warfare a minority component of counter‑UAV measures—estimating EW accounts for "approximately 10% of overall counter drone efforts"—and said Azov has already prepared counters to likely Russian adaptations. He also stressed that the corps developed both the hardware modifications and new tactics internally because existing mid‑range concepts were built around scarce, expensive assets that his unit could not rely on.
What this means for the U.S., SpaceX, and the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
- U.S. procurement and units: The officer advised that unmodified, out‑of‑the‑box drones are limited, and recommended that units include "their own drone laboratory" to reconfigure systems. He argued assets can become obsolete within months as navigation and frequency environments change.
- SpaceX / satellite communications providers: Starlink terminals are one of multiple communications solutions reported installed on drones; the officer said Starlink is not the only system in use and that international and supply issues "should be dealt with at the level of our ministries."
- General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine: The officer deferred broader strategic assessments—such as whether the campaign is shaping counteroffensive potential—to the general staff, noting his remit is the UAS component of the corps.
The campaign, as described by the First Corps Azov officer, is a deliberate attempt to push "the sanitization zone" for enemy logistics farther from Ukrainian territory by using inexpensive, modified tactical drones at operational ranges. His final appeal framed the larger lesson plainly: innovation and rapid adaptation, not just volume of platforms, determine battlefield utility—"victory will belong to the side capable of adapting faster," he said.
