“The speed at which these adversaries are deploying counterspace capabilities is ‘mind-boggling,’” said General B. Chance Saltzman, the head of U.S. Space Operations.
The GNSS paradox: jamming, spoofing, and counterspace
Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) — once an unquestioned foundation of modern warfare — are now a double-edged sword. According to the reporting, GNSS jamming and spoofing are no longer the preserve of major powers: they are “routine features of the tactical environment,” occurring even in lower‑intensity conflicts. Maps accompanying the source material document a growing, systematic use of GPS disruption in identified conflict regions and show these techniques appearing before and during localized flare‑ups, including events in southeast Asia in 2025.
Electronic warfare applied to navigation is evolving quickly, the piece says, driven by an “AI‑enabled arms race” of measures and countermeasures. Beyond jamming and spoofing, some actors have acquired counterspace capabilities with the potential to undermine the GPS satellite architecture itself — a development that, as General Saltzman put it, is unfolding at startling speed.
Why inertial navigation is the battlefield's new "source of truth"
Faced with contested skies and degraded satellite services, the reporting insists any resilient navigation solution must not rely solely on external signals. The bedrock of that independence is high‑performance inertial navigation. An inertial navigation system (INS), the article explains, is fully passive: it emits no signals, receives none, and is inherently immune to jamming and spoofing. It functions as the platform’s internal reference — its “source of truth” — by depending only on constants such as gravity, the rotation of the Earth, and the laws of physics.
The operational stakes are stark. Without a reliable internal reference, a unit that cannot determine its orientation cannot dependably maneuver, synchronize effects, or deliver precision fires. In practical terms, the source says, such a unit is combat ineffective when external signals fail.
Fiber Optic Gyroscopes (FOG): stability, north‑seeking, and durability
Among inertial technologies, the report singles out Fiber Optic Gyroscopes (FOG) as the most operationally relevant for high‑intensity land warfare. Three advantages are highlighted:
- High‑end stability for extended autonomy. FOGs offer bias stability that supports longer periods of accurate dead reckoning once satellite signals are lost, reducing cumulative error and extending mission continuity in GNSS‑denied environments.
- Instantaneous north‑seeking (gyrocompassing). A robust land navigation system must autonomously determine True North whether stationary or maneuvering over rugged terrain; FOGs provide that capability with speed and reliability, enabling immediate operational readiness without external movement or signal references.
- Durability and lifecycle value. With no moving parts, FOGs are far more resilient to shock and vibration than legacy mechanical gyros and carry near‑zero maintenance requirements, translating into greater lifecycle value in combat conditions.
These characteristics position FOG‑based INS as the way to restore autonomy to platforms that cannot depend on satellites or RF signals.
Responses under consideration: hardening space systems and building independence
The reporting describes a necessary multi‑layered response. Efforts to harden the GPS constellation — through M‑Code, next‑generation satellites, and more discerning GPS receivers — are characterized as necessary steps that will improve resilience. But they are also limited: they still depend on a physical satellite infrastructure that adversaries may be able to target or degrade if they judge the stakes high enough. The implication is clear: hardening satellites and receivers must be paired with infrastructure‑independent sensors like FOG‑based INS.
What this means for technologists, policymakers, and ground units
- Technologists and security teams: The source points toward prioritizing photonics and inertial sensing advances — particularly FOGs — to enable assured navigation without external signals. These teams will likely focus on integrating high‑stability INS into vehicle and platform architectures.
- Policymakers and regulators: Decision‑makers, the article suggests, must adopt a layered approach that funds both constellation hardening (M‑Code and next‑generation satellites) and autonomous, infrastructure‑independent navigation capabilities for forces operating in contested environments.
- Ground combat units: For units in the field, the practical need is simple: maintain orientation and precision when satellites and RF are degraded. FOG‑based INS promise the continuity of operations that, according to the reporting, determines whether a unit remains combat effective.
Signals can be disrupted; the reporting’s refrain is blunt and limiting: physics cannot. By leveraging advanced photonics and inertial sensing — most notably FOG technology — the defense community can buy time and maneuver space when satellites do not answer. Whether procurement, doctrine, and industrial capacity move fast enough to make FOG‑based autonomy routine on the battlefield is the pressing question left by the record.
