“The IDF is currently establishing a factory that will produce suicide drones (FPV drones) for use in all theaters of war,” Israel Army Radio reported.
The IDF factory: purpose, ownership, and timeline
Israel’s military is building an internal production facility to turn out first-person-view (FPV) suicide drones, with the stated goal of “industrializ[ing] and significantly expand[ing] the arsenal of suicide drones that the IDF has,” according to Israel Army Radio. The project will be run by the IDF’s Technology and Logistics Division, bringing manufacture in-house to reduce costs, substitute indigenous components for imported parts, and boost output.
The IDF estimates the factory will begin supplying large quantities starting in July. Initial monthly output is set at 1,000 drones, with plans to scale production to “tens of thousands” thereafter.
Production drivers: supply chain and security concerns
One immediate driver of the decision is a supply-chain and security concern: existing domestic manufacturers use Chinese components, a vulnerability the IDF-funded Israel Army Radio highlighted. Moving production into the IDF’s own division aims to eliminate that dependency and ensure procurement of only indigenous parts.
The program’s planners link the factory to both cost and capacity: producing thousands per month is intended to increase battlefield capabilities while reducing reliance on external suppliers.
Hezbollah’s FPV employment and technical edge
Israeli reporting and open-source footage show Hezbollah increasingly using FPV drones in southern Lebanon. Video and social-media releases presented FPV strikes on Israeli vehicles — including two Merkava Mk.4 tanks, a D9 Caterpillar armored bulldozer, and what appears to be a Namer heavy IFV with a 30 mm Bushmaster Mk 2-equipped turret. Some footage suggests the FPV drones carried PG-7VL or PG-7AT high-explosive anti-tank (HEAT) warheads.
Notably, Hezbollah has relied heavily on fiber-optic guided FPV drones. Fiber-optic control wires reduce susceptibility to radio-frequency jamming and work around line-of-sight limitations that can otherwise constrain radio-controlled systems, according to the reporting.
Defensive responses: nets, active protection, detection, and interceptors
Faced with FPV attacks that have caused casualties and equipment damage, Israel is deploying a range of countermeasures. Field fixes include protective netting fitted to vehicles; the nets are intended to entangle attacking drones or keep detonations far enough from crews to reduce lethality.
Armored systems are also being adapted. Active protection systems (APS) — which use sensors to detect incoming threats and fire interceptors to destroy them — are being considered for hard-kill counter-drone roles. Israel has long deployed APS technologies, but reporting notes it is not yet clear how quickly specific systems such as Iron Fist can be upgraded for FPV engagement, and that lighter vehicles without APS remain vulnerable.
Additional measures under development or procurement include improved detection equipment and purpose-built interceptor drones designed to counter FPV weapons, according to YNet.
How technologists, policymakers, and frontline units are responding
- Technologists and security teams: Engineers inside the IDF’s Technology and Logistics Division are replacing foreign components with indigenous alternatives and designing production lines to scale output to thousands per month.
- Policymakers and procurement leaders: Decision-makers are shifting procurement from private domestic manufacturers with foreign parts to an IDF-run factory to address supply-chain risk and accelerate deliveries starting in July.
- Frontline units and vehicle crews: Troops are receiving physical countermeasures—netting on vehicles—and armor units are prioritizing adaptations to existing APS while lighter vehicles remain a pressing gap.
Conclusion
Israel’s decision to build an internal FPV drone factory responds directly to battlefield pressure from fiber-optic-guided attacks and worries about foreign component dependence. With an initial target of 1,000 units per month and an IDF estimate of supply beginning in July, the factory is a clear bet on quantity as well as sovereignty of supply. Whether production can rapidly reach the “tens of thousands” the IDF envisions, and how quickly defensive upgrades like APS adaptations and interceptor drones can protect lighter forces, are the concrete next steps the reporting leaves in focus.
