“Hammond hit the ground running on 9 July, promptly inserting ‘command’ back into ADF nomenclature.”
Admiral Mark Hammond’s first orders: restoring “command” to the ADF
On taking command of the Australian Defence Force (ADF), Admiral Mark Hammond immediately retitled the chief of joint operations as commander joint operations and began inserting the word “command” into various ADF committee structures. Those renamings, the original analysis argues, signal an increased institutional focus on operations and preparation for warfighting as Hammond begins what is likely to be a four‑year tenure.
Building a National Military Strategy beneath the National Defence Strategy
The piece calls for a National Military Strategy (NMS) to sit below the National Defence Strategy (NDS) and convert policy direction into executable military plans. The second iteration of the biennial NDS has established a rhythm of reassessment and replaced ad hoc white papers with an Integrated Investment Program. An NMS, the author argues, would apply locations, resources and timings to the ADF’s five tasks in the NDS, assign responsible commanders, and thereby “turn NDS direction into action.” Such a document would likely be classified in parts, although its overarching principles could be published. The government may also choose to create a whole‑of‑nation National Security Strategy (NSS) above the NDS; the US model of a strategy hierarchy — NSS, NDS and NMS — is presented as a useful guide.
Audit-ready is a season. It shouldn't be.
Evidence in spreadsheets, controls drifting between audits, frameworks multiplying on flat headcount. Nubivance runs continuous compliance on Rapid7 Cyber GRC - SOC 2, HIPAA, ISO 27001, PCI, CMMC.
End the scrambleMaking the long‑term case for deterrence beyond 2027
The article highlights a particular strategic pressure point in 2027. It notes reporting that President Xi Jinping directed the Chinese armed forces to be ready to invade Taiwan by 2027 and recalls that in 2021 Admiral Philip Davidson warned the US Congress of a possible risk within that window — a period which has come to be called the “Davidson window.” The author cautions that if 2027 passes peacefully there will likely be public and political calls to reassess military spending. The recommended response: CDF and others should argue that a peaceful 2027 would be evidence that allied deterrence is working and therefore needs reinforcing, not weakening. The piece states plainly that Beijing “aimed to be ready by then” and that “At no foreseeable time will Beijing drop its ambition to control the island,” concluding that “Australia must settle in for decades of militarily backing regional deterrence.”
Completing integration of the five domains — including space and cyber
The new CDF, the author notes, does not control whole‑of‑nation integration but does own integration of the uniformed force. Space and cyber capabilities have made “great strides” within the ADF, yet the article argues a way remains to achieve full integration across all five domains. Space and cyber do not need parity with navy, army and air force in size or resources, the piece states, but they should be considered equally as operational components. The development of capabilities, identity and esprit de corps for these newer components is presented as fundamental to an integrated armed force.
Spending and the communications challenge
All three recommended tasks — an NMS, a sustained deterrence posture, and full domain integration — will require higher defence spending, the analysis says, and Defence currently lacks a “strong social license” for increased budgets. Hammond’s personal advantage, according to the piece, is his “capacity for getting a message across,” and that, coupled with a stronger communications effort across Defence, should be used to make the case to the public for the investment the author believes the nation needs.
What this means for the Minister for Defence, Meghan Quinn, and the uniformed ADF
- The Minister for Defence: The article reminds readers that the CDF commands the ADF under the direction of the Minister, so the Minister will be central to decisions about operational posture, resourcing and public messaging tied to an NMS and deterrence policy.
- Defence Secretary Meghan Quinn: Under a long‑standing diarchy, the CDF shares responsibilities with the defence secretary for ensuring Defence meets government requirements; the secretary and CDF together will shape how strategy, investment and organisational reform are balanced.
- The uniformed ADF: The CDF “owns the integration of the uniformed force.” Units in space and cyber should be further developed as operational components, with attention to capability, identity and esprit de corps to make joint, multi‑domain operations effective.
Admiral Hammond begins his command at a time the author describes as “pivotal,” with compressed warning time and rising strategic risk in the Indo‑Pacific. The article sets out three concrete priorities for him over the next four years: develop a classified but actionable National Military Strategy beneath the NDS, press the case for sustained deterrence if 2027 passes without conflict, and complete the integration of all five domains of the ADF — supported by clearer public communications and likely increased spending. Whether those priorities translate into policy and political consensus will be the test of Hammond’s early command.
https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/a-to-do-list-for-australias-new-chief-of-the-defence-force/
