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GSA Successfully Tests Post-Quantum Encryption on Legacy PIV Cards

Close-up of a smart card with chip and contact area visible, on a neutral background with blurred laptop in the background.

"That work demonstrated that quantum-resistant credentials are not theoretical, they are achievable with the cards we have today, the technology we have today," said Dan Pomeroy Tuesday at FedTalks presented by FedScoop.

GSA's PIV-card experiment and Dan Pomeroy's findings

Federal technologists at the General Services Administration focused their initial post-quantum work on the smart Personal Identity Verification (PIV) cards that control access to GSA facilities, computers and authority to sign documents. According to Dan Pomeroy, deputy associate administrator at the Office of Technology Policy at GSA, engineers ran new post-quantum encryption algorithms directly onto the card chip, issued new credentials, and built the surrounding policies, certifications and hardware security modules to support the transition.

Pomeroy framed the result as a proof of concept: the experiment showed that quantum-resistant credentials can be implemented on existing PIV cards and with technology already in use across the agency.

The executive order’s 2030 deadline and industry timelines

An executive order issued earlier this year moved the mandatory federal deadline for completing the post-quantum transition from 2035 to 2030, cutting by more than half the time agencies were originally given to transition their public-key encryption. Major private-sector organizations have set similar timetables; the source notes Google has an internal timeline of 2029 for its encryption switchover. National security officials have cited threats such as "harvest now, decrypt later" in pushing for faster adoption, even as experts quoted in the source say encryption switchovers are often measured in decades.

Technical trade-offs: larger keys, bigger signatures, and weak links like satellites

Post-quantum cryptography, the article notes, tends to require larger keys and signatures and a fast, reliable network connection to move larger volumes of cryptographic data. That creates practical constraints. The source cites satellites as an example of an asset where weaker connections could make some post-quantum approaches problematic. At the same time, Pomeroy emphasized that in many cases agencies can switch to newer algorithms using the same systems, data and devices already in place.

Contractors, testing, and the need for supporting infrastructure

Pomeroy urged continuous testing for bugs and interoperability issues as part of the transition. He said GSA works with contractors to ensure they use post-quantum algorithms "from the start" and that vendors bring the necessary infrastructure to support an agency’s encryption efforts. The GSA effort combined software changes on the card chip with policy, certification and hardware security-module work to make the new credentials operable within existing systems.

Visibility gaps and Vanessa Hunt’s warning

Vanessa Hunt, general manager for federal markets at IBM, told the forum many federal agencies have "blind spots" in their networks — especially where "the sensitivity of the data outlives the approach protecting it." Hunt said the main blind spot is visibility: "I think it's easier to know where our sensitive data lives, it's less easy to know where the cryptography that protects it is." The comment underscores a recurring operational challenge: mapping where cryptography is deployed across datasets, identities, infrastructure and networks so upgrades can be planned and executed.

What this means for technologists, procurement teams, and agency leaders

  • Technologists and security teams: continue hands-on testing for bugs and interoperability and pursue targeted upgrades where existing devices (like PIV cards) can accept post-quantum algorithms.
  • Procurement teams and contractors: implement post-quantum algorithms "from the start" on new contracts and bring the supporting hardware and certifications required to integrate with agency systems.
  • Agency leaders and policymakers: map cryptographic deployments to close visibility gaps and account for assets with constrained networks—satellites being a cited example—while aligning program schedules with the 2030 federal deadline.

GSA’s hands-on work with PIV cards offers a concrete data point: at least for some identity credentials, post-quantum protections can be retrofitted into existing technology stacks. The broader test is less technical than logistical and organizational — can agencies find all the cryptography that needs upgrading, ensure contractors adopt quantum-resistant algorithms from the start, and resolve connectivity constraints before the 2030 deadline compresses the timetable even further?

https://cyberscoop.com/gsa-post-quantum-encryption-piv-cards/