US Seeks to Empower Civilians Against Internet Repression

"The internet drove Iranian protests by enabling civilians to organize efforts to oppose the regime," wrote Vice Admiral Jeff Trussler, USN (ret.), and Sarah Havdala — a pithy summary of why Tehran's nationwide shutdown this year mattered beyond military headlines.

Iran's 88-day blackout and continuing controls

Iran shut down the country's internet and communications during nationwide anti-regime protests and Operation Epic Fury earlier this year, and restored access in late May after an 88-day blackout meant to prevent an uprising during the 2026 war. Even after restoration, Tehran "continues to heavily filter civilian communications," uses "sophisticated tools to detect citizens using virtual private networks (VPNs) and unauthorized satellite internet services like Starlink," and retains the technical ability to impose another nationwide blackout if unrest surges.

Why existing circumvention tools fall short

The article highlights three practical shortcomings of today's tools. First, consumer VPNs can be expensive and are "vulnerable to authorities’ monitoring and interference," a specific problem noted for Iranians who often turn to insecure, informal-market VPNs or pay for the regime’s heavily filtered "Internet Pro" tier. Second, conventional satellite broadband such as Starlink has physical constraints: terminals are large, difficult to smuggle and conceal, and "vulnerable to governments’ detection and jamming technology." Iranian police, the authors report, say they confiscated 997 Starlink devices and detained 163 people linked to the equipment between March and July 2026. Third, newer options like direct-to-cell (D2C) are promising but uneven: D2C can bypass the need for a traditional dish but remains in development, with "availability, speed and reliability" varying across providers and continuing technical and regulatory hurdles to broad deployment.

Starlink, Starshield, and the logistics of clandestine distribution

Because Starlink has been one of the few options that can operate during a terrestrial blackout, the authors urge the United States to "funnel Starlink terminals to civilians in need via activist organizations trained in smuggling humanitarian goods into conflict zones." They also recommend the US government work with SpaceX "to co-develop smaller Starlink terminals that are easier to smuggle and assemble as part of its Starshield program," aiming to reduce the visibility and legal risk for people in countries where possession of such equipment is criminalized.

Direct-to-cell (D2C): technical promise and policy steps

D2C technologies can "directly connect to a satellite, bypassing the need for a traditional dish," and companies are actively working to expand D2C’s ability to support communication, web browsing and livestreaming across more smartphone models. The authors argue Congress should direct relevant departments or agencies to accelerate D2C development and testing. Once secure and ready for public distribution, they suggest the State Department "collaborate with humanitarian organizations to distribute D2C-compatible phones." They also call on the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control to "quickly issue distributors the proper licenses" so sanctioned or restricted trade barriers do not prevent delivery of these tools to civilians.

Policy package the authors propose

• Short term: prioritize funneling existing Starlink terminals to civilians through activist and humanitarian distribution channels trained in smuggling relief supplies.
• Medium term: negotiate with SpaceX under Starshield to co-develop smaller, less conspicuous terminals suitable for clandestine distribution.
• Long term: push Congress to direct agencies to work with D2C companies to mature capabilities and permit State and Treasury departments to distribute D2C phones and license transport under OFAC.

What this means for technologists, policymakers, and humanitarian organizations

• Technologists and security teams: expect a push to harden D2C for reliable cellular communication, web browsing and livestreaming across multiple handset models while minimizing detectability.
• Policymakers and regulators: will need to balance sanctions and export controls with new licensing paths (OFAC) and congressional direction to speed testing and distribution of satellite and D2C tools.
• Humanitarian organizations and activist networks: may be asked to take on smuggling-style distribution roles for Starlink and D2C devices, requiring training and legal clarity to operate under sanctions regimes.

The authors frame the problem bluntly: authoritarian regimes "increasingly weaponize the internet and civilian communication to repress dissent," and current US capabilities left civilians in Iran poorly supported during one of the country's most consequential blackouts. Their prescription stitches together immediate relief (Starlink distribution), hardware redesign (smaller terminals via Starshield), accelerated productization (D2C), and bureaucratic fixes (OFAC licensing, congressional direction, State Department distribution). Whether those steps are feasible — technically, legally and politically — is the next question the piece leaves on the table.

Original story: The US needs an information-warfare strategy for Iran — and beyond