"integrated use of cyber and electronic warfare, ISR, space-based capabilities, and synchronized maneuver generating cross-domain effects." — Lt General Nauman Zakria
What Pakistan means by Multi-Domain Operations (MDO)
Since the May 2025 clash with India, leaders of Pakistan’s Army, Navy, and Air Force have pushed MDO as an organizing concept. At its simplest, Quwa describes Pakistan’s MDO as a capacity to deploy a single “enablement” infrastructure — for example, ISTAR — across the tri-services so that each arm can draw on common sensors and effects for its own strike or attack missions. The practical implication: a service arm can now access systems managed by another to close a shared kill-chain.
Army Rocket Force Command and PAF Space Command
The clearest example Quwa provides is the relationship between the Army Rocket Force Command (ARFC) and the Pakistan Air Force’s Space Command. The ARFC, which operates under the Army and functions as Pakistan’s principal surface-to-surface strike arm, is expanding its mix of guided artillery rockets, tactical ballistic missiles, and subsonic and supersonic cruise missiles. For the ARFC to realize its targeting potential, Quwa notes, its ISTAR network requires inputs from Space Command — the military steward of Pakistan’s growing satellite constellation (PRSC-EO1, EO2, EO3, S1, HS1, and planned InSAR).
Unified sub-service arms and the chain-of-command question
Below the buzzword lies an organizational tendency Quwa calls “unified sub-service” arms: sub-service elements that integrate deeply with counterparts in other branches. The author observes that these horizontal MDO chains could cut across traditional service silos and, adjacent to that horizontal line, create a C2 structure that owns the kill-chain. Quwa’s thesis is that Pakistan appears to be constructing MDO chains that would ultimately report back to the Chief of Defence Forces (CDF) — a necessary consolidation, the analysis argues, if centralized controls are to manage escalation risk.
Strike tempo, escalation risk, and lessons from recent fights
Quwa highlights how the evolving mix of ARFC capabilities — including the recent announcement of the Fatah-3 as an apparent supersonic-cruising missile and an Army disclosure that a “Fatah-5” had been tested — changes decision tempos. While specifics about Fatah-5 were not provided, the author infers additional range is likely being pursued. Historically, air strikes by the PAF required prep time that could create a de‑escalatory buffer; an ARFC-led horizontal layer linked to real‑time ISTAR could compress decision-to‑response timelines and allow strikes at earlier stages of a crisis, including preemptive options.
Quwa also draws an analogy to Iran’s “mosaic defence” approach, noting Tehran disaggregated C2 of its stand-off weapon assets to enable nimble operations even in the absence of top leadership. In Pakistan’s case, chaining ARFC and related MDO elements to the CDF is presented as a mechanism to retain strong controls and keep escalation in check — but it raises the strategic question Quwa poses repeatedly: who holds accountability when strike decisions carry the risk of wider war?
What this means for Pakistan military planners, the Chief of Defence Forces, and PAF/ARFC operators
- Pakistan military planners: will have to reconcile an operational appetite for speed and reach with institutional incentives to centralize escalation control; Quwa implies planners are pursuing increased conventional strike range while building ISTAR enablement nets.
- The Chief of Defence Forces (CDF): faces a potential new responsibility as the likely ultimate authority for horizontal MDO kill-chains if the organizational trend toward unified sub-service arms continues; Quwa’s analysis frames the CDF role as the place where accountability and stop-start authority for strikes could vest.
- PAF Space Command and ARFC operators: will be operationally interdependent — Space Command providing satellite-derived targeting and the ARFC delivering long-range strike effects — meaning technical integration and fast C2 links will be operational priorities for both units.
Quwa’s reporting reframes MDO from slogan to structure: a move toward horizontally integrated, potentially centralized kill-chains tied to advances in ISR, space assets, and strike systems such as the Fatah family. The central, concrete question the author leaves on the table is institutional: as Pakistan builds these horizontal layers, will command arrangements squarely place authority and accountability with the CDF, and if so, how will that re-shape decisions in the first tense hours of future crises?
