“ASD(SO/LIC) cannot effectively conduct program oversight, in part, because DOD policy has not fully enabled it to perform its acquisition-related responsibilities,” the Government Accountability Office (GAO) wrote in a report released today.
GAO finds friction between ASD(SO/LIC) and SOCOM on access and oversight
The GAO examined collaboration between the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD(SO/LIC)) and the Special Operations Command (SOCOM), the command the civilian office oversees for budgeting of acquisition programs. The watchdog concluded that disagreement between the two organizations about the level of access ASD(SO/LIC) should have to some programs and meetings has left the civilian office without the data it needs to carry out acquisition oversight.
“We found that these [civilian] officials can’t effectively carry out the office’s oversight responsibilities as they can’t always get access to relevant program information or meetings,” GAO wrote. The report tied that lack of access to difficulty ensuring that acquisition programs align with Department of Defense priorities on budget and capabilities.
Nine major-capability programs reviewed and where they stand
The GAO looked at nine “major capability” acquisition programs to assess cost and schedule performance. The programs reviewed were:
- AC-130J Ghostrider fixed-wing aircraft;
- Skyraider II armed overwatch fixed-wing aircraft;
- Silent Knight Radar aircraft;
- Dry Combat Submersible maritime asset;
- Dry Deck Shelter Extension maritime asset;
- Sea, Air, Land (SEAL) Delivery Vehicle Mk 11 maritime asset;
- Mk 18 Mod 1 Unmanned Underwater Vehicle;
- MH-47G Block II Chinook helicopter; and
- MH-60M Block I Black Hawk helicopter.
The verdict: only the MH-47G Block II reported cost growth, but five programs reported schedule delays — MH-47G Block II, Dry Combat Submersible, Mk 18 Mod 1 UUV, Skyraider II and SEAL Delivery Vehicle Mk 11 — and GAO noted that schedule slips can lead to additional cost increases over time.
SOCOM portal reporting gaps complicate oversight
SOCOM’s acquisition policy requires programs to report current information — including cost estimates — in an online portal. Yet officials for eight of the nine selected programs did not maintain that information. GAO attributed the shortfall to the fact that SOCOM’s acquisition policy did not specify the frequency with which program officials must update cost estimates in the portal.
“Having ready access to current cost estimates in the portal could help support officials’ efforts to identify potential cost growth risks or opportunities to reallocate resources,” GAO added, linking the reporting gap directly to reduced visibility for oversight activities.
Three GAO recommendations accepted by the Pentagon
To address those problems, GAO made three recommendations to Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth; the department agreed with all three. The recommendations call for:
- Fully institutionalizing the ASD(SO/LIC) in policy and guidance so the civilian office and the SOCOM commander better collaborate on documenting clear protocols for acquisition-related responsibilities;
- Ensuring the SOCOM commander updates the command’s acquisition policy documents to specify the frequency and circumstances under which program officials should update program cost estimates; and
- Making sure the SOCOM commander updates acquisition policy documents to reflect leading practices for iterative product development to help with speed and innovation.
The department’s agreement indicates intent to change written authorities and reporting requirements; the report does not publish timelines for those updates.
How SOCOM, ASD(SO/LIC), and program officials will respond
SOCOM will be the organization tasked with updating its acquisition policy documents to set update frequencies and to incorporate iterative development practices. ASD(SO/LIC) stands to be formally institutionalized in policy and guidance, which GAO framed as necessary to secure clearer access to program information and meetings. Program officials will be expected to begin maintaining current cost estimates in SOCOM’s online portal once the policy specifies frequency and circumstances for updates.
Those changes take on added significance as the command could see an influx of funding tied to the department’s emerging plans: the Pentagon is considering a plan to spend $55 billion on a replacement for the Replicator initiative, dubbed the Defense Autonomous Warfare Group (DAWG), and SOCOM is leading the effort. “I think of the DAWG as a pathfinder, they’re out there finding the best technology for us and working on integration,” Jules “Jay” Hurst, now nominated to take the reins full time as the Pentagon’s comptroller, told reporters in April. “They’re with these companies, live right now, testing different systems and orchestration tools for autonomy, and they’re giving them live feedback.”
GAO’s findings are straightforward: insufficiently defined policy and inconsistent data reporting have constrained ASD(SO/LIC)’s ability to oversee SOCOM acquisition programs. The Pentagon’s agreement with the GAO recommendations sets a clear next step — updates to policy and reporting practices — but the impact will depend on whether the SOCOM commander’s revisions deliver the access, cadence, and iterative practices GAO says are needed to keep schedule slippage from turning into broader cost growth.
