"Pakistan’s private sector has started to enter the country’s military drone effort," Quwa reported — and three developments in 2026 show how that shift is unfolding.
Ministry of Defence Production opens the door
The Ministry of Defence Production (MoDP), fronted by a serving Directorate General Defence Purchase (DGDP) official, has publicly invited private firms to help meet the armed forces’ drone requirements. That formal call matters because it signals a change in procurement posture: for years, Pakistan’s drone programmes were run largely through state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and the MoDP’s outreach indicates a willingness to broaden the supplier base.
Woot-Tech’s rocket-assisted take-off test
Private firm Woot-Tech recently tested a rocket-assisted take-off (RATO) motor designed to let a loitering munition launch without a runway. The trial demonstrates the private sector moving beyond component supply into mission-relevant subsystems that change how a munition is deployed — a capability particularly relevant where runway infrastructure is limited or contested.
Alsons Group unveils piston engines at Eurosatory
Alsons Group, historically an automotive supplier, unveiled a family of indigenously built piston engines for small unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) at the Eurosatory exhibition in Paris. Showing the engines outside Pakistan — at an international trade fair rather than a local defence event — underscores the dual commercial-defence strategy noted among new entrants: keep a civilian arm and an export market alongside defence work to spread risk and sustain production lines.
From SOE-driven platforms to volume economics
Since 2020, Pakistan’s drone build-up has been driven mainly by state bodies: NESCOM has overseen the Shahpar line, while the Pakistan Air Force’s National Aerospace Science and Technology Park (NASTP) worked with Turkey’s Baykar on the Yiha-3. But two conflicts — the 2022 Russia–Ukraine war and the May 2025 clash with India — shifted demand toward “large numbers of smaller, cheaper systems.”
The armed forces’ current wish list, as reported, includes Shahed-style loitering munitions, first-person-view (FPV) drones, interceptors, swarms, and low-cost cruise missiles. Producing thousands of low-cost, attritable airframes is a different industrial task from building a handful of complex platforms; it favours suppliers who can operate on profit-and-loss terms and chase volume economics, a space where private manufacturers can be competitive.
Structural and talent constraints at SOEs
State-owned enterprises carry a structural burden that helps explain the opening to private firms. SOEs “hold capacity and the long-term cost of sustaining it,” which obliges continued spending on underused labour and idle production lines when programmes stall. Pakistan Ordnance Factories (POF) remains structured around the G3 rifle and MP5 submachine gun, while the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex (PAC) continues to draw funding through gaps in JF-17 orders.
Operational frictions are also institutional: PAC is managed closely by the air force and officials working a project can rotate out every few years, forcing private partners to re-explain work to successors. Hiring at SOEs has slowed sharply since the late 2010s, and the defence sector has seen a steady flow of aerospace engineers leave for the UAE, Australia, and Europe — a talent drain that raises the opportunity cost of sustaining legacy SOE models.
What this means for the armed forces, private manufacturers, and procurement officials
- The armed forces: They are seeking high-volume, low-cost systems — Shahed-style loitering munitions, FPV drones, swarms and low-cost cruise missiles — and will increasingly look to suppliers who can deliver at scale rather than bespoke SOE platforms.
- Private manufacturers: Firms with civilian businesses and export ambitions, like Alsons, can use commercial revenue to fund R&D and absorb demand variability; success will hinge on steady orders and access to state procurement.
- Procurement officials and MoDP: The choice to invite private firms creates a policy test — whether incentives, contracts, and acquisition rules will be altered to hand work to industry, or whether the status quo will reassert itself around SOEs.
There is a precedent to watch: Turkey spent roughly 26 years moving from an import-dependent posture to a self-sustaining defence industry and export business. Whether Pakistan’s 2026 openings harden into durable capacity or fade will hinge less on any single engine or motor than on policy choices — specifically, whether the incentives to sell, invest, and hand substantive work to private industry are written into how the state buys.
