CVE-2026-84869 (CVSS score: 9.9) sits at the center of ongoing attacks that have forced ConnectWise to tell partners to update ScreenConnect to version 26.6.5 or later and to immediately disable several third‑party extensions on on‑premises deployments.
ConnectWise: investigation complete; update to ScreenConnect 26.6.5
ConnectWise said on Monday that it completed its investigation into unauthorized access targeting partner ScreenConnect environments and recommended customers ensure that the technician client is running version 26.6.5 or later. The company warned that additional activity targeting on‑premises environments continues to be reported where the identified third‑party extensions remain enabled and ScreenConnect has not been updated.
ConnectWise instructed partners: "On‑premises partners must immediately disable the identified extensions and update ScreenConnect to the latest supported version." The company also cautioned that "Disabling extensions and updating software do not remove unauthorized access or persistence already established on affected devices."
SCKit and RelayTrap: a multi‑component toolkit exploiting CVE-2026-84869
Researchers have linked the incidents to a multi‑component toolkit dubbed SCKit. The toolkit is capable of spreading from infected customer devices to managed service provider (MSP) technicians' computers and of compromising additional managed networks through a C# module called RelayTrap ("RelayTrap.cs").
According to the reporting, the malware uses a worm‑like technique that exploits CVE-2026-84869 — a critical‑severity flaw in the ScreenConnect client — to execute malicious code on a technician's workstation when they connect to an infected device. The advisory notes there is no evidence this worm‑like behavior has succeeded in the latest campaign.
Version 26.6.5 specifically addresses the CVE‑2026‑84869 issue, which could, in certain circumstances, allow files to be transferred and executed through an active remote session without authorization or host confirmation.

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Get coverageAuthentication bypass in RMM+ and observed tactics
As highlighted by Huntress and Blackpoint Cyber, unknown threat actors are suspected of exploiting an authentication flaw in RMM+ versions 1.0.31 and 1.0.32 to execute unauthorized commands while bypassing ScreenConnect's regular authentication controls. The combination of an authentication bypass in those RMM+ builds and the critical CVE in the ScreenConnect client underpins how attackers are moving between customer devices and technician systems.
Huntress findings: November 13 spike and hosting indicators
Huntress reported a spike in SCKit‑related activity on November 13, 2026, impacting 205 hosts across 41 organizations. Huntress further observed that "Across the incidents, we saw the new ScreenConnect client being hosted at 185.241.211[.]197, which is associated with 1337 Services GmbH, a bulletproof hosting provider known for previously hosting malicious traffic."
In one incident Huntress detailed, a rogue ScreenConnect client established persistence by creating a service named Windows Update Agent and placing a service executable called UpdateConnect.ClientService.exe in C:\ProgramData\Windows Update Agent (de362a425905bcc4)\, configured to run under the LocalSystem account.
Disabled extensions and partner scope: five add‑ons, 400 partner environments
In response, ConnectWise disabled five third‑party extensions — Labtech Plus, RMM Plus, RMM+, RMM Plus Password Link, and RMM+ Password Link — across 400 partner environments. The company emphasized that the mere presence of these extensions does not imply those environments were impacted, and it urged partners not to re‑enable or reinstall the extensions until further guidance is issued.
What this means for MSPs, security teams, and managed customers
- MSPs: Operators running on‑premises ScreenConnect should treat the disablement order as immediate operational guidance: do not re‑enable the named extensions and confirm the technician client is updated to 26.6.5 or later.
- Security teams at affected organizations: teams should assume that disabling extensions and updating software will not remove any existing unauthorized access or persistence and should investigate endpoints where the rogue client or the Windows Update Agent persistence mechanism may be present.
- Managed customers and procurement leaders: organizations that rely on MSPs should request confirmation of updates and extension disablement and seek evidence that any persistence indicators (including services like Windows Update Agent and files such as UpdateConnect.ClientService.exe in the ProgramData path) have been checked.
The technical chain described in the reporting — an authentication bypass in specific RMM+ builds combined with exploitation of CVE‑2026‑84869 and the deployment of SCKit/RelayTrap — explains why ConnectWise's immediate mitigations focus on both software updates and disabling extensions. The record from Huntress that the new ScreenConnect client was hosted at 185.241.211[.]197 and the detailed persistence technique using a Windows Update Agent service underscore the level of operational detail investigators have already observed.
ConnectWise's direction to disable extensions, update clients, and refrain from re‑enabling add‑ons while remembering that those steps do not remove established persistence leaves open a concrete next step for partners and incident responders: verify, hunt, and remediate confirmed persistence rather than relying solely on configuration changes.




