"This is not something a friend does," said the Solomon Islands' prime minister, summing up a rare chorus of Indo‑Pacific criticism after a Chinese submarine test‑launched a ballistic missile on 6 July.
The 6 July missile test and the region's unusually unified response
On 6 July a Chinese nuclear‑powered submarine test‑launched a ballistic missile from the South China Sea into the Pacific Ocean; Beijing described the launch as routine. More than a dozen Indo‑Pacific governments, including several Pacific island nations, publicly criticised the action. Australia’s prime minister called the missile launch a provocation that “undermined regional stability,” noting it involved a nuclear‑capable ballistic missile. Japan said it had urged China not to proceed after receiving advance notification, a request Beijing ignored. The Philippines called the test “a reckless display of military power.”
Pacific island leaders spoke in stark terms: the Solomon Islands’ prime minister’s “not something a friend does” remark was echoed by Tuvalu’s prime minister, who expressed “grave and serious concern and disappointment” that China had violated the region’s Ocean of Peace Declaration — a compact committing Pacific states to a nuclear‑free region.
Even beyond the Indo‑Pacific, responses registered. On the day of the incident, NATO Secretary‑General Mark Rutte said the alliance “cannot be naive about China” and that “what happens in the Indo‑Pacific is relevant to what is happening in the trans‑Atlantic.”
Why Brussels’ public reaction matters: investments and expectations
The European Union has in recent years invested political capital in becoming a more consequential security actor in the Indo‑Pacific. It has signed Security and Defence Partnerships with Japan, South Korea, India and Australia; launched political, security and defence dialogues with the Philippines and Indonesia; and expanded cooperation on security and resilience with Pacific island countries. For those commitments to carry strategic weight, the article argues, they must be visible in practice.
Yet, the piece notes, the EU remained silent immediately after the 6 July launch. The EU’s high representative for foreign affairs and security policy, Kaja Kallas, “had another chance this week” to show Brussels took its Indo‑Pacific security partnerships seriously — for instance by calling out alleged aggression by the China Coast Guard against the Philippine navy — but she had not done so, the source says. The article highlights one prior positive move: Kallas did issue a statement in support of the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s ruling in favour of the Philippines on 14 July, marking the 10‑year anniversary of that decision.
How the EU’s own security assessment frames the problem
The EU’s recent security assessment — which will feed into its new security strategy — places China prominently for three reasons: its role as a “key enabler” of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, its “increasingly assertive military behaviour in the South and East China Seas and across the Taiwan Strait,” and the expansion of its nuclear arsenal. The article points out that the missile test coincided with the start of the Sino‑Russian Joint Sea 2026 naval exercise, an alignment that “ticked all the boxes” of those concerns.
Australia, Japan, the Philippines, and Pacific island leaders: unified messaging
- Australia’s prime minister: described the launch as a provocation that undermined regional stability because it involved a nuclear‑capable ballistic missile.
- Japan: publicly revealed it had urged China not to proceed after receiving advance notification, a request China ignored.
- The Philippines: called the test “a reckless display of military power.”
- Solomon Islands and Tuvalu prime ministers: voiced sharply critical language, the latter invoking the Ocean of Peace Declaration and describing the incident as a violation of that commitment.
The article underscores why that unified regional response is significant: unlike Europe, the Indo‑Pacific lacks an integrated security architecture, and many countries in the region have varying degrees of economic dependence on China. That combination makes coordinated political signalling — visible statements of concern — a primary tool of collective response.
A concrete diplomatic option: the suggested EU statement
The source offers a concise draft that it says would “go a long way” toward demonstrating the EU’s seriousness: “The European Union shares the concerns expressed by its partners across the Indo‑Pacific regarding the recent test launch of a nuclear‑capable ballistic missile and other destabilising conduct. The EU supports its partners’ calls on the People’s Republic of China to uphold its responsibility to maintain regional peace, stability and security.”
The article argues that such an expression of solidarity would reinforce the EU’s credibility as a security partner and make clear that coercive behaviour is not to be normalised — “whether in Europe or the Indo‑Pacific.” It warns that democratic silence and good faith yield nothing from Moscow or Beijing and instead can be read as an incentive for further aggression and division among democratic partners.
Kaja Kallas is in the Indo‑Pacific this week at a meeting of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations; the piece closes by saying a clear and unambiguous show of support by her would back up the EU’s claim to be a consequential global security actor. If Brussels does not speak now, the source warns, that silence will be heard not only in Canberra, Tokyo and Manila but also in Beijing — and will shape how future provocations are interpreted.
https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/eu-speak-out-about-china-you-owe-it-to-the-indo-pacific/
