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Star Blizzard Targets Cloud Identities for Mass Data Theft

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"Cold Relic’s campaigns demonstrate the convergence of human-centric social engineering and cloud identity abuse. By obtaining access to strategic personnel rosters and operational documents, Russian intelligence services turn legitimate business communications into attack vectors against trusted partners," Google wrote in a blog dated November 17, 2026.

Who Star Blizzard (aka Cold Relic) is targeting and why it matters

New analysis from Google lays out a pattern: the Russian cyber-espionage actor Star Blizzard — also tracked under the names Coldriver, Callisto, Cold Relic and Gossamer Bear — is focused on high-value targets in policy and defense-related sectors across North America and Europe. The group's tradecraft turns stolen organizational data into the very pretexts it uses to expand access, allowing one successful compromise to seed further intrusions against partners and professional contacts.

Social engineering and the chain of compromise

Google's write-up describes a clear human-centric method. After obtaining initial credentials through spearphishing, the actor mines email archives, personnel lists and operational documents to craft authentic impersonations. In a documented sequence, accounts and emails taken from a first victim were later used to impersonate employees when contacting second victims. The second intrusion began with secure-messaging contact impersonating someone from the earlier compromise and escalated to phishing links that captured credentials and authentication tokens.

Cloud identity abuse: MFA fatigue, SSO, and persistence

The report details how Star Blizzard combines social engineering with cloud identity manipulation. In a late-2025 intrusion, the actor used stolen super-admin credentials together with a multi-factor authentication (MFA) push notification fatigue attack to gain access. Access was routed through a US residential proxy network positioned near the victim, and the adversary leveraged super-admin privileges to export large volumes of data and to remove traces — including deleting Alert Center notifications.

In the second intrusion, the researchers observed the actor capture Entra ID credentials and authentication tokens; Entra ID served as the federated single sign-on (SSO) provider for the victim's Google Workspace. After authenticating, the actor registered and used a new MFA device in the SSO solution to maintain access. Google also observed that the actor retained access to one victim environment for several months, repeatedly targeting cloud drive documents tied to credentials, personnel information and email archives.

Mass data collection and operational tradecraft

Star Blizzard's objective went beyond broad data grabs. The actor performed bulk downloads of cloud drive content, mass-shared files to an attacker-controlled email account, and initiated a domain-wide data export using Google Workspace Customer Takeout. Researchers emphasize the actor’s searches for materials that make future social-engineering campaigns more convincing — organizational rosters, contact lists, resumes and event schedules — turning legitimate documents into intelligence for subsequent phishing and impersonation.

Google’s mitigation recommendations

  • Enrich authentication logs with residential proxy and VPN IP reputation feeds and apply conditional access policies to block or detect logons from known proxy networks.
  • Implement cloud storage data loss prevention (DLP) policies to warn or block users creating, uploading, or externally sharing files that match sensitive patterns — a response to the group's exploitation of user-stored credentials and secrets in cloud storage.
  • If an intrusion is identified, revoke all user sessions and force password resets for impacted accounts.
  • Enforce phishing-resistant MFA, particularly hardware keys which cannot be intercepted or approved via fatigue attacks.
  • Restrict and audit passkey registrations.

How technologists, policymakers, and affected enterprises should react

Technologists and security teams will read Google’s findings as a reminder to treat identity and cloud storage as a single defensive surface: enrich logs for proxy reputation, harden SSO configurations like Entra ID, and enforce phishing-resistant MFA. Policymakers and regulators responsible for critical sectors may need to reassess guidance on identity hygiene and incident response given the group’s use of domain-wide exports and long dwell times. Affected enterprises — particularly those whose collaborators are in policy or defense-related roles — should assume that any compromise of trusted partners can generate believable, targeted pretexts and plan containment and notification accordingly.

Google also noted in its November 17, 2026 post that it observed new phishing operations by the actor as recently as November 2026, underscoring that these techniques remain current. The pattern is straightforward and urgent: social engineering plus cloud identity abuse equals scalable intelligence collection. Organizations that separate cloud storage protection from identity governance risk leaving the gap the adversary is exploiting.

Read the original Google-based report