The Pakistan Army uses 35 mm Oerlikon anti-air guns as its primary hard-kill solution in counter‑unmanned aerial systems (C‑UAS) operations, paired with Skyguard radar and ammunition produced by Pakistan Ordnance Factories (POF).
From disparate systems to a system-of-systems challenge
Quwa’s reporting describes Pakistan’s current C‑UAS posture as a patchwork: a mix of soft‑kill and hard‑kill capabilities deployed largely in localized nodes with “limited upward connectivity to a broader system.” That local focus may be sufficient against insurgent and criminal uses of small drones, but the report warns a state‑level conflict brings a different threat geometry — massed loitering munitions, mixed salvos of drones and missiles, and attacks designed to saturate localized defenses. Without an integrated picture, low‑cost aerial threats can cause disproportionate damage or force the wasteful expenditure of high‑value effectors such as surface‑to‑air missiles.
Key indigenous building blocks: SPIDER, SAFRAH, RAAST, and interceptor drones
Multiple domestic programs provide the raw materials for a future integrated C‑UAS architecture. The Defence Science and Technology Organization’s (DESTO) Spider system — including a man‑portable SPIDER Portable variant — uses electronic warfare to target satellite navigation and communications links (soft‑kill) and pairs an electro‑optical tracker with EW measures. The National Electronics Complex of Pakistan (NECOP) has produced low‑level portable soft‑kill “gun” systems in its SAFRAH series. Pakistan Ordnance Factories supplies ammunition for the 35 mm Oerlikon anti‑air guns currently used in the C‑UAS role. Quwa also notes a domestically made radar, RAAST, as an integration candidate.
Automation, interceptors, and directed energy: new effectors on the horizon
Beyond guns and jammers, Pakistan’s defence industry is pursuing interceptor drones and directed energy weapons. Industry sources confirmed to Quwa that work is underway to pair small interceptor drones to radars via data‑link so they can be automatically vectored toward threat zones rather than relying solely on manual operators. Parallel efforts include early development of high‑powered microwave (HPM) systems to defeat swarms and research into new soft‑kill tools such as jamming driven by cognitive software‑defined radios.
Layering C‑UAS into an integrated air‑defence network
Quwa lays out a three‑layer model for how C‑UAS should fit into Pakistan’s territorial air‑defence system. The first layer is the local C‑UAS node protecting specific assets — airbases, depots, headquarters — and choosing the most appropriate effector for each threat. The second layer links several local nodes across a region, aggregating inputs from longer‑range surveillance radars, short‑range drone‑detection radars, passive RF sensors, and electro‑optical systems. The third layer connects the C‑UAS network into the wider integrated air‑defence system (IADS), distinguishing among small drones, one‑way attack systems, cruise missiles, aircraft, and ballistic missiles so threats are routed to appropriate defenses and costly SAMs are conserved for high‑value targets.
What this means for the Pakistan Army, Pakistan’s defence industry, and forward units in Balochistan and FATA
- Pakistan Army: The service will have to manage trade‑offs between locally deployable hard‑kill systems (35 mm Oerlikon AAGs) and higher‑level effectors housed elsewhere in the IADS; integration could preserve SAMs for larger threats while enabling local nodes to reject low‑cost drones more efficiently.
- Pakistan’s defence industry: Firms such as DESTO, NECOP, and POF are supplying complementary capabilities — EW, portable jammers, ammunition, radars, and interceptor drones — but the industry’s immediate task is linking these pieces through data‑links and C2 architectures rather than building more standalone effectors.
- Forward units in Balochistan and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA): Units lacking long‑range effectors or directed energy systems remain vulnerable to insurgent drone attacks, but an integrated network could allow those units to tap longer‑range sensors and receive networked interceptor support from other regions.
Quwa’s assessment concludes that the “groundwork and integration layers for an actual, cohesive C‑UAS system are forming,” but it is “unclear if there is a unified effort to bring these all together into a strategic ‘dome’.” The article points to models such as Türkiye’s MKE TOLGA — which ties AESA radar and EO sensing to multiple effectors across ranges — and the conceptual move toward dense, multi‑layer “domes” (Israel’s Iron Dome, Türkiye’s Steel Dome, the United States’ Golden Dome) as illustrative of where counter‑drone architectures are headed. For Pakistan, the choice facing planners is explicit: continue operating a collection of localized tools, or accelerate the engineering and C2 work necessary to knit DESTO’s Spider, SAFRAH, RAAST, interceptor drones, HPM, and other effectors into a coordinated territorial air‑defence layer that can discriminate threats and ration high‑value interceptors.
