Iran's multi-domain attack profile and the tactical challenge
Officials and industry observers describe the recent confrontation as a demonstration of concurrent, multi-domain attacks designed to overwhelm defenders. Mitrevski said the Iranian threat “challenged the defender to defeat low-cost threats with low-cost defensive means, and defeat high-cost, more capable threats with more capable effectors.” The combat mix included several classes of missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) launched in significant numbers and on compressed timelines.
The arrival of low-cost drone swarms—most prominently Iran’s Shahed, “which has a cost per drone measured in the tens of thousands”—has reshaped the arithmetic of air-and-missile-defense (AMD). The defended asset matters, but the cost imbalance between inexpensive attackers and high-priced interceptors complicates tactical choices and force-sizing decisions.
Cost, value, and Tom Karako’s prescription
Tom Karako, director of the Missile Defense Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), framed the dilemma bluntly: “The value is what you defend,” but affordability remains a real constraint. He warned against assuming unlimited spending even when defending high-value assets.
Karako argued that available counter-UAS technologies—less expensive than traditional interceptors—should be bought in volume: “Well, then start buying more of the kind of UAS things that are already available, already fielded and already operational. Just go and turn up the volume dial on that.” He rejected the shorthand complaint that “you shouldn’t kill a $40,000 drone with a $4,000,000 missile” by pointing to procurement choices as the lever to change the balance.
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End the scrambleInterceptor depletion, radar losses, and proven AMD performance
AMD systems have continued to perform effectively in recent engagements, with defenders able to counter waves of cruise missiles and drone swarms at a high success rate. At the same time, the campaign burned through interceptors at an “alarming rate,” and the loss of THAAD/TPY-2 radars “have forced the US to scramble to ensure assets in the Middle East are protected,” according to the reporting.
The record of AMD performance reaches back decades; the Patriot system is cited as an historical example, “dating back to the first Persian Gulf War when the Patriot system was shooting down Scuds.” But the changing threat set—low-flying, highly maneuverable swarms alongside high-speed and ballistic threats—demands adaptation in doctrine and force structure to handle simultaneous, diverse attack profiles.
Industrial base constraints: solid-rocket motors, radars, and demand signals
Replenishing expended interceptors and rebuilding inventory presents industrial challenges. The report highlights that components such as solid-rocket motors “require a complex manufacturing process,” and that building THAAD/TPY-2 radars is an “extended, multi-billion-dollar task.” Inconsistent demand over time has eroded production capacity, leaving stockpiles thin at a moment of urgent need.
Mitrevski pointed to a policy environment that includes the NDS, “executive orders, the reconciliation budget, acquisition reform initiatives and other policy pieces,” arguing these together create “plenty of demand signals — including the Department of War’s priorities to defend the homeland with next-generation air and missile defense and supercharge the defense industrial base.” The implication is that coordinated, sustained demand will be necessary for industry to scale production.
What this means for technologists, policymakers, and procurement leaders
- Technologists and security teams: Expect pressure to accelerate fielding of counter-UAS and short-range air defense systems that are cheaper per engagement than traditional interceptors, and to design layered approaches that mix lower-cost effects with higher-end interceptors.
- Policymakers and budget planners: Will need to reconcile affordability with global defense commitments; the policy instruments cited — NDS, executive orders, reconciliation budget, and acquisition reform — are the levers to create the consistent demand industry requires.
- Procurement and defense industrial leaders: Must prioritize scaleable, manufacturable solutions—solid-rocket motor production and radar construction are explicitly flagged as bottlenecks—and respond to calls for a munitions ramp to refill stockpiles.
The facts in the record are stark: AMD worked, but at a high consumable cost and against a threat mix that exposed gaps in capacity and procurement posture. As Karako put it, “We needed to do a munitions ramp before we vaporized a couple trillion dollars of interceptors,” and “Now we need it even worse.” The combination of tactical adaptation, buying the right mix of effects, and restoring industrial throughput will determine whether defenses can match the next wave of multi-domain attacks.
