“The reality is that there is little excess left to cut from the US presence in Europe without affecting capabilities.”
The European force posture review and the timetable
The Pentagon has launched a European force posture review that will produce options for the size and distribution of U.S. forces in Europe. The Secretary of War will be briefed on those options in early November, and the process is scheduled to conclude in early December. President Donald Trump will then decide whether to accept, amend, or reject the department’s recommendation, with input from the National Security Council and State Department.
How depleted munitions and May Force Model limits shape the choices
Since the start of 2026, two developments have strained U.S. deterrence in Europe: “the ongoing rapid and deep deterioration of US munitions stockpiles resulting from the war with Iran,” and the May announcement of immediate and substantial limitations on U.S. contributions to NATO’s Force Model in the event of a future conflict. The article reports that U.S. stockpiles in Europe of PAC-3 missile interceptors and ATACMS missiles are “beyond critical,” and warns that replacing those high-end capabilities will take years.
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End the scrambleThe current U.S. footprint: numbers and constraints
U.S. forces in Europe are already lean by recent historical standards. The piece cites an 80,000 figure for combined rotational and permanent troops currently deployed — “well below the average permanent American presence in Europe of approximately 94,000 since the Cold War ended.” Permanently based air and naval assets are limited: only three fighter wings permanently deployed to Europe, zero strategic bombers permanently based there, a command-and-control ship in Italy, and five destroyers in Spain. Those destroyers have been “consistently deployed to the eastern Mediterranean to take part in operations in the Middle East,” constraining their participation in NATO exercises; a sixth destroyer will arrive in October to augment U.S. naval forces in the theater.
Russian adventurism, European attacks, and signaling risks
The review is taking place amid an uptick in hostile activity attributed to Moscow. The piece cites recent attacks and plots against European infrastructure, including an airport attack in Germany that Berlin directly attributed to Moscow, and an arson at a Polish drone factory that Polish Prime Minister Tusk said is “very likely a Russian act.” According to the article, America’s CIA chief recently visited Russia reportedly to deliver a message dissuading Moscow from further adventurism into NATO.
The author argues that signaling significant limits on rapid U.S. reinforcement — effectively what the May announcement did — could encourage further probing by Russia. “For Putin,” the piece says, “the US is the nation that matters most; were he to come to the conclusion that America were so constrained as to not be able or willing to meaningfully intervene in defense of our allies, it could prompt him to roll the dice on a conventional attack against the alliance before European military rebuilding has gained critical mass.”
How Congress, NATO allies, and Moscow will react
- Congress: The article notes that the fiscal 2027 NDAA is likely to reinforce limits on withdrawals beyond a 76,000-troop floor and add “clearer restrictions and more onerous requirements,” indicating that lawmakers will play a direct role in shaping any reduction in U.S. presence.
- NATO allies and European taxpayers: The piece emphasizes that American basing in Europe is “quietly heavily subsidized by European taxpayers” and that Europe’s rapid rearmament remains incomplete — “not yet fully realized” — meaning allies still rely on U.S. forces and high-end enablers that cannot be replaced quickly.
- Moscow: The article argues that Russia is “closely tracking” both U.S. munitions levels and signals about force availability; therefore Moscow will be attentive to the posture review’s outcome and may adjust behavior based on perceived U.S. constraints.
Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Roger Wicker is quoted warning of the danger of a hollowing out of U.S. presence in Europe: “It will take time to translate this spending into military capability. The ongoing force posture review in Europe must account for this reality and for the risk that a wounded and failing Putin might seek to change his circumstances through opportunistic aggression in Europe.”
The author concludes that the timing of a drawdown would be poor: Europe’s rearmament is substantial but incomplete, U.S. stockpiles are under severe strain from the war with Iran, and the Kremlin appears willing to probe Western resolve. “Everyone with a vested interest in NATO security — including Moscow — will be watching this review closely,” the piece warns, urging that those conducting the review “remember what is at stake and get it right.”
