Satellite Surveillance Gaps Exposed as Adversaries Develop Anti-Satellite Capabilities

"Space is no longer a benign domain – it’s a warfighting domain," writes Stephan Hanna, Lead Product Manager at Vantor.

The 2007 inflection and the rush to orbit

Hanna points to a specific turning point: China’s destructive Fengyun-1C anti-satellite test in 2007, which "created thousands of pieces of debris" and demonstrated a credible counterspace capability. That moment, he argues, helped set the conditions for what followed — an acceleration from the early 2010s driven by affordable commercial launch services and the rapid proliferation of satellites. Nations and commercial operators began launching constellations "numbering in the thousands," producing far higher orbital density and far more traffic to observe and manage.

Kinetic and non-kinetic threats in recent conflicts

The source traces an expanding threat picture. It notes that "some of our largest adversaries, including China and Russia, have demonstrated the ability to directly target satellites with kinetic attacks," and that the war in Ukraine has produced "numerous cyberattacks and electronic warfare attacks leveraged against satellite systems, hardware, and signals." The article also relays claims that Russia could be in possession of — or developing — a weapon intended to attack multiple smaller satellites in Low Earth Orbit, such as those operated by Starlink.

A concrete near‑miss: Kosmos-2610–2613 and ICEYE‑X36 (June 2026)

Hanna cites a recent, detailed example of how on-orbit behavior has become more aggressive and harder to interpret. In June 2026, four Russian satellites — Kosmos-2610–2613 — "performed fuel-intensive plane changes to align with Finnish-American ICEYE‑X36," a satellite described as supporting Ukraine and Western governments. Tracking data, he writes, showed repeated close-approach geometry with "cross-track distances reportedly as small as roughly 500 m." No interference or physical contact was reported, but the episode illustrates the limits of track data alone for determining intent.

Non‑Earth Imagery (NEI): the "last mile" of space domain awareness

Hanna introduces Non‑Earth Imagery (NEI) as imagery of objects in space rather than imagery of Earth. When generated with high‑resolution sensors — he cites Vantor’s high resolution WorldView constellation as an example — NEI can show "space debris, spacecraft, or other celestial bodies" with the visual fidelity needed to characterize payloads, distinguish physical marks and features, and detect deployed hardware or damage.

NEI is presented not as a replacement for existing systems but as a complementary layer. Ground‑based radars and optical telescopes excel at wide‑area detection and tracking; NEI provides the close‑range visual intelligence needed to identify what a track represents and to "truly see what payloads a spacecraft is carrying" or whether two spacecraft are interacting in a threatening way. To illustrate, the article uses a maritime analogy: long‑range radar can track a vessel’s course, but a close‑up image reveals whether it has changed configuration or deployed equipment.

AI, autonomy, and faster responses

The article argues that pairing NEI with advanced artificial intelligence will change operational timelines. AI can "more rapidly and autonomously detect changes to spacecraft," Hanna writes, and, when a change is identified as potentially malicious, those systems could alert operators or even "direct satellites to evade attacks — protecting spacecraft and the mission‑critical capabilities they enable." The combination, he suggests, would reduce latency between detection and response and provide a more actionable picture for decision-makers.

What this means for the military, commercial satellite operators, and AI developers

• Military: Needs higher‑fidelity visual intelligence to classify and attribute proximity operations and to understand whether an approach is benign, accidental, or hostile — using NEI to supplement ground‑based tracks and telemetry.
• Commercial satellite operators: Will rely on NEI to identify unexpected proximity, detect damage, and validate whether a satellite has deployed a payload or been tampered with, filling gaps left by geography‑constrained ground sensors.
• AI developers and systems integrators: Are tasked with building rapid, reliable autonomy that can detect changes in imagery, generate alerts, and potentially enable automated defensive maneuvers without adding risky latency.

Hanna’s central case is pragmatic: as launch rates and satellite counts climb and as counterspace tools diversify, traditional sensing alone will leave critical "last mile" gaps. NEI — especially when fused with ground assets, radars, telemetry, and AI — is presented as a way to close those gaps and bring more actionable clarity to an increasingly contested orbital environment. The open question his argument leaves is operational and immediate: can NEI capabilities and the AI that drives them be integrated quickly enough into existing space domain awareness systems to match the pace of hostile approaches and new counterspace capabilities?

https://governmenttechnologyinsider.com/nei-a-way-to-know-whats-really-happening-on-orbit/