"In the calls, the threat actors are claiming to be representatives from Internal IT, providing the user both verbal and email instructions they claim will stop the flood, but in reality, attempting to compromise the user account, system, or both," the researchers explained.
Fortra FIRE traces a two-stage fraud: mail bombing then IT-impersonation
Researchers at Fortra Intelligence and Research Experts (FIRE) say they are tracking a campaign in which inboxes are deliberately flooded with subscription and registration emails, then exploited by threat actors who call targets over Microsoft Teams while pretending to be internal IT. FIRE described the sequence as a large-scale "mail bombing attack" followed by vishing that attempts to convert the inbox disruption into account and system compromise.
Scale and delivery: peaks of 10k messages per campaign, common use of Mailchimp and Mandrill
FIRE reported that "the average email delivery of a mail bombing attack is at a peak of 10k messages per active campaign, around 1k emails per day." The researchers said Mailchimp and its transactional service Mandrill were the most frequently observed delivery services used in the floods, followed by Amazon SES and SendGrid.

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See what we buildTechnique: automated subscription sign-ups, possible AI agent crawling
According to FIRE, the attacks do not require access to a target mailbox. Instead, an attacker submits a target address to newsletter signups and registration forms across unrelated sites, causing a flood of otherwise normal-looking subscription emails. The team noted there are "some indications that these attacks are likely an AI Agent setup, where the agent is instructed to crawl every webpage available for newsletter subscription boxes." Individual subscription messages may appear legitimate and contain no malicious links, complicating detection.
Operational impact and detection challenges
FIRE warned that the mail floods can interrupt customer service and routine correspondence, and obscure account alerts, payment notifications and other messages that may require attention. The team also observed that phishing attempts have been mixed into the waves; those phishing emails are harder to detect amid the volume of legitimate messages. Allowlist exceptions for email delivery platforms used in the floods can further complicate containment efforts, the researchers said.
Security guidance from FIRE and controls from Mailchimp
FIRE advised security teams to monitor email volume per recipient against a normal baseline and to investigate bursts involving many unrelated senders, subscription wording and mailing-list headers. They recommended confirming the scope and duration of an event directly with the email delivery provider.
During FIRE’s investigation, Mailchimp told the researchers that senders can request temporary subscription blocking for a specified recipient. Mailchimp also documents an automatic control that "restricts an address from joining additional audiences for 24 hours after rapid repeated signups," a provider-side mitigation FIRE flagged as relevant.
What this means for security teams, affected enterprises, and end users
- Security teams: Monitor per-recipient email volume against baselines and inspect mailing-list headers and subscription language to distinguish legitimate bulk mail from coordinated floods. Confirm suspected events with delivery providers to understand whether the traffic originates from a platform feature or mass signups.
- Affected enterprises and procurement leaders: Note the delivery platforms named by FIRE — Mailchimp/Mandrill, Amazon SES, and SendGrid — and engage those providers' controls and abuse channels when floods are observed. Allowlist policies that broadly exempt entire delivery services can increase exposure during a mass-signup event.
- End users: Be wary of unsolicited Teams calls claiming to be internal IT that offer instructions to "stop the flood." FIRE reports these calls as the linkage between the mail-bombing waves and account-compromise attempts; verbal directions and follow-up emails provided in such calls were described as attempts to compromise accounts or systems.
FIRE did not attribute the campaign to any particular group. The investigation highlights a practical attack chain: automated mass signups that drown inboxes in otherwise normal messages, followed by targeted voice-based social engineering via collaboration tools. For organizations, the immediate levers are behavioral detection (monitoring volume and sender diversity), provider coordination (temporary blocks and automatic signup throttles), and user awareness about unsolicited internal-IT calls delivered over Teams.




