Visitors to sites run by at least 178 organizations — including CNN, the BBC and Zoom — loaded malicious scripts yesterday after an attacker “exploited a vulnerability in Experimentation,” Optimizely said in an incident notice posted at 01:02 UTC.
Optimizely Web Experimentation vulnerability and vendor response
Optimizely acknowledged a flaw in its Web Experimentation service and said the attacker used it to add malicious JavaScript to some customer projects. The vendor said it has fixed the flaw, removed the code, and taken steps to secure affected user accounts and added protections to stop unauthorized code from being delivered. The incident notice did not say how the flaw worked, how many projects were changed, when the fix was applied, whether the attacker still has access, or what customers should do.
Delivery mechanism: Project JavaScript, loaders, and webshell[.]lol
The attacker added a loader into the Project JavaScript field that many customers use inside Optimizely’s snippet. Snippets normally update themselves from cdn.optimizely.com and run Project JavaScript each time they load; the injected loader left the rest of each snippet intact and was still served from cdn.optimizely.com with Optimizely’s certificate. Snippets that sites host on their own domains were affected as well because the content came from the same project.
Report URI and other researchers found three loader variants. Most snippets loaded 1688360[.]cc/track.js directly; one variant hid that address in base64 so a simple text search would miss it; another carried a full copy of the payload so it would run even if the external domain was blocked. The first injection observed at 04:21 UTC loaded webshell[.]lol, which Report URI calls the same actor’s injector. That injector had also been observed in earlier campaigns using Kissmetrics, StorifyMe and Minute Media scripts since late last week, and traces of it go back to Turkish sites on September 17.

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See what we buildPayload behavior: crypto swaps, card skimmer, and iOS exploit kits
The primary payload, a file named track.js, performed multiple malicious functions. It replaced valid cryptocurrency wallet addresses with the attacker’s addresses in page text, forms, links, the clipboard and outgoing requests — but only when an address passed its chain’s checksum and appeared near payment wording such as wallet, deposit or send. StepSecurity noted that copying from a page is not safe because an address may be swapped before it is pasted into a wallet.
At 13:43 UTC the attacker added a card‑skimmer that captured card number, expiry date and CVV from form fields and sent them to the attacker’s server; the skimmer could not read cards entered in cross‑origin payment iframes such as Stripe’s hosted fields or Adyen’s, and it could not read cookies marked HttpOnly. The payload also sent visitors’ cookies and a screenshot to the attacker after performing an address swap near wallet or payment wording.
On iPhones and iPads the code loaded a second stage identified by researchers as iOS exploit kits. Reported kits include Coruna (targeting iOS 13.0 to 17.2.1) and DarkSword (targeting iOS 18.4 to 18.7). The infection chain loaded boot.js from two .icu domains, read the device’s iOS version, and opened a hidden iframe with Coruna for iOS 13–17, DarkSword for iOS 18, and a separate chain for iOS 26 that so far only collected device details. Between 17:13 and 17:57 UTC the actor added a Coruna iframe to every visit from iOS 18.6 or earlier; those pages reloaded every 60 seconds to retry the exploit. Researchers noted comments marking iOS 18.7.3 and later, and iOS 26.3 and later, as patched.
Cynet retrieved the second stage with an emulated iPhone browser and described the delivery as conditional — “not a successful compromise of a physical iPhone or iPad.”
Scope, timeline, and financial impact
Report URI checked 1,611 Optimizely snippets and found injected code in 188 of them, belonging to 178 organizations; its published list names all 178 domains. Affected organizations included Salesforce, GitLab, IKEA, HSBC, Equifax, Air France‑KLM, Ledger and Peacock, and Optimizely’s own main site and login page also carried the code. Some researchers have called the campaign OPTIMJACK.
The first injection was seen at 04:21 UTC in the BBC’s snippet. A mass cleanup began at about 20:40 UTC, and by 21:52 UTC only TalkTalk’s snippet still carried the code. Smartsheet reported that its script was cleaned once and then re‑infected with a hidden version of the code, which the firm says indicates the attacker still had access at that point.
Researchers report cryptocurrency theft. As of 19:25 UTC yesterday the attacker’s wallets had received about $7,040, all within roughly nine hours. StepSecurity put the total across the same addresses at about $6,600 and noted two of the addresses were already in use before the injections began, making it unclear which transfers came from victims.
What Site Owners and Visitors Should Check
- Report URI advises owners to open the Project JavaScript in every project and custom code in every experiment and look for 1688360, atob( or any script they did not write; review which users, API tokens and integrations can write to the account and rotate credentials; treat cards entered on Monday as possibly exposed; rotate session tokens not marked HttpOnly; and deploy a strict Content Security Policy (noting that allowing cdn.optimizely.com does not help in this case).
- StepSecurity recommends blocking the indicators below, fetching every snippet you serve and searching for 1688360, .icu and track.js, recording Last‑Modified headers, asking Optimizely which project IDs were changed and when, keeping third‑party tags off checkout pages, and replacing any card entered on an affected site on Monday. It also advises checking wallet addresses on a hardware wallet’s screen rather than against copied text and considering checks of iPhones and iPads on iOS 18.6 or earlier that visited affected sites.
- Cynet treats cdn.optimizely.com as a legitimate delivery host rather than an indicator and advises against broad blocks of that host or of the affected news sites.
Investigators have published indicators: domains such as 1688360[.]cc (with paths /track.js, /card.php and /hit.php), the IP 136.113.106[.]136, .icu staging domains (5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icu and eil786npto9u5bq[.]icu), webshell[.]lol, and two SHA‑256 hashes for track.js. Report URI has copies of every infected snippet and offers to share them with affected organizations and CERTs.
Optimizely removed the active code and said it secured accounts, but the company’s notice omitted key technical details and timelines. For organizations and visitors the immediate task is concrete: search for the injected indicators, rotate writable credentials and exposed tokens, and compare any Monday crypto payment addresses and card charges against what was intended. The injections’ reach — hundreds of project snippets and major public sites — makes those steps urgent.




