"So now it’s confirmed: Ghost Shark uncrewed submarines will be able to lay mines, up to 12 at a time." The government confirmation on 19 October makes the capability real — but it also brings into sharp relief whether Australia can act quickly, lawfully and with allies' consent before an adversary has already transited the choke points that matter.
What Ghost Shark can do and who is building it
The uncrewed submarine program is being developed by Anduril in partnership with the Defence Science and Technology Group and the Royal Australian Navy. The newly confirmed mine-laying capability would allow an individual Ghost Shark to deploy up to 12 mines covertly from launch points that an adversary “cannot easily watch.” The platform is intended for persistent undersea missions without exposing crews.
Range, speed and the hard problem of reach
A September 2025 Strategist article by Sam Goldsmith and ASPI staff interpreted Anduril’s claimed “multi‑thousand mile range” as at least 3,200 km, but also estimated a cruising speed of only three to four knots to conserve battery energy. At that pace, a 1,600 km outward transit would take roughly 1.5 weeks. If the vehicle’s intended deployment radius is longer, deployment duration would increase proportionally.
Those maths matter operationally. To place mines at distance, Australia would either need a launch vessel already positioned in the region or permission for the uncrewed submarine to operate from the territory of a consenting partner. Both options require arrangements well before a crisis; a launch ship in contested waters would itself be exposed to attack.
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End the scrambleGeography, choke points and neutral waters
Australia’s northern approaches run through the Indonesian archipelago and across the Timor and Arafura seas. Mines are most effective in choke points, where an adversary’s vessels must pass; once hostile forces clear such bottlenecks, the threat disperses across a far larger area. The choke points that matter most lie in or beside neighbours’ waters, and mining there would obstruct Indonesia’s seaborne trade and shipping from other countries.
Legal constraints compound the political ones: the law of naval warfare bars belligerents from mining neutral waters, requires minefields to be recorded and notified, and protects neutral navigation. Forward mining therefore depends on diplomacy and partner consent as much as on hardware.
Mine-countermeasures and the risk to Australia’s own freedom of manoeuvre
The navy’s mine-countermeasures force has fallen from six Huon‑class minehunters to two, both described in the article as old, and the navy itself calls the capability “minimally viable.” That shortfall creates a gap between the ability to place denial mines and the ability to clear or re‑seed approaches. Mines laid closer to home risk obstructing Australia’s own navy, fuel imports and merchant trade as much as they would impede an adversary; submarines in open seas are particularly hard to track, meaning contact can be lost and mined areas may not channel enemy movement as planners expect.
What this means for Parliament, the Royal Australian Navy, and Indonesia
- Parliament and policymakers: The article argues that government should be able to say, without revealing operational detail, who authorises mining and at what level of crisis; how peacetime preparation differs from wartime laying; whether mines can be laid inert and activated later; and how Australia would coordinate with Indonesia and protect civilian shipping. It recommends that Parliament seek assurance that Defence has assessed the cost of delayed authorisation.
- The Royal Australian Navy and Defence planners: They must address operational questions about launch arrangements, interoperability with allies, stronger maritime domain awareness and exercises that rehearse warning failure and compressed timelines — while also remedying the reduced mine-countermeasures fleet.
- Indonesia and neighbouring states: Because choke points lie in or beside their waters, mining would impede their seaborne trade and require diplomacy and partner consent; the law of naval warfare protects neutral navigation and constrains unilateral mining in neutral waters.
Authority, warning and the final strategic choice
Warning is not a single thing: strategic indicators may give months, operational warning much less, and tactical warning can arrive too late for a platform that needs well over a week to reach its operations area. The article stresses that autonomy “delivers the mine without a crew. It does not relieve ministers of the decision.”
To make mining a credible deterrent rather than a risky escalation, Australia needs publicly accountable governance of maritime mining; tested crisis decision procedures; prearranged launch options with consenting partners; better maritime domain awareness; allied interoperability; and exercises that assume compressed timelines and warning failures. Parliament should demand that Defence quantify the operational cost of delayed authorisation.
The decisive question the article leaves on the table is stark and simple: will Australia recognise warning signs, make the decision and have its defences ready before a potential adversary reaches our shores?