Researchers at Technische Universität Berlin found a four‑digit Windows Hello PIN and a six‑digit BitLocker PIN in lab tests by resetting the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) lockout after just 236 guesses, a pace that turns protections designed to take years into problems solvable in days.
HP OmniBook 3 and Framework Laptop 13: the lab demonstration
In controlled tests the researchers attacked two locked, up‑to‑date laptops. On an HP OmniBook 3 with an AMD Ryzen AI 5 330 processor and a BitLocker‑encrypted drive they automated PIN entry from 1000 upward and recovered a Windows Hello PIN of 1235 after 236 tries in 57 minutes. On a Framework Laptop 13 with an Intel Core Ultra 5 125H processor and Winbond flash, they found a BitLocker startup PIN of 123457 after 236 tries in 6 minutes and 55 seconds.
Both systems were physically opened, their mainboard flash chips removed, and a custom board wired in. A script read the screen, typed PINs and restarted the laptops through a KVM switch; firmware settings were adjusted to slow the device‑to‑flash link so the researchers’ board could keep up. They publish their attack firmware, board designs and scripts, and note the reproductions are not plug‑and‑play — the RPMC attacks require one of their boards.
RPMC interposer and Winbond voltage‑glitch: how the bypass works
The core technical observation is that some recent PCs use a firmware TPM integrated into the processor rather than a discrete TPM chip. That firmware TPM stores state — including the count of wrong PIN attempts — encrypted on the mainboard flash. Newer systems attempt to protect that stored state with monotonic counters inside the flash chip called RPMC (Replay Protected Memory Counter), which are supposed to only ever increase.
The researchers describe two bypasses. On AMD‑based PCs that use RPMC, the processor firmware fails to verify that the counter actually increased. An interposer board placed between the processor and the flash can block counter updates while reporting success, letting an attacker write back an older saved state and reset the wrong‑guess count. Separately, RPMC chips made by Winbond can leak their signing key after a brief power‑supply glitch; with that key an attacker can forge any counter value. On the tested Intel laptop, a single glitch sufficed because the firmware fed the chip the same value at every boot, leaving the leaked key usable across restarts.

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Get a security leadWhich PCs are vulnerable and what AMD, Intel, Winbond, and Microsoft say
The researchers map vulnerability to processor and flash combinations:
- AMD‑based PCs with RPMC flash: open to the interposer attack. AMD confirms processor firmware has a flaw enabling this and tracks it as CVE‑2026‑43613 with a CVSS score of 5.1. AMD says fixes for most affected chips are planned between November and February 2027, across Ryzen, Ryzen AI, Ryzen Threadripper, Athlon and EPYC families, and that one product is unnamed with no date yet.
- AMD‑based PCs without RPMC flash: on two AMD desktops the researchers could reset the count by writing an old copy back with an ordinary flash programmer; they conclude many AMD systems likely lack additional protection, though they tested only two desktops.
- Systems that rely on Winbond RPMC flash: vulnerable to the leaked‑key method regardless of processor; the flash maker has been told (first in January 2025, again in April) and is studying the issue, possibly including a new chip design, but has not committed to a fix or date.
- Intel systems without RPMC‑like flash: three Intel systems detected the same write‑back in the researchers’ tests. Intel said the research “did not demonstrate a vulnerability in an Intel component,” and its security team described the reused value as a weakness.
On disclosure timelines, the researchers informed AMD in February and Microsoft in April. Microsoft rated the Windows Hello report “moderate severity,” declined a CVE or bounty for that finding, and committed to raising its recommended minimum Hello PIN length to six digits. A Windows 11 test build released late last week makes six digits the minimum for personal‑account Hello PINs, with an option to use four.
Impact on PIN cracking times for Windows Hello and BitLocker
With the TPM lockout bypassed, the researchers’ measured speeds dramatically shorten worst‑case cracking times. From their timings they compute a worst case of 40 hours to brute‑force a four‑digit Hello PIN when the lockout can be reset, versus 69 days with the documented lockout in place. For a default six‑digit BitLocker PIN, the worst‑case drops from 19 years to 20 days. In their two tests both PINs (1235 and 123457) were found in 236 attempts.
The difference stems from how lockout counters are returned to attackers after each reset: Windows Hello enforces restarts after every five wrong attempts but did not apply additional delay on the tested AMD laptop; BitLocker’s startup prompt adds no limit of its own, so each reset restored a fresh 32 attempts on the tested Intel laptop.
How technologists, enterprises, and end users should respond
- Technologists and security teams: the researchers advise adding at least two digits to Hello and BitLocker PINs. For Windows Hello for Business, raise the Minimum PIN length policy (Computer Configuration > Administrative Templates > System > PIN Complexity). For BitLocker, raise the Configure minimum PIN length for startup policy (allows 4–20 digits and requires six by default) and consider turning on “Allow enhanced PINs for startup” to permit letters and symbols.
- Enterprise procurement and admins: follow AMD’s planned firmware updates and, until fixes arrive, keep affected PCs under strict physical control and watch for tampering. Microsoft in May advised moving BitLocker from TPM‑only to TPM+PIN as a mitigation to block related bypasses (the researchers cite this as part of Microsoft's YellowKey mitigation).
- End users and device owners: on AMD systems you can check for RPMC presence by booting Linux and running grep . /sys/bus/pci/drivers/ccp/*/rpmc_*; missing files do not prove absence. For Intel systems there is no equivalent software check; owners would need to open the device and look for a Winbond chip marked 25R or 74M.
The researchers leave some questions concrete: Winbond has not committed to a hardware fix, AMD’s bulletin does not cover AMD PCs without RPMC flash nor says whether updates will prevent an attacker installing older firmware, and Microsoft’s change to recommended PIN length is reflected in a test build but not yet in universally deployed updates. For now, the simplest, immediate defense the researchers and vendors agree on is longer, stronger PINs — and keeping devices physically secure.
https://thehackernews.com/2026/11/flash-chip-attack-bypasses-tpm-lockout.html



