"a historic tragedy of epic proportions," Minxin Pei writes, describing how a moment in 1989 foreclosed a plausible path toward political reform in China.
Deng Xiaoping's 1978 "reform and opening" and its original intent
When Deng Xiaoping announced the "reform and opening" of China’s economy in December 1978, many inside and outside China expected a gradual political liberalisation to follow. Minxin Pei, professor of government at Claremont McKenna College and author of The Broken China Dream, argues those expectations were misplaced. According to Pei, Deng’s economic changes were explicitly designed to preserve the Chinese Communist Party’s political monopoly rather than to create a trajectory toward democracy. Introducing market mechanisms was a tool for consolidating party-state control, not a step toward creating a capitalist society divorced from party authority.
How Leninist institutions and weak guardrails set the stage
Pei emphasises a structural explanation: Deng left Leninist institutions intact while adding limited procedural constraints — collective leadership and age and term limits — intended to prevent a return to one-man rule. Those arrangements, however, were weak and inconsistently enforced. Pei contends the guardrails often did not apply to senior leaders; the formal institutions remained in place, but they proved vulnerable to political manoeuvre.
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End the scrambleXi Jinping's reversal: flipping the switch back to totalitarian control
Under Xi Jinping, Pei argues, the dormant totalitarian elements of the system were reactivated. Xi "ignored the checks and balances Deng established" and "pushed through an amendment of the explicit term limit on the presidency." With Leninist institutions intact, Xi was able to consolidate near-absolute power by reversing the post‑Deng constraints and resuscitating the old, more centralised system.
Leadership struggles that shaped the present: Zhao Ziyang, Li Peng, Jiang Zemin, Li Keqiang and Bo Xilai
Pei traces a series of high-stakes internal contests that determined the system’s trajectory. In the 1980s a tug-of-war among reformists, pragmatists and hard-liners reached a climax in 1989. Party secretary Zhao Ziyang—who wanted economic and political reform—was absent from Beijing on a short trip to Pyongyang at the height of the Tiananmen demonstrations. That absence, Pei argues, allowed his hard-line rival Li Peng to secure Deng’s approval for a tougher approach. Zhao was subsequently ousted and replaced by Jiang Zemin.
Later contests also mattered. Pei notes Xi’s rise was not inevitable: at the 2007 party congress Xi and his reformist rival Li Keqiang were closely matched for a key second‑tier slot, and in 2012 Xi had to work to oust Bo Xilai, a charismatic contender who could have threatened Xi’s authority. Those internal battles, Pei suggests, were decisive moments that shaped who would hold power and how it would be exercised.
What this means for Western policymakers, China’s next‑generation leaders, and China watchers
- Western policymakers and those who backed China’s economic opening: Pei highlights a key misjudgement — Western support, including embracing China’s membership in the World Trade Organization, rested on an assumption that economic development would produce democratisation. Pei calls that a critical misreading of the causal link between modernisation and political liberalisation.
- China’s next‑generation leaders: Pei points out there is "significant opposition to Xi’s rule" and that younger leaders are waiting in the wings. He warns the next step in Xi’s consolidation — notably at the 2027 party congress — is unlikely to be automatic and will probably involve further behind‑the‑scenes struggles.
- China watchers and analysts: Pei’s framework reframes how to read Chinese stability. What appears as a stable, monolithic system is, he argues, sustained by a delicate balance among competing CCP factions and by institutional choices made in the post‑Deng era.
The 2027 party congress and the lingering question
The CCP’s next party congress is scheduled for late 2027 and, Pei notes, is widely expected to confirm Xi for a fourth five‑year term as head of the party. Extending Xi until 2032, Pei writes, would consolidate his position as "China’s longest‑serving and most powerful leader since Mao Zedong." Yet Pei cautions that meaningful resistance remains inside the party and that extending Xi’s rule will likely require further internal manoeuvring.
Pei’s account reframes a familiar story: economic opening did not create inevitable political liberalisation because the party engineered reforms to survive, and that survival architecture could be—and was—reactivated. The central question his book leaves on the table is concrete and immediate: can the CCP’s internal balance hold as Xi seeks a fourth term in 2027, or will the behind‑the‑scenes rivalries Pei documents reshape what comes next?
