“I’m currently assigned there to build out a [Joint Task Force Defense of Critical Infrastructure] framework and command and control footprint,” Col. Adolph Rodriguez told attendees at the TechNet Cyber conference, summing up the Pentagon’s immediate work to knit military authorities into a response for cyberattacks on U.S. critical infrastructure.
Col. Adolph Rodriguez on the joint task force and command-and-control footprint
Rodriguez, identified in the Pentagon as the director of Defense Critical Infrastructure at the Defense Cyber Defense Command (DCDC), said his team’s priority is not only technical — it is organizational. “The most important thing, besides understanding the technology, the people, the processes, is who’s in control, who’s executing, what’s the common rail amongst all the authorizations that we have between CISA, FBI, Coast Guard, Department of War writ large,” he said.
That formulation places command relationships and legal authorities at the center of the DCDC effort: setting clear lines of control and execution during a cyber incident, and doing so in a way that meshes with existing civil and federal partners.
Defense Cyber Defense Command's new posture under US Cyber Command
DCDC, Rodriguez noted, was elevated from its prior identity — Joint Force Headquarters-DoD Information Network — to a sub-unified command under US Cyber Command in May 2025. That change gives the organization a formalized role inside the military cyber architecture and frames its work on critical infrastructure as part of a larger defense posture.
Within that posture, Rodriguez described the task as operational and doctrinal: develop a persistent campaign plan and command framework that can be used before, during, and after an attack to maintain continuity of services that both civilians and military installations depend upon.
Digital green zones: defining good data and operational continuity
One of the concrete concepts Rodriguez is advancing is what he called “digital green zones,” modeled on physical protected spaces used in Iraq and Afghanistan. The digital green zones, he said, will determine “what exactly needs to be secured and what data leaders need to look for to ensure they know what good and bad data is.”
The intent is twofold: first, to catalogue which systems must be preserved to sustain essential services such as power and water and to protect military installations; second, to give commanders and civilian partners an auditable set of indicators that distinguish normal operations from manipulation or compromise.
Volt Typhoon and the shift in how China-linked actors are targeting infrastructure
Rodriguez cited recent activity by Chinese hackers dubbed Volt Typhoon as an example of the threat DCDC is building against. According to the remarks reported at the conference, Volt Typhoon has been “found lurking in these systems in recent years, which intelligence and cyber officials say is to map networks in order to cause disruption, stymie and deter possible US response to a Beijing feint against Taiwan.”
What he and other officials find alarming, he added, is the reported paradigm shift: Chinese threats moving from primarily espionage and intellectual property theft toward operations that hold critical infrastructure at risk.
How CISA, FBI, and critical infrastructure operators will be implicated
Rodriguez repeatedly framed the effort as multi-agency: CISA, the FBI, the Coast Guard and other federal entities must be integrated with defense roles. He suggested using the Northern Command model of civil-military cooperation as a template: “Why don’t we build a cyber campaign plan that’s enduring that we can utilize those NORTHCOM authorities with Cyber Command’s authorities,” he said.
He also proposed organizing protective effort “build out the sectors very similar to FEMA so this way we don’t have to change any of the infrastructure and now execute that muscle memory of training, assessments, and then identify where the key infrastructure is.” That approach would require operators and federal partners to adopt shared training, assessment rhythms, and sector definitions aligned to military-led campaign planning.
Rodriguez boiled the practical problem down to a contrast: in a natural disaster or terrorist attack, the roles and lines of authority across local, state and federal partners are clear; in a cyberattack, he said, “those distinctions are not yet there.” The DCDC effort he is building aims to make those distinctions operative in cyber — a single command-and-control footprint, persistent campaign plans, and an inventory of what must be defended to keep services running.
Whether that architecture will shorten decision timelines, reduce interagency confusion, or deter adversary operations remains to be seen; Rodriguez’s next step, as he described it, is to complete the framework and the command-and-control footprint so training, assessments and execution can follow.
