What happens when a force trained on modern kit reaches back into an older toolbox? "Old‑school PLA vibes here," a China Defense blog post observed, as it described troops from a brigade of the 73rd Group Army employing high‑explosive satchels and related makeshift charges. The post frames that choice as more than nostalgia: it echoes a lesson the blog draws from the war in Ukraine about the continued battlefield relevance of simple explosive charges.
What the reporting shows
The China Defense blog reported that soldiers from a brigade of the 73rd Group Army were pictured or filmed using dynamite-style satchel charges. The post explicitly connects this behavior to a broader takeaway from the war in Ukraine, stating that "the humble satchel charge or the TM‑62 anti‑tank mine acting as one" remains tactically useful. Beyond that linkage, the blog characterizes the practice as part of a long‑standing PLA tradition of solving problems with dynamite.
Context and implications
The blog’s account highlights two points. First, personnel in at least one PLA brigade are employing low‑technology explosive solutions in training or operations. Second, the lesson drawn from another conflict — the war in Ukraine — is that such simple devices retain combat value. The combination of those observations suggests a conscious retention or revival of older methods alongside more modern capabilities.
Why experts and policymakers should care
- For technologists: The continued use of satchel charges and improvised anti‑tank techniques underlines that not all battlefield problems are solved by advanced sensors or precision munitions. Simpler, low‑cost explosive solutions can remain relevant in constrained or close‑terrain environments.
- For military planners and procurement officials: A force that sustains proficiency with basic explosive charges signals requirements for training, doctrine, and logistics that encompass both high‑end and low‑end ordnance. Doctrine that overlooks the operational utility of rudimentary charges risks a capability gap.
- For potential adversaries and defenders: The persistence of such tactics complicates assumptions about battlefield environments. Defensive measures and counter‑IED/charge tactics need to account for continued use of satchel charges and converted anti‑tank mines, as noted by the blog’s reference to Ukraine.
Balancing tradition and modernization
The image conveyed by the blog post is not simply of improvised fieldcraft but of institutional continuity: a brigade of the 73rd Group Army "carrying on the proud tradition of solving problems with dynamite," in the blog’s words. That continuity raises a strategic question about force design: how much emphasis should modern militaries place on preserving low‑tech skills that proved decisive or at least useful in other recent conflicts?
The China Defense post provides a snapshot rather than a comprehensive accounting, but it points to a larger tension shaping armed forces worldwide — between high‑technology transformation and the proven utility of simple, brute tools. If the lesson from Ukraine is that the humble satchel charge or a repurposed TM‑62 can still affect outcomes, then planners must decide how to integrate that lesson into training, doctrine, and force posture. Is modern warfare being over‑engineered at the expense of practical, hard‑earned fieldcraft?
https://china-defense.blogspot.com/2026/03/this-blows-pla-200kg-dynamite.html
